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ABSTRACT 
This thesis contains the findings of the empirical studies of the relationship between 
bank risk, corporate governance and bank performance in Africa. Specifically, using 
a sample of 635 banks from 48 countries in Africa (a total of 10795 firm-year 
observations) and corporate governance data collected directly from banks annual 
report, the thesis seeks to examine whether there is a relationship between bank 
risk and bank performance, whether there is a relationship between corporate 
governance and bank risk, whether there is a relationship between corporate 
governance and bank performance, and whether corporate governance moderate 
the relationship between bank risk and bank performance.  
Firstly, using Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) technique, the result 
suggests that bank risk, measured by Loan Loss Provisions to Net Interest Revenue 
(LLPNR) has negative relationship with both accounting measures, Return on 
Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). However, bank risk, measured by Loan 
Loss Reserve to Gross Loan (LLRGL) is insignificantly negative related to both 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE).  
Secondly, the result based on bank risk and corporate governance is mixed. Board 
size is insignificantly negative related with Loan Loss Provisions to Net Interest 
Revenue (LPNR) and significantly negative related with Loan Loss Reserve to 
Gross Loan (LLRGL). Duality is significantly negative related with Loan Loss 
Provisions to Net Interest Revenue LLPNR and insignificantly negative related with 
Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loan (LLRGL). Board meeting is significantly negative 
related with Loan Loss Provisions to Net Interest Revenue (LLPNR) and significantly 
positive related with Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loan (LLRGL). Female directors 
is significantly negative related with Loan Loss Provisions to Net Interest Revenue 
(LLPNR) and significantly positive related with Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loan 
(LLRGL). Finally, independent directors is insignificantly positive related with Loan 
Loss Provisions to Net Interest Revenue (LLPNR) and significantly negative related 
with Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loan (LLRGL). 
Thirdly, the result based on corporate governance and bank performance is mixed. 
Board size and board meetings have significant and negative impact on Return on 
Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). Duality has insignificant positive impact 
on Return on Assets (ROA) and significant negative impact on Return on Equity 
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(ROE). Female directors has significant positive impact on both Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE), while independent directors has insignificant 
negative impact on Return on Assets (ROA) and significant negative impact on 
Return on Equity (ROE).  
Finally, the result suggests that all the five governance variables, board size, duality, 
board meeting, female directors and independent directors, moderate the 
relationship between bank risk and bank performance in Africa.  
Given a dearth of empirical evidence on the relationship between bank risk, 
corporate governance and bank performance, this study seeks to fill the gap and 
contribute to the growing literature by providing new evidence on the relationship 
between bank risk and bank performance, corporate governance and bank risk, 
corporate governance and bank performance, and the joint effect of corporate 
governance and bank risk on bank performance.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
LNTA         Bank size 
MEETINGS          Board meetings 
BSIZE                  Board size 
DUAL                   CEO or role duality 
CEO                     Chief Executive Officer  
COR                     Corruption  
CPI                       Corruption Perception Index  
COST                   Cost-to-income ratio 
EQTA                    Equity/total assets 
FEMALE               Female directors 
GMM                     Generalized method of moments 
LNGDP                  Gross domestic product 
INDEP                   Independent directors 
LLPNR                  Loan loss provisions/net interest revenue 
LLRGL                  Loan loss reserve/gross loans 
NLTA                     Net Loan/Total Assets 
OLS                       Ordinary least squares estimates  
ROA                       Return on assets 
ROE                       Return on equity 
OECD                    The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2SLS                      Two-Stage least squares 
VIF                         Variance Inflation Factor                  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Good corporate governance is important for the success and continuity of 
institutions, hence much attention has been paid to the procedure of such 
governance. It is being recognised everywhere that good governance is important 
for corporate performance. Corporate governance is therefore currently an 
important concept worldwide (Crowther & Seifi, 2010). In the same way, bank risk 
has become an important issue in financial institutions in both developed and 
developing countries, particularly in the light of the recent financial turmoil. The profit 
of shareholders and the success of banks depend on how management of these 
banks manage the bank risks. Therefore, the corporate governance of banks can 
determine the success of the management of risks of banks which can determine 
the performance of the banks. The literature on corporate governance is widely 
covered in developed countries as compared to the developing countries, especially 
in Africa. In the UK there has been a succession of codes on corporate governance 
dating back to the Cadbury Report in 1992. All companies reporting on the London 
Stock Exchange are required to comply with the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance, which came into effect in 2003 (Crowther and Seifi, 2003). A significant 
number of research discuss issues around bank risk, corporate governance and 
bank performance with focused on developed countries. Few of them are done in 
Africa especially in banking. Like developed countries, issues related to bank risk, 
corporate governance and bank performance affect socio economic development 
of developing countries like Africa. Therefore a study on bank risk, corporate 
governance and bank performance in Africa is very relevant. This research intends 
to use bank risk and different corporate governance and bank performance 
measures to apply in African banks to find out if what other researchers have done 
is applicable in Africa.      
The research hopes to achieve four main objectives. They are, (1) to investigates 
the relationship that exists between bank risk and bank performance in Africa (2) to 
find out the relationship that exists between bank risk and corporate governance in 
Africa (3) to investigate the relationship that exists between corporate governance 
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and bank performance in Africa (4) to explore the moderating effect of corporate 
governance on the relationship between bank risk and bank performance in Africa.  
To achieve the aim and objectives of this research, a sample of 635 banks have 
been selected from 48 countries in Africa. Secondary source of information is used 
and data on bank risk, corporate governance and bank performance are drawn from 
some data sources such as BankScope, Orbis bank focus, Boardex, World Bank 
and the banks annual report for corporate governance information. Panel data from 
2000 to 2016 is used for the analysis. 
1.1 Background of the study 
There is a good diversification of financial institutions in Africa. The Republic of 
South Africa and parts of North Africa have quite developed banking sector with 
modern banking system and active stock market. Other parts of Africa have poor 
banking system and many households do not have access to banking services, and 
there is either non-existence of the stock market or a very small number of listed 
companies trade in shares (Andrianova et al, 2015). One distinct feature of Africa is 
that corruption level varies and contract enforcement quality shows that there is 
likelihood of substantial variation in the behaviour of banking (Andrianova et al, 
2015). The greater part of Africa is characterised with common patterns which 
makes the continent different from other part of the world. One of the safe assets in 
Africa is treasury bills which attract banks in Africa that operate in environment 
where risky loans are many. It is interesting to note that loans to the private 
organisations pose the same risk as loans to the state-owned enterprises 
(Andrianova, et al, 2015). Due to many different languages in Africa and the 
absence of inter-ethnic trust can cause inter-ethnic transactions cost to be high in 
addition to degree of market segmentation (Robinson, 2016). It is important to know 
that commercial banks which operate in Africa are prone to loans default which 
result to failures (Andrianova, 2015). This default risk is one of the major risks faced 
by banks in Africa which impact negatively on bank performance on the continent. 
Therefore, effective risk management strategies of this risk and other important risks 
faced by the banks in Africa are required. 
On the corporate governance side, the separation of ownership and management 
in an organisation calls for attention to be given to corporate governance in both 
developed and developing countries (Okeahalam, 2004). Developing countries like 
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Africa in particular, corporate governance in the financial institutions is very essential 
since it causes better management and assists banks with weak corporate 
governance structures to mobilise funds and help them to attract foreign investors 
(Okpara, 2011) 
Once good corporate governance practices are achieved within the banks in Africa, 
in effect, risk in the banks can be managed well and a better performance of the 
banks could be achieved. However, there is still a problem with risk management 
within the banks in Africa and corporate governance is an issue as it is still 
developing not just in the banking sector but non-banking firms as well.  Africa is 
characterised with transitional economy and some of the main unique problems are 
corruption, there is no transparency in the business environment, financial 
intermediation is low and majority of the enterprises are state-owned (Okeahalam, 
2004). Africa is also being affected by political and legal challenges, which impact 
negatively on the sound corporate governance on the continent. For instance, in 
Nigeria, the supervision and enforcement of the rules still remains a challenge and 
the judicial supervision which includes the court have failed, despite the existence 
of laws, processes and penalties for violations. There are legal and political 
challenges on corporate governance including legal framework dominated by 1969 
Companies code and absence of enforcement of relevant laws (Okeahalam, 2004). 
Moreover, Register of Companies in Kenya does not have enough resources to 
monitor the registered companies effectively, according to Okeahalam (2004). One 
other major problem which negatively impact on effective corporate governance in 
Africa according to Okeahalam (2004) that needs mentioning and addressing is the 
problem of undisclosed payments and bribes. Also, in South Africa, despite the 
rigorous regulations on insider trading listing rules, the implementation and 
enforcement of these rules and regulation is very weak (Ntim, 2013). 
1.2 Motivation, problem and the need for the study  
Most of African economies are still underdeveloped. The researcher argues, that 
one way to develop these economies is to develop the banking sector. Once the 
banking sector is sound and strong, it can boast the socio-economic development 
of the continent. Some of the positive results will be employment creation and 
reduction of poverty. It is a fact that one way of developing the banking sector in 
Africa is to ensure an effective risk management and ensuring sound corporate 
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governance within the banks. This gives a good motivating factor for conducting a 
research on bank risk, corporate governance and bank performance in Africa. 
Therefore, conducting a research on bank risk, corporate governance and bank 
performance in Africa is important in identifying the main issues in risk and corporate 
governance within the banks in Africa in order for the regulatory bodies to find the 
appropriate measures to curb the problems in order to improve performance of 
these banks.  
There are few empirical studies on bank risk, banks corporate governance and bank 
performance. There is evidence that the few empirical studies especially on 
corporate governance focus on non-African firms, according to Abor and Fiador 
(2013). Most of the countries in Africa are emerging economies and corporate 
governance is still developing within firms including banks. On the other hand, the 
banking sector in Africa is not fully developed as those in the developed countries. 
Banking risk is the main issue which affects the performance of the banks in Africa 
just like those in the developed countries. The majority of the countries in Africa are 
colonies of some of the developed countries including Britain and France. As a 
result, these African countries do certain things in common with their colonial 
masters. In view of this, some of the banking practices and corporate governance 
regulations being used in these African countries are expected to be borrowed from 
the developed countries of their colonial masters. Therefore, it will be interesting to 
conduct a research to get a picture of bank risk corporate governance and bank 
performance in Africa.  
Cross-country studies on bank risk, corporate governance and bank performance 
are very limited not just only in Africa but across developed countries in Europe, 
America and the emerging economies in Asia as well. The few studies on bank risk, 
corporate governance and bank performance in Africa only focus on single country 
and do not give a broader picture on the relationship between bank risk, corporate 
governance and bank performance of the whole continent of Africa. According to 
OECD (2015) report on African Economic Outlook, Africa still remains a region with 
most difficult business environment. Therefore, it is very motivating to conduct a 
research to know how some of these corporate governance issues are impacting on 
the risk and performance within the banks in Africa. 
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Another motivation factor to this study is the theoretical contribution that this study 
may add to the debate on bank risk, corporate governance and bank performance. 
The contribution may not add to the debate on bank risk, corporate governance and 
bank performance in Africa alone but towards a general knowledge on banking risk, 
corporate governance and bank performance. This contribution will be beneficial to 
both academics and non-academics who are interested in issues and debate on 
bank risk, corporate governance and bank performance  in general, and Africa in 
specific, hence, the call for this study.  
The problem: The problem of bank risk and corporate governance remains one of 
the major threats to the banks’ profitability in Africa. There are many gaps within the 
literature in these areas in Africa. In the first place, to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, the literature on bank risk, corporate governance and bank performance 
in Africa is scanty or non-existence. To date, there are many studies on corporate 
governance, yet only a few papers focus on banks’ corporate governance (e.g., 
Adams and Mehran, 2005; Caprio et al., 2007; Levine, 2004; Macey and O’Hara, 
2003), even though the key aspects of corporate governance can be applied to 
banks. The majority of these studies focus on developed and Asian Countries (for 
example Aebi, Sabato, & Schmid, 2012, Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2013) with very 
little focus on Africa. Therefore, there is the need to study bank risk, corporate 
governance and bank performance in Africa.  
Secondly, even though different studies have reported on different issues about 
bank risk, corporate governance and bank performance, there are still some areas 
that have been given little attention. Some of these areas are the relationship 
between bank risk and corporate governance, the relationship between bank risk 
and bank performance, the relationship between corporate governance and bank 
performance, and the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship 
between bank risk and bank performance. All these areas are fertile grounds which 
need further research in Africa.  
Thirdly, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, in Africa, the literature on the 
moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between bank risk 
and bank performance is almost nil. Whether there is a positive or negative effect of 
moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between bank risk 
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and bank performance in Africa still remains a big question, hence the need to 
conduct a research in this area.   
Fourthly, few research on bank risk, corporate governance and bank performance 
in Africa do not give a broader picture. The reason is that, they concentrate on either 
small sample size or a single country study. Therefore, there is a need to embark 
on cross country studies using large sample to determine broader picture on the 
relationship that exists between bank risk and bank performance, corporate 
governance and bank risk, corporate governance and bank performance, and the 
moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between bank risk 
and bank performance in Africa.  
1.3 Research questions and contributions 
The main research questions are as follows:  
Firstly, what is the relationship between bank risk and bank performance in Africa? 
Secondly, what is the relationship between bank risk and corporate governance in 
Africa? Specifically, is there positive, negative or no relationship between bank risk 
and corporate governance in Africa? Or how does corporate governance impact on 
bank risk in Africa? Thirdly, what is the relationship between corporate governance 
and bank performance in Africa? Specifically, how do internal corporate governance 
structures affect bank performance in Africa? Do internal corporate governance 
structures within African banks increase or decrease the performance of African 
banks or the internal corporate governance structures have no impact on the 
performance of African banks at all? Finally, what is the moderating effect of 
corporate governance on the relationship between bank risk and bank performance 
in Africa? Specifically, we know that corporate governance affect bank performance, 
so how does corporate governance moderate the relationship between bank risk 
and bank performance? 
After addressing the above mentioned research questions, this study can contribute 
to the existing literature in a number of ways. Firstly, this study contributes to the 
existing literature by extending the debate on bank risk, corporate governance and 
bank performance. Secondly, unlike the majority of other studies that look at one or 
two areas, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first cross country 
study that combines data on African bank risk, corporate governance and bank 
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performance. And by using data on African bank risk and bank performance, this 
study offers the first time cross country study in Africa that gives evidence on the 
relationship between bank risk and bank performance in Africa. Therefore, this study 
intends to show how African bank performance is affected by bank risk. Thirdly, by 
using data on African banks internal corporate governance structures and bank 
performance, this study portrays a new evidence on the relationship between 
corporate governance and bank performance in Africa. Therefore, this study gives 
a new evidence on how internal corporate governance structures within African 
banks assist in reducing or enhancing the bank performance. Fourthly, unlike single 
country studies, this study combines data on bank risk, corporate governance and 
bank performance in many different countries in Africa. As a result, it gives a new 
evidence on the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship 
between bank risk and bank performance. Therefore this study closes the gab in the 
existing literature on the moderating effect of corporate governance on the 
relationship between bank risk and bank performance in Africa. Fifthly, this study 
can assist both academics and non-academics who are interested in finding 
information about bank risk, corporate governance or bank performance in Africa. 
Investors may use the findings from this study to understand African banks. The 
findings can assist them to diversify their investment portfolios. Banks on the other 
hand can use the findings from this study to make the right choices about bank risk 
issues, appointment of boards of directors, and best governance structures to 
increase bank performance.  
1.4 Thesis organisation 
This research is divided into ten chapters. The remaining of the work is organised 
as follows: the first part of chapter two define corporate governance, the second part 
of chapter two discusses corporate governance in Africa which is followed by some 
challenges of corporate governance in Africa. Chapter three discusses the detailed 
theoretical review. The first part of chapter three presents the main theories related 
to this research, namely Agency, resource dependency and stewardship theories. 
The remaining of chapter three talks about the theoretical literature review. Chapter 
four presents the empirical literature review of the study. Chapter five presents the 
research design and methodology of the whole work. Data sources, criteria for 
sample selection, measurement of all variables and explanation of control variables 
are all detailed in this chapter. Chapter five also discusses the OLS assumptions 
and presents the descriptive statistics. Chapters six, seven, eight and nine present 
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the empirical results of the relationship between bank risk and bank performance, 
the relationship between corporate governance and bank risk, the relationship 
between corporate governance and bank performance, and moderation effect of 
corporate governance on the relationship between bank risk and bank performance 
respectively. Chapter ten presents the conclusion and recommendations of the 
study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
DEFINITION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 
2 Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to provide a recognised definition of corporate governance 
and to discuss the main models identified within the corporate governance literature. 
The chapter also presents the details of the corporate governance codes of four 
African countries namely, Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. The chapter also 
gives brief description of corporate governance in banks. Finally, this chapter 
outlines some of the main challenges of corporate governance in Africa.   
2.1 Definition of corporate governance 
Corporate governance according to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) deals with the way 
in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return 
on their investment. After the recent financial crises, corporate governance has 
become an important issue in organisations. The governance of banking has 
received considerable attention because majority of people consider banks to be 
the main cause of recent financial turmoil. The concept of corporate governance is 
very popular in the business world. The returns from investment activities by 
shareholders of a firm rely partly on corporate governance of the firm, as a result, 
corporate governance is very vital to shareholders and stakeholders.  
The available literature define corporate governance either in a narrowly or broadly 
way. Cadbury Report (1992) define corporate governance as ‘the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled’. Organsisation for Economic Corporation 
and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) also defines 
corporate governance as ‘a set of relationships between a company’s management, 
its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders’. Moreover, one broader definition 
which is embodied in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (2006) 
guidance is taken from Leventis et al (2013) and states that   
‘’a banking industry perspective, corporate governance involves the manner in 
which the business and affairs of banks are governed by the board of directors and 
senior management which, inter alia, affects how they: (1) set corporate objectives; 
(2) operate the bank’s business on a day-to-day basis; (3) meet the obligation of 
accountability to their shareholders and take into account the interests of other 
recognized stakeholders (including, inter alia, supervisors, governments and 
  
22 
  
depositors); (4) align corporate activities and behaviour with the expectation that 
banks will operate in a safe and sound manner and in compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations; and (5) protect the interests of depositors’’. Again, corporate 
governance has also been viewed broadly by Schleifer and Vishny (1997) as 
‘corporate governance deals with the ways where by finance suppliers to 
corporations assure themselves of receiving a return on their investment’.  
The question is, what constitute a good governance? In 1992, World Bank defined 
a good governance as the manner in which power is exercised in the management 
of a country’s economic and social resources for development. International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (2019) also looks at a good governance as ‘’a broad concept 
covering all aspects of how a country is governed, including its economic policies, 
regulatory framework, and adherence to rule of law’’. A good governance can also 
be described as bureaucratic quality (Reinsberg et al., 2018). The distinction 
between the IMF and Reinsberg good governance is that IMF looks at good 
governance as the one with transparency of government accounts, stability and 
transparency of the economic and regulatory environment for private sector activity, 
and the effectiveness of public resource management, and the stability and 
transparency of the economic and regulatory environment for private sector activity 
(IMF, 1997). Reinsberg et al., (2018) bureaucratic quality on the other hand is 
measured by perception-based indicator from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). This scores high in ‘’ countries where bureaucracy has the power and 
experts to govern with no drastic changes in policy or interruptions in services of 
government. Moreover, bureaucracy to some extent tends to be autonomous from 
political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training 
(Reinsberg et al., 2018).  
We now see different types of definitions of corporate governance, the choice of 
definition is very important since this can affect the structure, focus and 
interpretation of the subsequent analysis (Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010). Based 
on the above definitions, it can be established that the emphasis is on shareholders 
and management. The management are employed by shareholders to manage 
corporations to bring maximum returns for the shareholders and for the benefit of all 
other stakeholders. The main concern in the corporate governance concept is how 
the management manage corporations with the interest of the shareholders in mind 
to bring the maximum returns expected by the shareholders and stakeholders. This 
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brings about agency problems which has been a big debate within the corporate 
governance theory.  
  
2.2 Models of corporate governance 
This section discusses the main models of corporate governance within the 
available literature. The main models of corporate governance identified within the 
extant literature are the shareholding and the stakeholding models. 
 
2.2.1 The shareholding model 
This is the corporate governance model which was originally practiced by US and 
the UK and it is now being practiced in other parts of the world especially the 
commonwealth countries. The shareholding model posits that the maximisation of 
profit through allocative, productivity and dynamic efficiency is the objective of the 
firm (Maher and Andersson, 1999, Letza et al, 2004). In this model the performance 
is based on the market value (shareholder value) of the firm. The model also posits 
that shareholders are the owners of corporations and for that matter they incur 
greater part of risk, therefore, the main responsibility of corporate managers is to 
increase the wealth of shareholders (Daily et al, 2003; Ahmad and Omar, 2016; 
Nwanji and Howell, 2007). Under this model, the shareholders are represented by 
board of directors and their main function is to safeguard the interest of the 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bottenberg et 
al, 2017).  
Although some single-tiered boards have executive and nom-executive directors, 
the board of directors in shareholding model is normally single-tiered and primarily, 
the board of directors in this model compose of non-executive directors and these 
directors are elected by the shareholders (Weimer and Pape, 1999; Ahmad and 
Omar, 2016). In this model the underlying issue of corporate governance comes 
from the relationship between the principals who are the shareholders and the 
agents who manage the firm for the principals. This issue arises from the separation 
of beneficial ownership and executives who make decisions. The owners of the firm 
are the shareholders, therefore it is the fiduciary duty of the managers to act in the 
best interest of the shareholders (Letza et al, 2004). However, the behaviour of the 
firm deviates from the maximisation of profit ideal due to this separation of 
ownership and executives who make decisions (Maher and Andersson, 1999). This 
arises because the interest of the principal and the agents differs anytime there is a 
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separation of ownership and control. Management are not the owners of the 
business, therefore, they do not pay the entire cost or enjoy the entire benefit of their 
decisions. As a result, the interest and objectives of the management may be 
different, such as for instance attachment to a particular investment projects or 
maximising their salary, although the interest of the investors is to maximise the 
value of shareholders (Maher and Andersson, 1999).  
The main issue of the shareholding model is the principal-agent problem (Letza et 
al, 2004; Ahmad and Omar, 2016; Franks and Mayer, 1997) and the issue is whether 
the management can protect the interest of the shareholders effectively under the 
current institutional arrangement. This principal-agent problem was developed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) among others in the 1970s (Letza et al, 2004). Because 
few directors and managers are delegated by the shareholders to control and run 
the firm for the shareholders, the possible risk is that the directors and the managers 
will serve their own interest at the expense of the shareholders (Letza et al, 2004; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the managers are basically not trustworthy 
individuals and for that matter they must be monitored. The two main problems 
which occur in agency relationship which the agency theory is concerned are, first, 
it is harder and expensive for the performance of the agent to be known by the 
principal, it is impossible for the principal to verify that the agents behave in 
appropriate manner. Secondly, because the attitude towards risk of the principals 
may be different from that of the agents, the two may prefer different actions (Letza 
et al, 2004; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Some say that the 
agency problem was initially identified by Adams Smith in 1776 who noted that joint 
stock company directors are not expected to be vigilant and cannot handle other 
people’s money as they are with their own (Letza et al, 2004). The 20th century has 
seen a more serious and wider agency problems since the separation of ownership 
and control  raised the power of managers who are professionals and allow them to 
pursue their own interest for free (Letza, 2004; Berle and Means, 1932).  
The shareholding model offers some suggested solutions to deal with the agency 
problems. One solution is to find an efficient contract to govern the principal and the 
agency relationship and the best incentive scheme to align the managers’ behaviour 
while having the interest of the owners (Bottenberg et al, (2017; Letza et al, 2004; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The second solution to resolve the agency problem is 
to introduce an incentive systems purposely for rewarding the managers, removal 
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of restrictions on the market and introduction of voluntary governance code (Ntim, 
2009).   
 
One of the characteristics of the shareholding model is its arm’s length relationship 
between the shareholders and the corporations (Weimer and Pape, 1999; Ahmad 
and Omar, 2016; Franks and Mayer, 1997). Another characteristics of the 
shareholder-oriented countries according to Bottenberg et al, (2017) is, that the 
shareholder rights are strongly protected, and in particular, it covers people who 
hold only minority shares. In the shareholder oriented countries, during control over 
decisions and assets, other stakeholders of the firm normally have fewer claims 
(Van Essen et al, 2013; Bottenberg et al, 2017). Other more features of shareholding 
model are outlined in table one.  
2.2.1.1 Criticisms of the shareholding model 
Although the shareholding model is dominantly used by the developed countries of 
Britain and America, and the developing countries of the common Wealth, the model 
suffers from some weaknesses. In the first place, some argue that this Anglo-
American model, due to the market pressures, is flawed by over concern with short-
termism, thus market price and expenditures are all short-term, return on investment 
and corporate profit are also short-term, while management performance is also 
short term (Letza et al, 2004).  Thus one main challenge of corporate governance 
is that the arrangements of the current institutions allow managers to forgo long-
term value and concentrate on short-term profit return (Letza et al, 2004). Another 
criticism of the shareholding model was made in the 1930s by Merrick Dodd who 
suggested that businesses and managers of firms have a duty for the society 
beyond the interest of the owners and for that matter have to engage in social 
responsibility (Dodd, 1932; Bottenberg et al, 2017). Moreover, with the shareholder 
approach, the analytical focus on how to resolve corporate governance problem is 
very narrow, according to Maher and Andersson (1999). The main concern of 
corporate governance with this approach is focused on the alignment of interest 
between shareholders and managers and with making sure that the flow of external 
capital to the firms. However, shareholders are not the only people who invest in the 
corporation. Success and competitiveness of a corporation are the outcome of 
teamwork that involves contributions from various providers of resources which 
include employees, suppliers, investors, distributors, customers and creditors. 
Therefore, corporate governance and economic performance are affected by 
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relationships within these different stakeholders in the firm (Maher and Andersson, 
1999).  
 
2.2.2 Stakeholding model 
This model is used in countries such as Germany, Japan, France and Asian 
countries. Stakeholding model claims that corporate governance concerns 
management and directors managing on behalf of stakeholders which involved 
attention to more than maximising the wealth of shareholder (Nwanji and Howell, 
2007). Therefore, according to this model, apart from shareholders, corporations 
are responsible to a wider constituency of stakeholders (Maher and Andersson, 
1999). Unlike the shareholding model, the stakeholding model encourages firms to 
include the interest of all stakeholders who can affect or be affected by the success 
of the firm (Ntim, 2009). Based on the stakeholding model, the absence of 
stakeholder participation in running public corporation and the separation of 
ownership and control in public organisations brings about governance problem 
(Ntim, 2009). Customers, employees, creditors and suppliers are part of the other 
stakeholders. Social constituents is another group of stakeholders and they include 
local and national government, environmental interest, people in the community in 
which the firm is sited, and the society as a whole. The view of this model is that 
corporations and institutions which are socially responsible and they must be 
managed in the interest of the public (Maher and Andersson, 1999). In this model, 
performance is judged based on a broader constituency interest in employment, 
financial performance, market share, and development in trading relations with 
customers and suppliers (Maher and Andersson, 1999).  
There are three categories of this theory namely normative, instrumental and 
descriptive. The categories are based on their approaches in research (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Letza et al, 2004) but the two main types are normative and 
instrumental stakeholder theories. While normative stakeholder theory views 
stakeholders as ‘ends’, the instrumental stakeholder theory views stakeholders as 
‘means’ and it is interested in how the value of stakeholders can be used to improve 
corporate efficiency and performance (Letza et al, 2004). The normative stakeholder 
theory originated from the conception of social entity of corporations. It sees modern 
corporations as something which possesses large scale and scope which require 
unique professional management capability and a huge amount of capital 
investments. Share ownership in firms become dispersed and fragmented and 
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shareholders have turned to be investors instead of owners through stock markets 
(Letza et al, 2004). Public corporations must be mindful of its social responsibilities 
including social justice, fairness and employees protection, because firms are 
involve in various aspects of social life which affect several people in welfare and 
possible risks (Letza et al, 2004). In this case, firms have become independent 
entities with their own properties, responsibilities, and purpose (Allen, 1992; Letza 
et al, 2004). Under the Stakeholder-oriented governance system, different 
stakeholder groups rights are more equally distributed (Bottenberg et al, 2017).  
One of the criticisms of the stakeholder model is that it is difficult to make sure that 
corporations achieve their broader objectives (Maher and Andersson, 1999). 
However, Blair (1995) argues against this notion and explains that the argument 
failed to provide clear guidance to directors and managers to set priorities and 
decide beneficial use of corporate resources and supply no means to make sure 
that corporations perform their responsibilities. Therefore, some proponents of 
corporate governance reforms including academics and policymakers still support 
this model. Some other criticisms about the stakeholder model recorded by Ntim 
(2009) are (1) the model gives no effective standard against which corporate agents 
will be able to judge (2) the stakeholding model has been criticised as being 
incompatible with the notion of corporate governance and (3) sometimes the model 
is seen to be vague and also not compatible with the business concept. However 
the model offers some solutions to the agency problems including offering trust and 
long-term contractual links between the stakeholders and the firm; employee 
participation; offering of interfirm co-operation and by introducing business ethics 
(Ntim, 2009).  
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Table 1: Outline of theoretical assumptions and features of Shareholding 
versus Stakeholding corporate governance models 
Key point Shareholding model Stakeholding model 
Theoretical assumptions   
Background Ownership is separate from 
control  
Different capitalism style 
Corporation purpose  Shareholders value 
maximisation 
Stakeholders’ wealth 
maximisation 
Economic organisation Rational economic unit 
associated with profit motive 
Social economic unit 
associated with stakeholder 
motive of stakeholder 
welfare 
Governance problem Agency problem Stakeholder participation is 
absence 
Source of discipline  External market force Internal social forces 
Cause of problem Control of shareholders is 
limited  
Failure of governance to 
represent the interest of 
stakeholders’ 
Proposition  Economic market efficiency Economic social efficiency 
Main features   
Structure of board Executive and non-
executive board (one tier) 
Executive and supervisory 
boards (two-tier) 
Bank’s role Low  High 
Origin/legal system Anglo-American/common 
law: US, UK, 
Commonwealth 
Continental Europe/Civil 
law: Japan, France, 
Germany 
Main Source of finance Bank’s debt  Capital market equity  
Role of capital markets   High Low  
Concentration of ownership  Low  High  
Time limit of economic 
benefits  
Short term Long term  
Regulatory orientation  Self-regulated Statutory regulation  
Source: Ntim (2009) 
 
2.3 Corporate governance in banks 
The attention to the corporate governance in the banking industry has increased in 
recent years, especially after the recent financial crisis. Even though there are many 
studies on corporate governance, a few of them focus on corporate governance in 
banks (for example Anderson and Campbell, 2004; Caprio et al, 2007, Andres and 
Vallelado, 2008; Vasudev and Guerrero, 2014; John et al, 2016). The issue is that 
many aspects of the corporate governance can be applied to banks.  In view of this, 
the attention to the necessity to study, understand and enhance the corporate 
governance in the financial services industry has been called by the Basel 
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Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (Andres and Vallelado, 2008). The 
fundamental message of the BCBS is the belief that monitoring efficiency increases 
by a good corporate governance. John et al, (2016) posit that, banks possess 
special characteristics that impact and interact with the mechanisms of governance. 
Banking industry is complex in nature and its governance can be said to be different 
from nonfinancial companies. John et al, (2016) mention that the complexity nature 
of banks activities, bank regulations, conflict of interest between debtholders and 
shareholders, and opacity are the main characteristics that make the governance of 
banks different from nonfinancial companies.  
There are other studies that have examined the corporate governance in banks and 
how they are different from the nonfinancial companies (Mulbert, 2010; Becht et al, 
2011, Leaven, 2013; Hopt, 2013). These studies have provided some examinations 
into the unique characteristics of banks which have given rise to the structures of 
bank governance that make them different. The first feature is high leverage. It is 
not uncommon for banks leverage to be more than 90 percent, high leverage of 
banks is one of the special characteristics that makes them different (Mulbert, 2010; 
Berger and Bouwman, 2013; DeAngelo and Stulz, 2015; John et al, 2016). In 
average, the leverage of banks ranges from 87 to 95 percent (Gornall and 
Strebulaev, 2014; John et al, 2016). John et al, (2016) argue that the probability of 
banks failures increases as a result of their high leverage levels. Another feature is 
that the main providers of capital to banks are debtholders and depositors (John et 
al, 2016).  Also, due to the special attributes of banks, Laeven (2013) argues that 
there is a probability of agency costs to be more evident in financial institutions. 
The next unique feature that makes the governance of banks significant is the 
opacity and the complex nature of banking assets (Mulbert, 2010; John, 2016). The 
balance sheets of banks are more opaque compared to the other firms and the loan 
quality of banks is not readily observable compared to physical assets of industrial 
firms such as machinery which is easily discernible (Mulbert, 2010). The opacity 
nature of banks makes it tough for banks themselves to assess the riskiness of other 
banks accurately and the results of this is the cause of the financial crises in 2008 
(Mulbert, 2010). Some argue that information asymmetry in banks are more 
essential (Becht et al, 2011; leaven, 2013). Another feature of banks according to 
Mulbert (2010) is, that banks are interconnected among themselves since they 
engage major part of their business with other banks. Therefore, unlike the industrial 
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firms, the competitors of banks are also very important partners of their business. 
This situation in banking causes what is known as counterparty risk because the 
problem of one bank can quickly affect the other bank, the situation is prone to 
contagion (Mulbert, 2010). Moreover, there are high regulations banks must follow 
because of their importance on one hand and vulnerability on the other (Mulbert, 
2010). For instance, there is a limit on how much risk a bank can take. 
The discussion of corporate governance of banks will not be completed without 
mentioning the corporate governance mechanisms in banks. There are different 
kinds of corporate governance mechanisms which have been studied by different 
academics. Some of them are board size, board meetings, the presence of 
independent directors on a bank board, gender diversity of a bank board, and CEO 
duality. Some other corporate governance mechanisms in banks also include the 
presence of chief risk officer on a board, risk committee, busy board, CEO incentives 
and many more. Like the nonfinancial firms, banks characteristics such as return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and risk have been used to find out how 
corporate governance impact on them.  For example, board size has been used by 
many different authors (Chahine and Safieddine, 2011; Nakano and Nguyen, 2012; 
Adams and Mehran, 2012; Liang et al, 2013; Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2015; 
Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Salim et al, 2016; O’Sullivan, 2016). Board independent 
has been used by Pathan et al, (2007), Yeh, et al, (2011), Adams and Mehran 
(2012), Pathan and Faff (2013), Lian et al, (2013), while CEO duality has also been 
used by many authors to find the relationship with other variables (for example 
Grove et al, 2011; Carty and Weiss, 2012; Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2013; Bukair 
and Rahman 2015). Following the existing literature and based on the availability of 
data, this study employs five corporate governance mechanisms to answer the 
corporate governance research questions. The five variables are board size, board 
independence, role duality, female directors and board meetings.  
2.4 Corporate governance in Africa 
This section discusses the corporate governance in Africa. The objective of this 
section is to give a picture of the corporate governance being practiced by some 
selected countries in Africa. Although this study collects data from 48 countries in 
Africa to answer the research questions, it is not possible to discuss the corporate 
governance of all the 48 countries, due to availability of time and information. As a 
result, four countries have been selected for this discussion. However, at least one 
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country has been selected from Northern (Egypt), Southern (South Africa), Eastern 
(Kenya), and Western (Nigeria) part of Africa. As a result of the many corporate 
scandals around the world, the call for attention to be put on corporate governance 
in organisations has increased. In addition, there is the need for good corporate 
governance in listed and unlisted firms not only in Africa but the entire globe. In the 
western countries, there are corporate governance codes which firms must follow 
and adhere to. For instance, in the UK, there is corporate governance code, formerly 
known as the Combined Code, which sets out standards of good practice for 
companies to follow. In Europe, there is European Union corporate governance 
rules which companies in member states must adhere to, while there is corporate 
governance rules in the US and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) - Corporate 
Governance Guide which companies must also comply with such rules. In Africa, 
there are some countries which have already produced and published national 
corporate governance codes, which companies should follow and adhere to. Details 
of four corporate governance codes of these African countries are revealed to shed 
light on the corporate governance in Africa. Although the information provided here 
come from only four countries, it gives a good picture of corporate governance 
practices and the level of corporate governance development of the whole Africa. 
The main themes of each code of the selected countries (Egypt, South Africa, Kenya 
and Nigeria) which are relevant to this study are presented below.  
2.4.1 Guide to Corporate Governance Regulations and Standards in Egypt 
(March 2011) 
This document is compiled and summarised from European Corporate governance 
Institute, available at www.ecgi.org. The original language of this guide is in Arabic 
and this was translated and published in 2016. This corporate governance 
regulations and standards in Egypt addresses the corporate governance principles 
in the country. These principles are the rules, systems and procedures for the 
achievement of protection and balance between the interests of the shareholders, 
board of directors, management of companies and all other stakeholders who are 
affected by the companies. These regulations are applicable to joint stock 
companies which are listed on Egyptian Stock Exchange and listed and unlisted 
financial institutions. The regulations are also applicable to companies that are 
structured as joint stock companies where their ownership is distributed among a 
large number of owners and companies that rely on financial institutions for their 
funding. In addition, closed or family-held joint stock companies and limited liability 
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companies also have to adhere to these rules as much as is possible.  In case it is 
impossible for family-held joint stock companies or limited liability companies to 
comply with the governance regulations, they are supposed to apply other 
alternatives that have lower costs and are more suitable to their financial and 
managerial capabilities where the alternatives should achieve the same results 
aimed by these regulations. Due to many benefits achieved by the companies that 
implement this guidelines and the overall investment climate, it is anticipated that 
companies and their management, board of directors and shareholders will 
implement these regulations and comply with them. Similar to the UK corporate 
governance rule, the Egyptians companies are required to apply all the regulations 
of this guide and if a company could not apply any of the regulations, the reason (s) 
why they could not apply must be explained. 
Board of directors: The regulation requires the company’s board to be in charge 
of managing the company based on the authorisation of the general assembly. 
Every board member is considered as a representative of all shareholders and must 
commit to work in the best interest of the company in every event. It is a requirement 
that the contract of executive members should not exceed three years. In case this 
happens, the reason must be disclosed in the annual general assembly where this 
can be renewed for longer periods. 
The regulation advises the board to monitor the company’s general situation closely 
and should never delegate this task to others. Since board of directors need access 
to information and data in order to do their job effectively, the regulation urges 
companies to allow board members to have access to information and data anytime 
they demand for it and irrespective of the format they specify. It tasks the secretary 
of the board to serve as a link between the management of the company and the 
members of the board. 
The regulation requires the board to prepare annual report and present to the 
shareholders and should specify the following, in addition to what is required by law: 
(1) a comprehensive overview about the company’s operational and financial 
Status; (2) prospective vision of the company’s activities for the coming year; (3) 
subsidiaries’ activities and operational status (if any); (4) summary about changes 
in the company’s capital structure; (5) the extent of compliance with monitoring and 
applying the Corporate Governance Regulations, including adequate information 
about the board and its various committees; (6) the company’s Corporate Social 
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Responsibility (CSR) activities. In addition, the board should set a training plan for 
its members which must include training on corporate governance regulations.  
Board size and meetings: In terms of board size, the regulation requires Egyptian 
boards to have a minimum of five board members. The code requires all newly 
appointed board members to have adequate information and data with explanation 
to assist them to familiarise themselves with every aspect of the company to help 
them to perform their duties efficiently. With regards to board meetings, the 
regulation requires company boards in Egypt to meet at least every three months. 
Companies are required to disclose the number of board meetings and names of 
people who absent themselves from board meetings or board committee meetings 
in their annual report. Arrangements, date and time of the meetings shall be 
convenient for board members to attend. The regulation allows non-executive and 
independent board members to meet company managers to discuss issues with or 
without presence of the executive board members.  
CEO/Chairman: Unlike the other international codes such as the UK governance 
code that requires companies to separate the chairman and CEO role, this code in 
Egypt makes this rule a bit relaxed. The regulation in Egypt requires companies’ 
board to appoint chairman and managing director if they prefer not to have one 
person holding the two positions. The regulation requires the reasons to be 
documented in the company’s annual report when this occurs, and independent 
deputy chairman should be appointed to chair board meetings that discuss and 
evaluate performance of the board. The regulation sets the main role of the 
chairman and the managing director. While the chairman is in charge of managing 
the board of directors and achieving its goals, the managing director is responsible 
for managing the company and reporting to the board regularly. The regulation 
makes it the responsibility of the chairman to ensure that board members and 
various committees are familiar with the Corporate Governance Regulations and the 
methods of their application in Egypt.   
However, the regulation in Egypt advises that the evaluation of the board members 
should be the responsibility of the chairman using specialised bodies or by himself. 
Such evaluation is never disclosed to a third-party but can be used to identify board 
members training needs, taking decision for board restructuring, or for improving the 
board’s performance.  
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Independent directors: The code urges companies to have the majority of their 
members to be independent non-executives. The alternative is that at least two 
thirds of the board members should be independent who have technical or analytical 
skills to benefit both the board and the company.  The regulation urges companies 
in Egypt to form audit committee and must be formed from non-executive members 
and at least one independent member. The members of the audit committee should 
be at least three independent members and one should be expert in finance and 
accounting.  
 
2.4.2 PRINCIPLES FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN KENYA 
This document is obtained and summarised from European Corporate governance 
Institute, available at www.ecgi.org. This document, principles of corporate 
governance 2002, was prepared by the Private Sector Corporate Governance Trust 
in Kenya. In November 1998 and March 1999, consultative corporate governance 
seminars were held and resolved that a private sector initiative for corporate 
governance be established in Kenya to formulate and develop a code of best 
practice for corporate governance. However, these good corporate governance 
principles are neither prescriptive nor mandatory but are designed as a basis to help 
companies in Kenya to formulate their own specific codes of best practice. If all 
corporate entity in Kenya examines its own governance practices, enhance its own 
governance practices and improves what needs to be improved, then the purpose 
in which the guidelines are formulated would be served. Chapter three of the 
document set out sample code of best practice for corporate governance in Kenya. 
The main information in the code relevant to this study is summarised below: 
Board of Directors: The code urges the board of directors to act in the best interest 
of their company and to exercise leadership and judgement to direct their company 
to achieve continuing prosperity.  Therefore, the code tasks the board of directors 
to perform certain functions which include (1) directing the company to achieve 
continuing prosperity (2) acting in the best interest of their company and respecting 
principles such as accountability and transparency (3)  making sure that companies 
comply with every relevant regulations, laws and codes of best business practice 
(4) ensuring that there is a good communication with the shareholders and the 
stakeholders (5) regular assessment of the effectiveness and performance of 
individual directors including the CEO and  (6) to monitor performance indicators 
and key risk areas and to identify them. In order for the board of directors to fulfil 
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their functions well the code advises them on certain things such as defining the 
limits of authority of the top executives and the CEO, defining how the board will 
operate, having regular meetings and monitor the management performance. 
Board meetings: The code discusses about board meetings, but did not state a 
particular number of meetings that organisations should have each year. The 
chairman is expected to chair meetings. The chairman must ensure order, good 
conduct of meetings and giving opportunity to participants to speak to ensure that 
decisions are made fairly. A company would develop standing orders or regulations 
to regulate the conduct of board meetings, including how to nominate someone to 
preside a meeting if chairman or vice chairman is not present to chair a particular 
meeting. The code requires the board to ensure that key members of management 
are brought into the board meetings so that they can participate and add value to 
their deliberations and work on behalf of the Board. According to the code, it is the 
responsibility of the chairperson to prepare agenda for board meetings and 
chairperson should consult company secretary, the board and the chief executive. 
Management are expected to agree in advance the calendar of board meetings. 
Management are also expected to highlight important issues that needs attention of 
the board, which should be discussed at meetings. The board manual highlights that 
it is a duty of board directors to attend board meetings and must devote enough time 
and attention to affairs of their company.  
Independent/nonexecutive directors: The code urges corporations in Kenya to 
ensure that the composition of their board is a balance of executive and non-
executive directors to avoid individuals or group of individuals dominating decision 
making. Like many other corporate governance codes, the code in Kenya requires 
the independent non-executive directors to be independent of management and free 
from any business and relationship that can affect the exercise of their ability to bring 
an independent judgement to bear on issues of strategy. The code also 
recommends the flowing: (1) that at least one third of the company members in 
Kenya must be non-executive directors (2) people should not hold many non-
executive directors if they hold full time position in another company (3) person with 
relationship with the director in one company, whether personal or social, cannot 
become non-executive director in that company and (4) direct customers, suppliers 
or trading associates a company cannot become non-executive director of that 
company. The code recommends independent non-executive directors to be 
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independent of the management and free from anything which will affect their 
capacity to be independent judge to bear on issues of strategy. Where conflict of 
interest is likely to occur, for example performance evaluation and directors’ 
nomination and remuneration, independent directors must be relied upon.  
CEO/Chairman: The code advises the chairman of the board to be different from 
the managing director. Therefore, it is obvious that the code supports the split role 
of CEO and the chairman in order to balance power and authority and to avoid 
individuals having unfettered powers of decision. However, the code makes it clear 
that if for some reasons if the two roles are combined, the reasons for combining 
should be explained publicly. The code sets some responsibility for the chairman 
which include leading the board, assisting effective management and chair board 
meetings, making sure that good conduct, order, giving opportunity for members to 
speak and making sure decisions are made.   
2.4.3 KING CODE OF GOVERNANCE FOR SOUTH AFRICA, 2009 (KING III) 
This document is obtained and summarised from European Corporate governance 
Institute, available at www.ecgi.org. King III report is the third report on corporate 
governance in South Africa before King I and King II. The report sets the code of 
corporate governance principles and practices for South African companies. The 
first report was King I in 1994 which was updated to King II in 2002 which has also 
been updated to King III in 2009 under the chairmanship of Mervyn E. King. The 
King III became effective from March 2010. The King III report became necessary 
due to the new Companies Act no. 71 of 2008 (‘the Act’) and changes in international 
governance trends. King III report was compiled by the King Committee in South 
Africa with the assistance from the King subcommittees. In all, there were eleven 
subcommittees which consisted 106 people established the King III process in 
South Africa. It is important to note that the King III is also on an ‘apply or explain’ 
basis.  The King III report applies to all entities in South Africa irrespective of the 
manner and form of incorporation or establishment and it is also applicable to public, 
private and non-profit organisations. The report urges all entities to apply the 
principles in order to achieve good governance. The key areas of King III report of 
South Africa relevant to this study have been presented below.  
Board of directors. The code sets out some responsibilities for company boards. 
Some of the responsibilities of the board include setting out the strategic direction 
and control of their company and to promote stakeholder- inclusive approach of 
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governance. The principle urges the board to act as a focal point for and custodian 
of corporate governance. In this regard, the role and function of the board should 
include monitoring the relationship between management and stakeholders and 
making sure that their company survives and thrives well. It is the requirement of 
the board to be responsible of the governance of information technology (IT). The 
board should ensure independent assurance on the effectiveness of IT internal 
control systems. 
The code also urges the companies to appreciate that risk, strategy, performance 
and sustainability are inseparable. Therefore, the code requires company boards to 
inform and approve strategy and making sure their strategy is aligned with the 
purpose of the company and shareholders interest. It is therefore a principle of the 
board members to act in the best interest of the company. The board is also 
responsible for setting the levels of risk tolerance once a year, setting the limits for 
risk appetite and to monitor and make sure that risks taken are within the tolerance 
and appetite levels. In addition, the board should also ensure a continue risk 
monitoring by the management and make sure that continues assessment of the 
risks are performed and a formal risk assessment should be performed at least once 
a year. The board should also ensure a complete, accurate and accessible risk 
disclosure to shareholders.   
Board meetings: With regards to board meetings, the code recommends that all 
company boards in South Africa meet at least four times a year. The code requires 
companies and various committees within companies to record their meetings.  
CEO/Chairman: In line with other international code standards, section 2.16 of the 
principle recommends that every board should select a chairman who is an 
independent non-executive. The principle also make it clear that the CEO should 
not hold the position of chairman of the board at the same time. It is important to 
note that this code does not allow any CEO to become the chairman until three 
years have elapsed. The board and the chairman together shall consider the 
number of outside chairmanships held, and it is the responsibility of the board to 
ensure succession plan for the role of the chairman. The code recommends the 
members of the board to elect chairman of their board on annual basis and if the 
chairman is not independent then this should be justified in the integrated report. In 
order to ensure the chairman is making progress, ability of the chairman to add value 
and his performance against what is expected of his role should be assessed every 
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year. Section 2.17 of the code clarifies the appointment of the CEO and requires 
this responsibility to be taken care of by the board. It is the requirement of the board 
to ensure that the role and function of the CEO is formalised and to make sure that 
they evaluate the performance of the CEO against the criteria specified. The board 
also has to ensure that the succession planning for the senior executives, the CEO 
and other officers is in place. The CEO shall be responsible for the appointment of 
Chief Information Officer (CIO) to manage the IT.   
Independent directors: Section 2.18 requires the majority of the board members 
to be non-executive directors and the majority of the non-executive to be 
independent. The chairman should also be independent and free of conflict upon 
appointment. If the chairman is not independent, this must be justified in the 
integrated report. At least one third of the non-executive directors must rotate every 
year and any non-executive director who is independent serving more than nine 
years is expected to be subjected to a rigorous review of his independence and 
performance. Moreover, the code recommends that all committees apart from the 
risk committee should have majority of non-executive directors of which the majority 
must be independent. 
Board size: The code does not specify the size of the board that companies should 
use. However, it recommends the board to take into account what size, diversity and 
demographics make it effective. It recommends that the boards are expected to 
have a minimum of two executive directors of which one must be the CEO and the 
other the director in charge of the finance.   
2.4.4 EXPOSURE DRAFT OF THE NATIONAL CODE OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 2015, NIGERIA.  
This document is obtained and summarised from European Corporate governance 
Institute, available at www.ecgi.org. Nigeria has had different corporate governance 
codes in the past. 2003 saw a code of corporate governance in Nigeria which was 
crafted for both public and private companies with multiple shareholders. The 2003 
code was brought to enhance corporate discipline, transparency and accountability 
and the main target was the board of directors. In 2006, code of corporate 
governance for banks in Nigeria post consolidation was introduced and took effect 
from April 3rd, 2006. In 2008 code of corporate governance for licensed pension 
operators was also introduced. Other code of corporate governance in Nigeria 
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include not-for-profit governance code in 2016 and the exposure draft of the national 
code of corporate governance 2015.  
At the time of writing this section of this dissertation, the latest available corporate 
governance code found in Nigeria was the 2015 exposure draft of the national code 
of corporate governance. Therefore, this latest code was used in this work. This 
code is a Public Sector Governance Code in Nigeria to extend the corporate 
governance to the public sector. The code is an attempt by the federal government 
in Nigeria to correct the perceived defect in the ‘bottom-up’ strategy used in the 
introduction of corporate governance in Nigeria in 2003, which limited the concept 
to listed and unlisted public companies and the Anglo-Saxon variant of board 
structure. This code also came to promote public awareness about corporate 
governance principles and practices and also to promote the highest standards of 
corporate governance in Nigeria. This code is applicable to all Public Sector Entities 
(PSEs) in Nigeria. This code requires the state to let the boards of PSEs to discharge 
their responsibilities, exercise their authorities and assert their independence.  
Board of directors: Part B of the code discusses about the board of directors. The 
code requires boards to have a clear understanding of its mandate and the 
implications of its implementation. The code recommends the boards to seek clarity 
from the government when there is a doubt. The board is expected to execute its 
mandate to ensure transparent increase in public value and to maximise socio-
political benefits. Every public sector entity board is required by the code to work 
towards a financial target and a dividend policy. On annual basis or more frequently, 
where appropriate, the government should review the board’s mandate. Section 8.9 
of the code advises the boards to act with skill, care, diligence and loyalty in the 
public sector entity’s interest. Section 9 also gives advice on the role of the board. 
According to the code, the board of public sector entity (PSE) has absolute 
responsibility for the performance and the PSE is fully accountable to government 
for such performance. Section 9.1 of the code requires the board to give strategic 
direction to the PSE. The government in agreement with the board, where 
applicable, appoint the CEO and they ensure the effective succession plan for all 
key executives and directors is in place and adhered to. The board is expected to 
make sure that PSEs are fully aware and comply with the applicable laws, 
regulations, business practice codes, and government regulations. 
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The code requires the board to be responsible for formulating, monitoring and 
reviewing corporate strategy, action of major plans, annual budget, policy on risk, 
and PSEs business plan and identify key performance indicators and risk areas 
regularly based on financial and non-financial aspects. Section 9.8 of the code 
mandate the board to monitor and manage the management, board members and 
the government potential conflicts of interest. The code advises the board and 
individual directors to abstain from accepting payment of commission, bribery or any 
form of gift or profit. The boards are also required by the code to ensure that financial 
statement, which presents the true and fair view of the affairs of PSEs is prepared 
each year. The board is expected to appraise the performance of the chairman on 
an annual basis and to ensure that the whole board, its committees and each 
director’s contribution during the entire term of office is effective. The boards in 
Nigeria are also expected to make sure that there is effective and continuing 
education programmes for new and existing board members. The code mandate 
the board to be responsible for IT governance and maintain highest standard of 
integrity responsibility and accountability and to make sure that it conforms to 
corporate governance principles while optimising the performance of the PSE.  
Independent/non-executive directors: Section 10 of the code gives advice on 
board structure and composition in which all public sector entities (PSEs) in Nigeria 
must follow. Section 10.2 advises, that to avoid individual or small group of 
individuals to dominate the board’s decision-taking, PSEs board should constitute 
both executive and non-executive directors (government institutional directors, 
independent non-executive directors and nominee directors). It advises that the 
number of executive directors should not be less than two of which one must be the 
CEO but the executive directors must not be more than one-third of the whole board 
size. Also, the number of non-executive directors should not be less than two-thirds 
of the whole board while the number of independent non-executive directors on the 
board must not be smaller than half of the number of non-executive directors. The 
code advises the board to delegate to the executive directors, everyday 
management of the PSE, and the executive directors are to make sure that they 
implement the strategic decision of the board effectively and timely.  
With regards to non-executive directors, they shall be made up of independent non-
executive directors, nominee directors and Government Institutional Directors. 
Nominee directors are also executive directors in some situations. The code advises 
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the independent non-executive directors to attend all important committee meetings. 
The code recommends non-executive directors to perform different functions 
including the following: the non-executive directors are responsible to give 
independent and objective supervision and monitoring of the executive 
management performance which is related to the board’s decisions. They shall also 
be responsible for assisting in resolving conflicts, for instance, the conflicts that will 
arise due to the executive directors’ remuneration and succession. The non-
executive directors are also required to participate in the operation of various 
committees of the board.  
CEO/Chairman: In line with other codes of corporate governance in other 
developed countries such as UK, section 10.7 of the code requires the positions of 
chairman and the CEO to be separated so that no one in the PSE can hold the two 
positions at the same time. This means the code prevents a single individual to hold 
the positions of chairman and CEO at the same time. The code requires the 
appointment of the CEO of PSEs to be the responsibility of the government and the 
main job of the CEO will focus on the managing the PSE, making sure that the 
running of the PSE is effective and efficient in accordance with the board’s strategic 
decision. The CEO is expected to be accountable to the board. Section 11.1 under 
part C of the code requires the government to appoint one board member who is 
independent non-executive as the board chairman. It advises that the 
responsibilities of the chairman and the CEO should be separated, where this 
becomes impossible then the government should appoint deputy chairman who is 
independent non-executive director so that no single individual has unfettered 
decision making powers in the PSE. The code stipulates that the chairman should 
be the head of the board and has some responsibilities which include ensuring that 
non-executive directors contribute to the business decisions of the PSE and monitor 
businesses; ensuring that the CEOs performance is appraised on annual or more 
frequent basis as the PSE’s circumstances may demand, and exercising 
independent judgement, acting in objective manner and to ensure that every 
relevant matter is placed on the agenda and prioritised properly.  
Board meetings: the code requires that all Nigerian PSE boards and their 
committees should meet at least once every quarter. The chairman is expected to 
consult other board members to develop and agree the agenda for the board 
meetings. All directors are endeavour to attend board and committee meetings. 
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Attendance of meetings should be an important factor to be taken into account when 
considering reappointment or re-nomination.  According to the code, it is normal for 
non-executive directors to have a separate meetings, at no cost to the PSE, without 
the attendance of the executive directors, to discuss crucial matters in PSE best 
interest, which are of serious concern to the non-executive directors. The board is 
expected to ensure it receives feedback on the work of its committees and is able 
to consider their decisions formally. The minutes of the boards and committee 
meetings are expected to be maintained by the secretary or officer performing that 
duty. 
2.5 CHALLENGES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 
Corporate governance is very important issue due to its implications for socio-
economic development in every country. However, there are some challenges that 
hinder the good implementation of corporate governance in some organisations 
especially those in Africa. This section seeks to discuss some of the challenges 
facing the implementation of good corporate governance in Africa. 
The first and the most important challenge of corporate governance in Africa is 
corruption. The association between corruption and firm performance is one of the 
most topics discussed in the literature of corruption (Sahakyan and Stiegert, 2012). 
Corruption, the misuse of power by management and officials for eliciting personal 
gains, is rampant in developing countries. It impedes the nationwide institutions in 
promoting corporate governance, it weakens institutional foundations which 
supposed to be there to mitigate agency problems (Lemma, 2015), it increases 
operational cost at firm level and worsens and distorts corporate governance 
(Kimuyu, 2007; Lemma, 2015). Corruption is everywhere in Africa and it is reported 
that corruption and fraud in businesses in East Arica is at its increasing rate 
(Okeahalam, 2004). Mbaku (2016) posit that corruption is among the most 
intractable issues in Africa and it is the main restriction to the continent’s inclusive 
economic growth and development. The incident of corruption in Africa cuts across 
different sectors of African economy. There is evidence of corruption in the mining 
industry (McClintock and Bell, 2013; Knutsen, 2016), corruption in the banking 
industry in Mozambique (Hanlon, 2002), and there is an evidence of corruption 
impacting negatively on public sector spending efficiency within the health and 
education sectors in Africa (Fonchamnyo and Sama, 2016). Halliburton, oil services 
giant in US acknowledged that a subsidiary paid a sum of US$2.4m as bribe to 
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official to gain favourable tax treatment (Okeahalam, 2004). The impact of corruption 
is very great in Africa, it hinders good corporate governance practices and ultimately 
affect firm performance.  
The second challenge which is similar to corruption is political. Political influence 
and people of high political positions affect good corporate governance in Africa. 
The capacity to support good corporate governance in Africa is undermined by some 
politicians and people of high positions who misuse their powers (Okeahalam, 
2004). Some government ministries which are in charge of active monitoring state-
owned enterprise boards and serve as independent regulators do not perform their 
duties well and many are influenced by politicians. Independent bodies such as 
consumer watchdog are also not developed in many parts of Africa according to 
Okeahalam (2004). Other problems affecting the corporate governance in Africa 
include the nature of the weak institutions and the opaque nature of business 
environment. According to Rossouw (2005), the absence of transparency and 
market discipline with no sound regulatory environment within some countries in 
Africa, discourage companies which are owned by private individuals from listing on 
stock exchanges. Due to these problems, the majority of shareholders are not 
protected because there are inadequate effective corporate governance 
mechanisms in place to control managerial behaviour (Okeahalam, 2004). Nigeria 
for instance, the Judicials such as the courts have failed to hold non-compliance of 
good corporate governance responsible while there is inadequate legal framework 
which is mainly dominated by 1969 companies’ code, lack of enforcement of the 
relevant laws, shareholder ignorance and inadequate information management 
systems in Ghana (Okeahalam, 2004). 
The third challenge of corporate governance in Africa that needs mentioning is the 
lack of effective regulatory and institutional frameworks (Rossouw, 2005) and weak 
implementation and enforcement of rules and regulations within the continent 
(Rossouw, 2005; Abor and Fiador, 2013). For instance, there is a rigorous 
regulations on insider trading listing rules in South Africa but its implementation and 
enforcement is weak (Ntim, 2013). According to some large body of literature on 
institutions and developments, the deprivation of Africa is as a result of weak courts, 
high corruption levels and hostile regulatory environment for private business 
(Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016) and judicial supervision including the courts have 
also failed (Okeahalam, 2004). When the laws and regulations are weak, or if they 
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are not enforced properly, the result is, that both private and public businesses are 
mismanaged by the management. This leads to misappropriation of funds by the 
management and increases agency cost. However, good progress has been made 
in this regard in South Africa, Mauritius and the Francophone countries (Rossouw, 
2005).  
Fourth, inadequate resources to monitor the registered companies is another major 
challenge facing the implementation of good corporate governance in Africa. In 
order for management of organisations to be monitored effectively demands some 
training and resources. Inadequate training and resources such as money to hire 
more non-executive directors for monitoring purposes means that, the management 
of both private and public firms will manage the firms to suit their own interest. For 
instance, according to Okeahalam (2004), there is inadequate resources by the 
Register of Companies in Kenya to monitor their registered companies effectively. 
In Uganda, one of the governance challenge in their Oil industry according to Van 
Alstine (2014) is the ability and mandate to involve with oil issues by the local 
government at the village level. Although some officials such as those at the Natural 
Resources Departments, involve in an active role, lack of information and resources 
limit their ability to share and disseminate information with local communities (Van 
Alstine, 2014).  
Last but not the least challenge of corporate governance in Africa is inadequate 
disclosure of good corporate governance practices. Using a sample of 169 South 
Africa listed firms from 2002 to 2007, Ntim et al (2012) reported that disclosure of 
good corporate governance practices on both shareholders and stakeholders has 
positive effect on firm value. This provides the evidence that disclosing corporate 
governance practices is good for firms and increases shareholders value. However, 
undisclosed cases in Africa such as payment and bribery are on a very high record 
and this continue to undermine legal and corporate governance in Africa 
(Okeahalam, 2004). The worst scenario is that, in some parts of Africa, some foreign 
officials are prevented to disclose what they pay to government officials as bribes 
because they would face reprisals (Okeahalam, 2004).   
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2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The chapter has looked at some definitions of corporate governance, the main 
models of corporate governance, codes of corporate governance of some selected 
countries in Africa (Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya) and some challenges 
of corporate governance in Africa. It has been observed that even though corporate 
governance has been defined in a broader or narrow way (for e.g. Cadbury Report, 
1992; Mayer, 1997; OECD, 1999), there is still not a common definition of corporate 
governance. The models of corporate governance being used are stakeholding and 
shareholding. With regards to the codes of corporate governance, it has been 
observed, that African countries are improving their corporate governance 
standards which is reflecting in their codes and principles of corporate governance. 
These principles are in line with many other international principles of good 
governance. By adhering to the principles of international standard, there is a 
possibility of better and standard corporate governance structures across the length 
and breadth of the whole continent of Africa. The major concern is how the various 
institutions in Africa can work efficiently to enforce the use of the codes and 
principles of corporate governance in Africa. The main challenges of corporate 
governance in Africa has been summarised as corruption (Rossouw, 2005), weak 
implementation and enforcement of rules and regulations (Rossouw, 2005; Abor 
and Fiador, 2013), inadequate resources to monitor companies, political influence 
of those of high political positions and inadequate disclosure of good corporate 
governance practices.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
3 Introduction  
In this chapter, we discuss the extant theoretical literature on bank risk corporate 
governance and bank performance. In the first place, this chapter discusses the 
main theories that this study is based on, namely agency, stewardship and resource 
dependency theories. Secondly, the chapter reviews the theoretical literature on the 
relationships between bank risk and bank performance, bank risk and corporate 
governance, corporate governance and bank performance, and the moderation 
effect of corporate governance on the relationship between bank risk and 
performance. This is followed by the chapter summary.  
3.1 Theoretical literature review  
This subsection discusses the relevant theoretical review that provides a link 
between bank risk, corporate governance and bank performance. Previous studies 
have used different theories that provide a link between corporate governance 
characteristics, bank risk and financial performance. Some of the popular theories 
used by previous studies include signalling theory, agency theory, stewardship 
theory, corporate legitimacy theory and resource dependency theory. For the 
purpose of this work, the main theories which are used and discussed are the 
agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependency theory.  
3.1.1 Agency theory  
The first theoretical underpinnings of the research are enshrined in the popular 
agency theory in business. Jensen & Meckling (1976) define agency theory as the 
theory that addresses the relationship where in a contract ‘one or more persons (the 
principal (s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some services on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. The 
theory looks at how to ensure that agents (executives, managers) act in the best 
interests of the principals (owners, shareholders) of an organisation.  According to 
Jensen & Meckling (1976), there is tangible reason to accept that the best interests 
of the principal will always not be acted in by the agent if the two parties to the 
relationship are utility maximizers. In this case, how to write contracts so that an 
agent’s performance can be measured and incentivized so that they act with the 
interest of the principal in mind is the main concern of agency theory as proposed 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Agency theory is concerned about two main 
problems, how to align the conflicting interests between managers and owners and 
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how to make sure that agents carry out in the way that the principals want then to 
(Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2013). The problems can arise when managers make self- 
interested decisions and manipulate performance information, for example by 
moving numbers around to create good performance picture. The answer to the 
problems is by making managers part owners of the firm and to make sure that 
managers act in the best interest of the owners (Bendickson et al, 2016, Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
 From the point of view of agency theory, the implication for corporate governance 
is, that adequate monitoring is required to apply to protect and minimise the conflict 
of interest that exist between management and shareholders, between 
shareholders, and between debt-holders and firms such as conflict leads to agency 
cost (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2013). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) posit that the principal can minimise divergences from his interest through 
creating suitable incentives for the agent and through incurring cost of monitoring 
intended to limit the deviant activities of the agent. This is to make sure that the 
agent makes the best decisions from the point of view of the principal (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). By doing this the principal incurs some cost often known as 
monitoring cost.  Also, in certain circumstances principal may require the agent to 
use resources (bonding cost) to make sure that certain actions which will harm the 
principal will not be taken by the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Again, 
according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), there is a divergence between the agent’s 
decisions and decisions that miximise the principal’s welfare. The dollar value of the 
decrease in the principal’s welfare as a result of this divergence is also part of the 
cost to the agency relationship which is known as residual loss (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the sum of the monitoring expenditures by the principal, 
the bonding expenditures by the agent, and the residual loss is the agency cost 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Corporate governance mechanisms affect bank risk and bank performance in 
various ways. This means that if bank managers, CEOs and directors of Africa 
banks who are described as agents, according to this theory, are to do their work 
well, they should be able to manage and reduce the bank risk of the banks in Africa 
which will reflect on the performance of these banks by increasing their profitability.     
However, agency theory faces some criticisms. Nyberg et al. (2010) argue that the 
incentive alignment prediction of agency theory has not, so far, been empirically 
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proven in studies of CEO (who are agents) compensation. Another study, by 
O’Reilly and Main (2010), also questions the lack of empirical support for linking 
executive pay with firm performance. They believe executive pay may be more likely 
a function of management power and influence; that is, more of a behavioural than 
an instrumental phenomenon.  
3.1.2 Stewardship theory 
Stewardship theory is contrary to agency theory and it argues against the 
opportunistic self-interest assumption of agency theory (Hendry & Kiel, 2004). In 
short, the stewardship theory discards the basic notion of conflicting interests that 
the agency theory has been associated with (Abels & Martelli, 2013). The 
stewardship theory posits that management should be empowered to run firms since 
they are trustworthy individuals and are good stewards of the resources entrusted 
to them (Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007) and can make decisions 
that benefit the whole organisation rather than personal gratification (Abels & 
Martelli, 2013) and they are motivated to act in the principals’ best interest (Davies, 
Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). Since the stewardship theory recognises the 
presence of a relationship build on trust between principals and agents, it reduces 
the cost of monitoring and controlling the behaviour of the management (Abels & 
Martelli, 2013). In this theory, the main model is based on steward whose behaviour 
is ordered such that pro-organisational, collectivistic behaviours have higher utility 
than individualistic, self-serving behaviours. The behaviour of a steward will not 
move away from the interests of the organisation that he/she is working for, and self-
serving behaviours will not be traded or substituted for cooperative behaviours by 
the stewards (Davies, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). The steward puts higher 
value in cooperation than defection even if there is no alignment of interest of the 
principals and the stewards (Davies, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). The 
stewardship theory also posits that since the steward seeks to achieve the 
organisational objective including profitability and sales growth, there is a collective 
behaviour of the steward. Ultimately, this behaviour is beneficial to the principals 
through positive effects of profit on dividends and share prices (Davies, Schoorman 
& Donaldson, 1997). The wealth of the shareholder is maximised by the steward 
through firm performance, because, by doing so, the utility functions of the steward 
are maximised. The stewards also believe that there has been an alignment of their 
interest with the corporation and its owners (Davies, Schoorman & Donaldson, 
1997). Contrary to the agency theory, stewardship theory proposes that when power 
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is concentrated in a single individual and CEO is also the chairman of the board, 
there would be an attainment of superior performance of the firm (Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991). As a result, the supporters of stewardship theory argue that there 
would be a superior return to shareholders than the situation where the CEO and 
chairman roles are separated (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
3.1.3 Resource dependence theory 
The third and final theory that this study is based on is the resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This theory posits that organisations are self-
insufficient since they rely on the resources at their external environment which are 
in possession of other organisations in order to achieve their organisational goals 
(Pfeffer & Salancit 1978, Voss & Brettel, 2014). Therefore, for an organisation to 
survive depends on the transaction with the external environment to reobtain the 
required resources (Pfeffer & Slancit, 1978; Bergmann et al, 2016). The resource 
dependence theory suggests that, organisation that do not have the critical 
resources in order to achieve the desired goal will have to seek to form a relationship 
with other organisations in order to secure the required resources (Pfeffer & 
Salancit, 1978; Singh, Power, & Chuong, 2011). The theory further suggests that, 
there are some social –legal apparatus that define and control the nature and give 
a limit of the relationship between an organisation and players in its environment 
(Pfeffer & Salancit, 1978; Singh, Power, & Chuong, 2011). Power and dependence 
play a key role in understanding the relationships between inter-organisations. The 
balance of power is in favour of the organisation that has (resources) what other 
organisations need (Malatesta & Smith, 2014). If a particular resource is more 
critical, the stakeholders can have more powers to execute over the organisation by 
sheer refusal to make the resource obtainable to that organisation. In view of this, if 
a particular organisation fails to constantly assess their resources usefulness and 
quality, they are unable to effectively perform their mission, create public value or 
react to changes coming from the environment (Frączkiewicz-Wronka, & 
Szymaniec, 2012).  
For a competitive advantage to be achieved, an organisation has to secure 
resources which are available in the environment but are in possession by the 
stakeholders, which becomes likely if the organisation can present its own resources 
adequately (Frączkiewicz-Wronka,& Szymaniec, 2012). 
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Due to division of labour, managers also depend on the resources which are 
provided by their subordinate employees like organisational connections, work effort 
and expertise (Voss & Brettel, 2014). Managers use control to make sure that the 
resources which their firm is dependent on are available. This control increases the 
availability of critical resources needed by the organisation, which has positive effect 
on performance of a firm (Voss & Brettel, 2014).  
With regards to board of directors, the theory portrays that the board is a vital link 
between the firm and the important resources that the firm needs to maximise 
performance (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Some of the resources are (1) the board can 
provide a firm a link to capital and business elite (2) the board can provide a link to 
important information to the firm (3) the board can provide a link to customers, 
suppliers, competitors and other significant stakeholders (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007) 
(4) Non-executive directors on the board provide the firm a link to expert and 
contacts and also give them prestige (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002).  As a result, it has 
been argued that a firm with high level of links to the external environment is able to 
give a company with a high level of access to different resources including 
information, capital, customers and suppliers (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). According to 
Nicholson and Kiel (2007), if resource dependency theory holds then two patterns 
are expected to happen. (1) A firm with high level of links to its external environment 
has more access to resources and as a result, experience high corporate 
performance and (2) A frim with low level of links to its external environment has 
little access to resources and as a result, experience low` corporate performance.  
Briefly, the agency theory proposes that because there is separation of ownership 
and control in the modern organisations, it is more likely that the management or 
the agents will consider their interest and personal gain first instead of working with 
the interest of the owners in mind. This situation is the result of agency problem. 
The stewardship theory opposes the criticisms made by the agency theory that the 
agents will work for their personal gains without the interest of the shareholders. 
Instead, the stewardship theory recommends that the agents are good stewards, 
therefore, they should be empowered and entrusted to manage the resources and 
run the firms for the owners without any monitoring cost. Resource dependency 
theory on the other hand places emphasis on the corporate governance structures 
within institutions. For instance, resource dependency theory suggests that directors 
on the board will ensure that managers are monitored effectively and at the same 
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time they serve as a link between the firm and the critical resources required for the 
maximisation of the firm financial performance.   
3.2 Theoretical Literature review on bank risk and bank performance 
Banking activities are complex in nature and they are involved in different kinds of 
risks which affect the performance of the banks.  Banking risk and its performance 
are interrelated, and a proper definition of these concepts forms the basis of risk 
management (Apatachioaea, 2015). One way that risk can be defined is the event 
of uncertainty which can cause loses or situation which occurs through the banking 
activities which cause adverse effects on the activities by worsening in asset quality, 
reduction in profits which impact on the function of the bank (Apatachioaea, 2015). 
Within the banking industry, risk is refer only to negative deviations from expected 
outcome and it is associated with the probability of loss while opportunities are 
associated with positive deviations (Apatachioaea, 2015). In the banking industry, 
any operations, transaction or decision making can bring about risk. Uncertainties 
are associated with every activity of the bank, therefore, all operations of banks 
contribute to the total risk of a bank. The risks in banks are associated with financial 
risk due to the nature of the business of banks; they are the highest affected by 
deteriorating financial and economic condition in a country (Apatachioaea, 2015).  
According to Apatachioaea (2015), the risks of banks can be put into two categories. 
The first category is called permanent risks, which come through a source that may 
change permanently. The second category is the events or unique risks which occur 
due to specific, discontinuous source.  
There are different sources of risk in banking, and these sources have been grouped 
under credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, operational risk, strategic risk and legal 
risk (Fayman & He, 2011; Apatachioaea, 2015). Credit risk is the failure or inability 
of a customer to pay back the principal and or interest on a loan on the agreed time 
with the bank. The inability of a bank to acquire the required short term liquidity is 
the liquidity risk (Sufian & Chong, 2008; Arif, & Nauman Anees, 2012; Apatachioaea 
(2015). It should be the top priority of the bank management to ensure that sufficient 
funds are available to meet future demands of borrowers and providers at the cost 
which is very reasonable since liquidity risk can impact on bank’s capital and 
earnings negatively. If a bank is unable to liquidate its asset at reasonable price, it 
faces liquidity risk and a very significant withdrawal of deposits can cause a liquidity 
trap for a bank (Jeanne & Svensson, 2007; Arif, & Nauman Anees, 2012). Other 
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factors that can cause serious liquidity issues for banks are extensive commitment 
based, and long-term lending (Kashyap et al, 2002; Arif, & Nauman Anees, 2012). 
When banks have large commitments, they have to honour them when they are 
due. Also, liquidity problems arises when a bank have massive exposure in long-
term lending in times of huge liquidity pressure (Arif, & Nauman Anees, 2012). 
Market risk on the other hand is the risk of losses which occurs through the bad 
evolution of exchange rates, interest rates and market prices of primary and 
derivative financial instruments held by a bank in transactional portfolio (Chen et al, 
2013; Apatachioaea, 2015; Ekinci, 2016; Srivastav & Hagendorff, 2016). Market risk 
consists of currency, equity, commodity and interest rate risks (Ekinci, 2016). The 
available literature gives little agreement concerning the impacts of changes in 
interest rates on the performance of banks. On one hand, if the interest rates of 
banks do not have full flexibility, they will be exposed to repricing and yield curve 
risk if they borrow short-term while lending long-term. On the other hand, balance 
sheet interest rate changes can be protected by banks with the application of risk 
techniques such as interest rate risk hedging by using interest rate derivatives 
(Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Purnanandam, 2007; Ekinci, 2016). In the banking 
market, the risk that a new product, company or competitor changes the level of 
competition is called strategic risk, while legal risk is the risk of losses as a result of 
unforeseen changes in regulations. Operational risk is the likelihood of a loss on 
account of inadequate internal processes, employees, systems or external events 
Apatachioaea (2015). 
Among the risks that banks face, credit risk is the most significant risk exposure as 
a result of the strong link with the profitability of the bank and growth of the economy 
(Ekinci, 2016). When banks make proper investment decisions, they get the greatest 
returns on those investment decisions at the least credit risk. Banks reduce their 
profit and equity if a loan is not repaid, and if the bank is not able to pay off its 
liabilities it can lead to bank failure (Ekinci, 2016).  
Bank risks are managed to target the performance of the bank and the main aim of 
risk management activity is to optimize the relationship between risk and profitability. 
From the viewpoint of shareholders, bank performance is finding profit by minimising 
cost while maximising profit. In perfect competition, according to economic theories, 
profit maximisation is equal to minimizing costs (Apatachioaea, 2015). 
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Banking risks which include liquidity, credit, market and operational risk have huge 
impact on the performance of banks. In this regard, a large body of literature has 
looked at the impact of bank risk on performance (Tan, 2016; Zhang et al, 2013; 
Kamua et al, 2015; Al-Tamimi et al, 2015; Arif & Nauman Anees, 2012). These risks 
come in different forms. For instance, the absence of a deposit base may cause a 
bank to have a higher liquidity risk. Brunnermeier (2009) adds that a bank reliance 
on short term debt (for example repurchase agreements) can increase their liquidity 
risk. Arif & Nauman Anees (2012) contend that bank with liquidity problems may find 
it very difficult in meeting the depositors demand. In effect, liquidity risk faced by a 
bank can have negative impact on a bank’s earnings, capital and ultimately 
performance. Under extreme situations it may lead to a collapse of a bank. It is 
therefore important for banks to maintain good levels of liquidity, since banks that 
have higher levels of liquidity may undertake lower risk in the event of unforeseen 
financial shock (Mamatzakis & Bermpei (2014). 
On the other hand, a non-performing loan (NPL) leads to credit risk. A loan is said 
to be non- performing when principal and interest payment are overdue by 90 days 
or more (Misman et al, 2015). Banks may experience a lower margin of profit if they 
have problem with NPL and if the situation becomes critical, it can lead to a crises. 
It appears that banks that have lower risk of default perform more efficient than 
those that have higher risk of default.Therefore effective risk management in 
banking is required (Misman et al, 2015).  One of the areas that suppose to be given 
attention as far as bank risk and performance are concerned is investment banking. 
The reason is that due to the complex nature of the operations of these banks, they 
are exposed to very high risk which impact on their performance. (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2010) and Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2014) argue that higher volatility 
of earnings and higher risk are associated with higher fee-income for investment 
banks. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) added that the risk investment banks 
carry is higher because of their involvement in non-interest income activities than 
commercial and saving banks. As a result of high risk of investment banking 
activities, Altunbas et al, (2010) argue that this causes increase in write-offs and a 
reduction of their banking activities which causes a reduction in their performance 
and capital base. In order to reduce the negative impact cause by risk on bank 
performance, banks require resources to find effective risk management 
procedures. If higher risk occurs due to unforeseen event, banks may respond to it 
by spending more resources to manage the risk. As a result of this, a rise in bank 
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costs can happen due to the procedure. In accordance with the ‘bad luck 
hypothesis’, which states that a negative relationship exists between risk and 
performance (Berger & De-Young, 1997), it has been identified that banks that are 
not efficient are nearer failure. 
 
3.3 Theoretical literature review on corporate governance and bank risk 
  
3.3.1 Introduction 
Bank risk and corporate governance are much related since a good corporate 
governance practice can reduce bank risk whiles bad corporate governance practice 
can increase bank risk. Therefore, bank risk can be said to be dependent on 
corporate governance. The interest in how banks go about mitigating their risk taking 
behaviour in recent years have attracted the attention of academic and regulatory 
bodies (Srivastay & Hagendorff, 2016). Board of directors have a final duty for 
management of risk and setting the tone for a bank’s risk-taking culture at the top. 
The board makes sure that the bank is stable through monitoring executives on the 
impact of policies of the firm on the risk of bank, assessing if their current and future 
risk exposures are in line with the risk appetite, and designing executive incentives 
to promote prudent risk taking (Srivastav & Hagendorff, 2016). This section looks at 
different board characteristics that affect bank risk and particular attention is given 
to board size, board meeting, independent board directors, presence of female 
directors on board and CEO/chairman or role duality.   
3.3.2 Board size and bank risk 
A large body of literature has examined banks board size (e.g. Nakano & Nguyen, 
2012; Upadhyay, 2015; Chan et al, 2016; Mathew et al, 2016; Switzer & Wang, 
2013; Pathan 2009; Rachdi et al, 2013; Huang & Wang, 2015). Only a few of the 
studies have examined board size of banks and bank risk (Switzer & Wang, 2013; 
Pathan 2009; Rachdi et al, 2013; Chan et al, 2016). Due to the complex nature of 
banking activities and sometimes regulatory recommendations which demand more 
board committees, banks tends to have larger boards than non-financial firms 
(Adams & Mehran, 2012; John et al, 2016). The main question is whether board 
size has impact on bank risk and performance. Answer to this question by different 
researchers has been inconclusive. Theories such as agency and resource 
dependency hold opposing views on the impact of board size on bank risk and bank 
performance. Agency theory proposes that bigger board is not efficient because 
bigger board has problems with communication and coordination, internal clashes 
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among the directors and director free rider problems (Jensen, 1993). In addition, 
CEOs can control bigger boards easily because with a bigger board, an individual 
director’s incentive to acquire information and managers is low (Jensen, 1993). 
However, the resource dependency theory proposes that bigger board is good for 
firms because firms with diversified board members could give great quality advice, 
greater expertise and access to resources (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). From the 
resource dependency perspective, bigger board will work best to reduce the risk of 
banks because of the collective ideas and opinions from many different diversified 
board members. Moreover, insiders will find it difficult to control relatively bigger 
board (Switzer & Wang, 2013). According to Wang and Switzer (2013), there is a 
negative association between bank credit risk level and board size since larger 
board will reduce the probability of default. Myers (1977) contends that financial 
distress firms find their investment policies constrained, and as such there is a very 
likelihood of default. In the event where credit risk is paramount and a firm is in a 
distress state, diversified and larger boards may be of benefit (Switzer & Wang, 
2013). Upadhyay (2015) posits that moderate corporate decision is made which 
minimises firm risk when the board size is large. A firm with debt equity value is akin 
to a call option on the total value of the firm. However, the only situation where such 
call option will be exercised is when the value of the debt claims is less than the 
value of the assets. When firm risk is reduced, the value of this call option to equity 
holders will also be reduced by larger boards. This realises that this call option is 
less likely to be exercised by managers in firms with larger boards; these firms may 
be relatively safer to debt holders and ask for lower risk premium (Upadhyay, 2015). 
3.3.3 Female directors and bank risk  
The big question here is ‘does gender play a role in bank board and risk 
relationship?’ The debate of whether the presence of female directors on executive 
board can have negative or positive effect on the risk of firms such as banks is still 
ongoing. We contribute to this literature by investigating whether gender 
composition of a board has impact on bank risk. Different firms in some countries 
have come under intense pressure to increase the number of female directors on 
their board. Some countries in Europe including Italy, Belgium, France and Norway 
have passed legislation mandating increase in female representative for some firms 
(Sila et al, 2016). The impact of female directors of a bank board on banks risk is 
still unclear, understudied and the available empirical evidence is mixed and 
inconclusive. While some studies suggest that the presence of female directors on 
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bank board reduces risk of the bank, other studies argue that this is not the case. 
Due to this, few papers have tried to find out whether on average loans granted by 
female officers have statistically lower default rate (Agarwal and Wang, 2009). 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Farag and Mallin (2017) document that it is 
important for a firm to include a mix of people who have the necessary experience 
and background to be able to better monitor and evaluate management and 
business strategies. One best way to mix people on the board is to diversify the 
board members to include female directors. It has also been documented that 
improvement in board’s monitoring role can be increased and lower agency cost 
can be experienced with the presence of female representation on the board 
(Carter, 2003; Farag & Mallin, 2016; Farag & Mallin, 2017).  
Female board diversity which is supported by resource dependency theory, 
discusses about the benefit and impact of board diversity that a firm may derive 
(Carter et al, 2010; Farag & Mallin, 2017). Resource dependency theory posits that, 
the inclusion of female directors on board provides many different resources and 
benefits (Carter, 2010). Mateos de Cabo et al, (2012) added that the presence of 
female directors on executive board brings new opinions and perspectives to 
improve the firm performance that would not happen if the board was to be 
homogeneous. This theory also posits that diversity possesses the chance to 
improve information obtained from the managers as a result of the unique 
information held by diverse directors (García-Meca et al, 2015). Differences in 
gender and risk taking behaviour have been looked at by a number of studies and 
the consensus is that women are more risk averse in financial decision making than 
men (Schuber et al, 1999; Mateos de Cabo et al, 2012; Berger et al, 2014; Nelson, 
2015, Sila et al, 2016). One reason to support this is that the likelihood that firms 
that consist of female directors will take aggressive acquisition strategies is less and 
even if they do they offer less bid premium (Levi, Li & Zhang, 2014). Levi, Li & Zhang 
(2014) add that the presence of female director on executive board is important 
since woman seems to be less likely to destroy the value of the shareholder and as 
a result do not take risk unnecessarily. At the board level, board gender diversity is 
important since diversified boards are more likely to understand their customers and 
stakeholders, they are likely to be effective, bring fresh ideas, vigorously challenge 
and broad experience, according to Mathew et al, (2016). As a result, a better 
decision making is achieved and in turn leads to a lower bank risk levels. However, 
Adams and Funk (2012) posit that the presence of a woman on the board does not 
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lead to an increase in risk-averse decision making because compare to men, 
women directors are more risk loving. Also, Farag and Mallin (2017) provide the 
evidence that male and female executive directors may possess the same 
behaviour of risk taking and that female directors on management board are not risk 
averse. Again, Farag and Mallin (2016) show that, compared with their male 
counterparts, female CEOs are not risk averse.  
 
3.3.4 Board independence and bank risk 
We contribute to the literature by examining the` impact of independent board 
directors on bank risk. The extant literature on board independence have focused 
mostly on non-financial firms (for example Bhagat & Black, 2002; Ramdani & 
Witteloostuijn, 2010; Muniandy & Hillier, 2015; Liu et al, 2015; Fuzi et al, 2016) while 
few concentrate on banks (for example Pathan and Faff, 2013; Yeh et al, 2011; 
Adams & Mehran, 2012; Liang et al, 2013). Out of the entire literature on bank and 
board independent directors, only a few are related to bank risk. This causes for 
further investigation, and one of the reasons may be due to unavailability of data on 
bank risk and independent board directors. The board of directors suppose to be a 
mixture of executive and non-executive directors and the two groups of directors 
should act in the best interest of the shareholders. Regulators and corporate 
governance codes also recommend a balance of executive and non-executive 
members on a board (Fuzi et al, 2016; Mathew et al, 2016). The non-executive 
directors are unable to perform their functions effectively unless they are 
independent from the management (Fuzi et al, 2016). The independent or the non-
executive directors are entrusted by the shareholders to represent them at board 
meetings to provide an unbiased business decisions (Fuzi, et al, 2016) and to help 
reduce agency problems (Wang et al, 2014; Chang et al, 2016; Fuzi et al, 2016). It 
is suggested that a large number of independent directors can decrease the 
behaviour of bank’s risk-taking (Wang et al, 2014; Chang et al, 2016). It has also 
been argued that independent directors provide extra monitoring in order to reduce 
the risk of management inflicting danger on the firm (Pathan, 2009; Chang et al, 
2016). Also, there is a high probability that a firm’s operations will be monitored and 
controlled by independence directors and they are more likely to improve corporate 
transparency since the independent directors need to conserve their reputation as 
professionals (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Chang et al, 2016).  
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However, Coles et al, (2008) posit that a bank board with higher number of 
independent board numbers will reduce the number of board seats available to 
executive directors and this can prevent the flow of information between the 
management team and the boards. Jensen and Meckling (1976) add that in order 
to maximise the shareholders wealth, a bank board with more independent directors 
may involve in high risk-taking.  
3.3.5 Role or CEO duality and bank risk 
We contribute to this literature by examining the effect of combining CEO and 
chairman role on bank risk. Role or CEO duality can be explained as the situation 
in which the same person holds the position of Chairman and CEO on a company’s 
board at the same time (Dharmadasa, 2014; Krause et al, 2014). Different theories 
have different arguments on having the same person as CEO and chairman of a 
company at the same time and the separation of the two roles. Stewardship theory 
establishes that the same person occupying the two seats as CEO and chairman 
reduces the conflict during decision making (Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012). This 
theory also posits that strong and unified leadership with a good strategic direction 
is achieved when one person is holding the position of CEO and chairman at the 
same time. Stewardship further argues that the CEO duality helps to make timely 
and best decisions within a firm since the CEO knows how to run the business 
because of the in-depth knowledge of the business already gained by the CEO 
(Brickley et al. 1997; Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012). Contrary to the stewardship 
theory argument, the agency theory argues that separating the CEO and chairman 
roles is a good corporate governance practice when considering the interest of the 
shareholders and this aids effective control and monitoring of management (Jensen, 
1993; Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012). Also, CEO duality constraints 
independence of the board of directors. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the 
board of directors to manage the process of firing, hiring, compensating the CEO 
and evaluating. The performance of the chairman should not be assessed by the 
same person, otherwise it will be self-evaluated (Jensen, 1993; Syriopoulos & 
Tsatsaronis, 2012). According to Switzer and Wang (2013), credit risk level will 
reduce with the situation where the CEO does not hold board chairman position at 
the same time. It has also been argued that when the chairman and CEO roles are 
separated, it will result to reducing firm risk and improve firm performance 
(Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012).   
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3.3.6 Board meetings and bank risk 
A large body of literature has discussed board characteristics of firms (Kaymak and 
Bektas, 2008; de Villiers, 2011; Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2013; Dharmadasa et al, 
2014; Rodriguez-Fernandez et al, 2014; Jermias, 2014; Bukair & Rahman 2015; 
Gaur, 2015; Issarawornrawanich, 2015). Only a limited number of literature focus 
on bank board characteristics and meetings (Kaymak & Bektas, 2008; Aebi et al, 
2012; Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2013; Liang et al, 2013; Salim Arjomandi & Seufert, 
2016).  There is a clear indication that board meetings have effect on risk and 
financial performance of the bank due to the important role in which a firm’s 
meetings play in a way in which organisations are controlled and managed. Agency 
theory by Jensen & Meckling, (1976) states that the relevant and important of 
frequent corporate board meetings is the increased capacity to advise effectively, 
discipline management and monitor them, and the result is the improvement in the 
corporate financial performance. The theory also posits that, the frequency of board 
meeting shows that the monitoring by the board is active (Conger et al, 1998; Grove 
et al 2011). Other supporters of this argument are Adams and Ferreira (2007), who 
contend that the avenues in which board of director can get vital information which 
are firm-specific to enable them perform their monitoring role, which include 
monitoring of the risk-taking activities is board meetings. Battaglia and Gallo (2015) 
add that when a board meets more frequently, the board members get closer control 
over the managers. Also, according to Grove et al (2011), the banking business is 
complex and therefore require active role and effective board monitoring. Moreover, 
Adams and Mehran (2003) argue that bank board is bigger and its committees are 
more, and in order to operate effectively it needs to meet very frequently. However, 
frequent board meeting has been opposed by Vafeas (2009). Vefeas (2009) argues 
that, firm performance can be affected by frequent board meetings through agency 
cost (refreshment, managerial time, travel expenses meeting fees, etc.). 
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3.4 Theoretical literature review on corporate governance and bank 
performance  
3.4.1 Introduction 
Due to the experience of the recent financial crisis, more attention has been given 
to the corporate governance of banks. As a result, the financial crises has restored 
the attention to the need for improvement of the corporate governance so that 
financial stability can be ensured (Chitan, 2012).  The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) has requested that an attention to be given to the importance 
of studying, understanding and improving the financial entities corporate 
governance (Andres & Vallelado, 2008). The core of the message by BCBS is the 
believe that corporate governance is good for sound financial system which results 
to economic development and the committee also believes that good corporate 
governance can increase banks monitoring efficiency and performance (Andres & 
Vallelado, 2008). In this study, the board characteristics which have been reviewed 
in relation to corporate governance and bank performance are board meetings, 
board size, presence of female directors, CEO/Chairman role duality, and 
independent directors. 
3.4.2 Board meetings and bank performance 
Frequency of board meetings according to the agency theory context, may indicate 
active monitoring by the board (Grove et al, 2011; Conger, Finegolda, & Lawler, 
1998). Frequent board meetings increase the top management supervision, and the 
more important the advisory role which can increase the performance of a firm. Also, 
the complex nature of the business of a bank demands a more active role from the 
board. On the other hand, difficult decisions and financial distress times, the number 
of times board meet may increase (Liang et al, 2013). Grove et al, (2013) point out 
that frequent board meetings indicate a more effective monitoring role, which might 
mitigate agency costs and consequently can result to improvement in firm’s financial 
performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that corporate board gives advice, 
supervision, and seek accountability from management so that the interest of 
shareholders is pursued by the managers. There is an indication, that corporate 
board meetings have impact on their financial performance because of the 
significant role in which corporate board meetings play in the way in which 
companies are managed and governed. Vafeas (2009) argues that one of the 
important attributes that can have some vital implications for firm value is the 
frequency of board meetings. From the perspective of the agency theory by Jensen 
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and Meckling (1976), frequent corporate board meetings come with increased 
capacity to advise effectively, discipline management and monitor them, and as a 
result improve the corporate financial performance. Due to the complex nature of 
the banking industry, a more active role and efficient monitoring of the board is 
needed. Moreover, for effective operating purposes, bank boards tend to be bigger 
and have more committees, which are required to meet more (Adams & Mehran, 
2003; Grove et al, 2011). Liang et al, (2013) also argue that frequency of board 
meetings can serve as a sign of proactive board. Ntim (2009) adds, that higher 
frequency of board meetings can result to a higher quality of managerial monitoring, 
and thereby impacts positively on corporate financial performance. 
However, Vafeas (2009) and Vafeas (1999a) contend that there is an agency cost 
in the form of travel expenses, refreshments, directors’ meeting fees and managerial 
time which goes with the board meetings that can affect corporate performance 
negatively. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) also suggest that various things such as 
routine tasks, like presentation of management reports and numerous formalities 
take much of the meetings, and this minimises the amount of time that suppose to 
be available to outside directors to effectively monitor management which can have 
negative effect on corporate performance.  
3.4.3 Role or CEO duality and bank performance. 
CEO/Chairman separation reflects the board’s ability to provide independent 
monitoring and oversight role of management actions and result to better banks 
overall performance. CEO duality which is the practice whereby a single individual 
serves as CEO and chairman of a company’s board at the same time (Rechner and 
Dalton, 1991; Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2013; Krause et al, 2014; Mamatzakis and 
Bermpei, 2015) has been a subject which is interest to academics for over 20 years 
(Krause et al, 2014). The CEO is a full- time employee who is in charge of a 
company’s everyday operations and, as a result is responsible for the company’s 
financial performance. The chairman of the board on the other hand is usually part-
time employee who is mainly responsible for making sure that the board operates 
effectively (Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2013). 
The two key theories in the issue of CEO duality are agency and stewardship. On 
one hand, these two theories agree that non duality reflects higher board oversight 
and weaker CEO power. On the other hand, CEO duality reflects lower board 
oversight and stronger CEO power (Finkelstein et al, 2009; Krause et al, 2014). 
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Agency theory recommends that, to prevent managerial entrenchment, 
management and boards should be independent from each other (Fama & Jensen, 
1983a). Agency theorists have constantly argued that CEO duality has adverse 
effects on firm performance since CEO duality directly conflicts with this 
recommendations (Jensen, 1993).  Some supporters of the agency theory are 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Worrell et al. (1997) and Carlsson (2001). These authors 
contend that the separation of CEO and chairman roles can result to improvement 
in performance due to the improvement in the boards’ effectiveness in managerial 
monitoring.  
The UK corporate governance code (2012) also recommends organisations to 
separate the role of chairman from CEO to make sure that there is a clear division 
of responsibilities.  Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013) posit that signing the two roles 
to one person is a clear indication of bad corporate governance. Rechner and Dalton 
(1991) add that assigning one person as CEO and chairman at the same time 
constitute a clear conflict of interest while Grove et al. (2011) contend that the main 
cause of agency conflicts as a result of reduction in monitoring and permitting the 
CEOs to act in their own interest is duality. Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) and 
Jensen (1993) contend that large organisations’ agency cost can be minimised if 
decision management and decision control are separated, and that the board of 
directors is only an effective device for decision control if it limits the decision 
discretion of top managers. It is also argued that when one person holds the 
positions of CEO and chairman at the same time it could lead to decision making 
not to be in the best interest of the shareholders who are minority (Liang et al, 2013; 
Jensen, 1993) and would reduce the independence of the board (Yermack, 1996).   
Contrary, some scholars integrating stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991) 
and resource dependency theory (Boyd, 1995) argue that CEO duality promotes 
leadership unity and organisational effectiveness (Gulick & Urwick, 1937; Krause et 
al, 2014).  Brickley et al. (1997) support this and conclude that the costs associated 
with a breakup of a combined position are larger than the benefits for the majority 
of firms. Other opposing view of separating the CEO and chairman roles come from 
Liang et al (2013) who argue, that if the chairman and the CEO do not agree on the 
same strategies, decision making would be problematic if the two roles are held by 
two different people, and this will have some adverse effects on firm performance 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Rechner and Dalton, 1991) 
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However, most of the empirical studies find that there is no significant difference in 
valuation between firms with separated chairman and CEO roles and firms with 
combined CEO and chairman positions (e.g. Dahya & Travlos, 2000; Schmid & 
Zimmermann, 2008). Krause et al (2014) reviewed CEO duality, one of their 
concluding remarks is, that the most consistent outcome in the literature of CEO 
duality is that the separation of CEO and chairman positions alone does not improve 
firm performance. Elsayed (2007) adds that both CEO duality and separation styles 
have associated costs and benefits. CEO duality can be of benefit to some firms 
while separation can also be more worthy for other firms. Strategically, it should be 
better if firm boards are allowed free to employ the structure they consider to be 
beneficial for them. 
3.4.4 Female directors and bank performance 
Diversity in corporate boardrooms has now become a pressing issue in the world 
and many developed countries now demand improvement in board diversity 
practices and the disclosure of these practices from corporations (Harjoto, 
Laksmana, & Lee, 2015). Kang, Cheng and Gray (2007) define board diversity as 
variety in the composition of the board of directors. There are two groups such 
varieties may be classified, namely observable diversity (such as nationality, age, 
gender and ethnic background) which is readily detectable attributes of directors, 
and less visible diversity, such as educational, functional and occupational 
backgrounds, industry experience, and organisational membership of directors. 
From a ‘rational’ point of view, diversity can be seen as a ‘functional’ characteristic 
of a group of people assigned to a particular common task (i.e. board) (Mahadeo et 
al, 2012). Such functionality can result to a greater knowledge base, creativity and 
innovation and as a result, give competitive advantage to organisations (Werbel et 
al, 2003). According to Kang et al, (2007), board diversity brings about solving 
problem effectively, promotion of more effective global relationships, improved 
understanding of the market place and increased creativity and innovati.  
The US adopted a new set of rules which is required by publicly traded firms to 
disclose whether and how diversity of board is considered in their selection process 
of director nominees. There is still inadequate indication of the effect of diversity 
comprised boards on management decision making, although these rules identify 
the need of board diversity (Harjoto, Laksmana, & Lee, 2015). Although ethnic and 
gender diversity is now active policy making topic in many different countries, with 
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some national governments giving rules establishing quotas for diversity, it is still 
not clear how and if desired outcome be gained from these policies. Theories 
provide some understanding of the nature of the relationship between financial 
performance and board diversity (Cartel et al, 2010). One of the theories that provide 
the most backing for a positive link between gender and ethnic diversity of the board 
and firm performance is resource dependence theory (Carter et al, 2010). According 
to this theory, diversity has the possibility to improve the information given by the 
board to managers because of the unique information held by diverse directors 
(García-Meca, García-Sánchez & Martínez-Ferrero, 2015). Gender and 
nationalities differences are most likely to bring distinctive information sets which 
are available to management improved decision making (Carter et al, 2010).  
On the other hand, having diverse board of directors may cause decision making to 
be slower and more conflicted, suggested by some theory directors. This makes a 
lot of researchers see board diversity as ‘double-edged sword’, precisely improving 
group processes on some duties and resulting to higher quality solutions,  while also 
reducing cohesion and all too often disrupting group processes (García-Meca, 
García-Sánchez & Martínez-Ferrero, 2015). Resource dependency theory also 
gives the foundation for some theoretical point of view for a business case for board 
diversity (Carter et al, 2010). As a result of distinctive information held by diverse 
directors, diversity have the possibility to improve the information delivered by the 
board to managers. Diverse directors may bring different views and nontraditional 
ways to problems because they have little chance to be insiders or business experts. 
Accessibility is given by diverse directors to vital constituencies in the external 
environment. The formation of this vital link is essential since more than half of the 
human capital pool available to the firm is composed of women and ethnic minorities 
(Carter et al, 2010).  
Gender is perhaps the most longstanding and discussed component of board 
composition (Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, & Hanuman, 2012), yet a number of studies 
find that the number of female directors on boards is not encouraging. Some studies 
propose that a lot of women who are directors are likely to have staff management 
skills like communication, legal or human resources instead of marketing functions 
and operations in contrast to men (García-Meca, García-Sánchez & Martínez-
Ferrero, 2015). Women are also very likely to possess non-business background 
and to have advanced degrees which aid firms to gain competitive advantage 
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through dealing effectively with diversity in their product and labour market. Female 
board members also bring different views to the boardroom and transparency 
(Upadhyay & Zeng, 2014), encourage lively discussion in the boardroom and help 
represent shareholders better (García-Meca, García-Sánchez & Martínez-Ferrero, 
2015). According to Gulamhussen and Santa (2015), some advocates support that 
women behaviour is different in different kind of situations and their unique 
behaviour in the boardrooms assists boards to access untapped talent and transfer 
greater independence since women do not belong to the informal social networks 
dominated by males. 
3.4.5 Board size and bank performance 
Company’s board of directors’ structure and its association to company performance 
is extensively studied in various economics and business disciplines (O’Sullivan et 
al, 2016). Among the most important governance mechanisms that protect 
shareholders’ interests through monitoring managerial activities is corporate board 
(Upadhyay, 2015). And one of the most important board characteristics within 
corporate governance literature is board size. Jensen (1993) adds, that Board size 
is an important attribute that affects board effectiveness. According to resource 
dependency theory, large board size is good for firms because a firm with large and 
diversified board members can have greater expertise, they can have quality advice 
and access to resources (Zahra & Pearce, 1989, Salim et al, 2016). Also, it is 
relatively harder for insiders to control larger board size. Resource dependency 
theory also argues that bigger board comes with greater chance for additional links 
and therefore access to resources (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Brown and Caylor 
(2004) also add that firms with larger board size have higher returns on equity and 
higher net profit margins than do firms with smaller board size. 
According to Hoque et al (2013), a board that have bigger number of directors is 
able to have bigger committees than board that have smaller number of directors. 
Bigger committees are able to contribute to better financial performance (Hoque et 
al, (2013). O’Sullivan, (2016) add that a firm with larger board will find it easier to 
identify opportunistic behaviours of managers. Moreover, many studies mention that 
firms which are opaque require additional advice on their numerous segments and 
many board members bring experience and expertise (O’Sullivan, et al, 2016). 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Yermack (1996) recommend three reasons why bank 
holding companies have larger boards. Firstly, board size has positive effect on 
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asset size. Secondly, bigger diversified firms might require extra board members to 
assist management monitoring. The third reason is that banks requiring bigger 
boards may have come as a result of mergers and acquisitions in the industry 
(O’Sullivan, Mamun and Hassan, 2016). From the viewpoint of neo-institutional, 
larger boards comes with higher managerial monitoring. The effect is that this can 
improve efficiency and Corporate Financial Performance for shareholders by 
ensuring conformance to corporate regulations and norms. Also, decisions of 
executives which includes disclosure ones, can effectively be scrutinised by larger 
boards’’, according to Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013).   
However, there are many different opposing views to bigger board. The agency 
theory perspective suggests that because of director free rider problems, 
coordination and communication problems, and internal conflicts among directors, 
larger boards are inefficient (Jensen (1993). Also, boards that are larger than seven 
to eight members are not likely to function effectively since the chances for animosity 
and retribution between the members of the board are high (Jensen 1993; Hoque 
et al, (2013). Moreover, when it comes to decision making, it is very hard for a firm 
with bigger board to organise board meetings and it is more difficult and demands 
a lot of effort for larger group to reach consensus (Cheng, 2008). Due to this reason, 
the decision from a bigger board has a tendency to be less extreme, that is, tend to 
be either bad or good and as a result less variable performance has the possibility 
to be associated with larger boards (Cheng, 2008). Again, it is harder for CEO who 
is dominant to control a larger board than a smaller board (Jensen, 1993) because 
incentive to obtain information by individual director’s and monitor managers is low 
in boards which are bigger (Pathan & Faff, 2013). Additionally, the larger groups’ 
final decision reflect more compromises and are less extreme than those of smaller 
groups (Sah and Stiglitz, 1991; Cheng (2008). Eisenberg (1998) discussed two main 
sources of the board-size effect. They are: as group size increases, communication 
and coordination problems also increases, and the ability of the board to control 
management decreases, which lead to agency problems which stem from the 
separation of management and control (Eisenberg et al, 1998). Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) and Hoque et al, (2013) also add that the number of people on boards should 
be limited to between eight and ten, since boards bigger than this number have 
problems with less-candid discussion regarding managerial performance, slower 
decision making and biases against risk-taking. 
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3.4.6 Board independence and bank performance 
The majority of the previous studies compare board independence with non-
financial firms (for instance, Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Core et al, 1999; Nguyen 
and Nielsen, 2010; Liu et al, 2015; Bhagat & Black, 2002), with few studies focusing 
on banking and financial institutions. As a result, there are very few empirical 
literature on board independence and bank performance. The most important 
corporate governance mechanism is the board of directors who work to ensure that 
the self-interested managers do not pursue private benefits at the expense of 
shareholders (Lu &Wang, 2015). The board of directors should always act in the 
best interest of the shareholders by working as a collective body. To work for the 
shareholders interest, the board needs both executive and non-executive directors. 
The persons entrusted by shareholders to represent them in order to decrease 
agency problems are the independent directors (Fuzi, Halim & Julizaerma, 2016). It 
is argued that bank boards normally have more independent directors than non-
financial firms since banks normally have complex instruments and trading activities 
to address them (John et al, 2016). Fuzi et al (2016) posit that board independence 
reflects the ability of the board to provide independent monitoring and oversight role 
of management actions so as to reduce moral hazard. Aebi et al (2012) define 
independent directors as directors without any relation with the company except for 
their board seat. According to Bradley and Chen (2015), NYSE and NASDAQ 
classify a director as independent even if the director was a former employee of the 
firm, so far as the employment of the director terminated at least three years prior 
to the directorship. However, director is not regarded by RiskMetrics as independent 
if the director has any business transaction with the firm or has ever worked for the 
firm (Bradley & Chen, 2015). Bohren and Staubo (2016) also state that directors 
who have professional ties to the manager are called inside or dependent directors 
while those who do not have professional ties to the manager are called outside or 
independent.  
It is argued that unless the non-executive directors are independent from 
management and to make sure that unbiased business judgement are provided, 
they will find it impossible to exercise their duties effectively and efficiently (Fuzi, 
Halim & Julizaerma, 2016). Lu and Wang (2015) add that if the board is not 
independent, when performing its advising and monitoring duties, the function of the 
board could be compromised. Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
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Bohren and Staubo (2016) state that firm value may be created by independent 
directors because of the potential conflict of interest that exist between owners who 
delegate control rights to the managers and managers who runs the firm. 
Independent directors who have no personal or professional ties to the firm or to the 
manager have less to lose and perform their monitoring functions by challenging the 
manager better than those directors who have professional or personal ties to the 
firm or to the manager (Bohren & Staubo, 2016). According to Knyazeva et al (2013), 
independent board serves as a valuable monitoring role and positively affects ﬁrm 
proﬁtability and operating performance. Knyazeva et al (2013) add that, partly 
through better alignment of manager incentives with shareholder interests, 
independent boards contribute to improved proﬁtability and higher valuation. Also, 
the most abled body which have been identified inside the board which is assume 
to undertake monitoring and advisory role is outside independent directors because 
they are less, or not subject to potential conflicts of interest that minimises their 
monitoring capacity. Again, outside directors are experienced professionals in large 
organisations and other firms and for that matter they care about their reputation. It 
is mentioned that this reputation induces outside directors to monitor (Nguyen & 
Nielson, 2010) and outside independent directors have technical experts in 
management and decision making that enable them to be effective monitors (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Nguyen and Nielson, 2010). Moreover, CEOs are more likely to be 
removed by outside-dominated boards as a result of poor performance (Weisbach, 
1988). 
However, according to Nguyen and Nielsen (2010), adding more independent 
directors to a board might not always be helpful. Independent directors often lack 
high advisory skills which require deep insight into the frim, competitors, its 
customers, suppliers and industry, this is caused by their arms-length distance from 
the frim ((Bhagat & Black, 2002; Bohren and Staubo, 2016). Also, the CEO may be 
reluctant when sharing information with the board because independent board is a 
tougher monitor, therefore management friendly boards can be optimal (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2007). Moreover, Agrawal and Knoeber, (1996) indicate that independent 
boards decrease firm value, they find a negative relationship between more outside 
directors and firm performance.  
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3.5 Theoretical literature review on moderating effect of corporate 
governance on the relationship between bank risk and bank performance 
As mentioned earlier, banking activities are associated with risks which affect the 
performance of banks. The earlier discussions have looked at the direct impact of 
bank risk on bank performance, the impact of corporate governance on bank risk, 
and the impact of corporate governance on bank performance. This section looks 
at the moderation effect of corporate governance on the relationship between bank 
risk and bank performance. In other words, this section looks at the joint effect of 
corporate governance and bank risk on bank performance.  
Previous studies have   looked   at   how   different   corporate   governance   
characteristics   impact   on   bank performance. Firstly, according to agency theory, 
smaller board is more efficient than bigger board as a result of an increase in agency 
conflicts due to inefficient communication, agency conflicts and cooperation cost 
that associate with bigger board (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Mamatzakis 
& Bermpei, 2015). Contrary, resource dependency theory posits that, through bigger 
boards, firms obtain greater expertise and have access to resources. As a result, 
bigger board improves firm performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Salim, Arjomandi 
& Seufert, 2016).   
Secondly, agency theory posits that frequent board meetings may indicate active 
monitoring by the board (Grove et al, 2011). Thirdly, role duality impact on bank 
performance. Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, (2013) define role duality as the situation 
whereby one person holds the two most powerful positions of CEO and chairman 
on the board of directors. As agency theory and the Cadbury Committee (1992) 
recommend the separation of chairman and CEO roles, stewardship theory opposes 
the separation of chairman and CEO roles and recommends one person to hold 
both chairman and CEO roles. Fourthly, Independent directors are entrusted by 
shareholders to represent them in order to minimise agency problems. 
Independence reflects the ability of the board to provide independent monitoring 
and oversight role of management actions so as to reduce moral hazard (Fuzi, Halim 
and Julizaerma, 2016). Fifthly, previous studies (e.g. Robinson & Dechant, 1997; 
Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015) suggest that female directors are more likely 
committed to their work and have better communication with other members on the 
board and work to improve firm performance. According to resource dependency 
theory, diversity have the possibility to improve the information given by the board 
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to managers because of the unique information held by diverse directors (García-
Meca et al., 2015). We expect female directors to interact with bank risk to reduce 
bank risk and improve bank performance.  
However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no study has looked at any 
potential interactions that may occur between bank risk and performance. By 
contrast, it is rare to find literature assessing the extent to which corporate 
governance may moderate the relationship between bank risk and bank 
performance. The question is, what is the impact on bank performance if corporate 
governance interacts with bank risk? To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the 
impact of the interaction between corporate governance and bank risk on bank 
performance is missing within the banking-corporate governance literature, 
especially in Africa.  This is a very fertile area which needs to be researched. As a 
result, this section looks at the moderation effect of bank corporate governance on 
the relationship between bank risk and bank performance. To be specific, we want 
to see the impact on bank performance in Africa when corporate governance 
interacts with bank risk. Different mechanisms which include corporate governance 
have been recommended by agency theory to resolve the conflicts in modern 
companies in which there is an existence of separation of ownership and control 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ntim et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2017). As a result, we 
include a number of corporate governance characteristics to see how their 
interaction with risk affects bank performance. This discussion is based on five 
corporate governance characteristics already discussed above namely, board 
meetings, board size, female directors, role duality and the presence of independent 
directors.  
We already know from the above discussions that, bank risk can have either 
negative or positive impact on performance. On the other hand, various corporate 
governance characteristics can also have negative or positive impact on bank 
performance. Although banking risk affect performance, it also depends on the 
quality of corporate governance in place. Therefore, we argue that, in a better 
governed banks, risk is managed effectively leading to improved performance. On 
the contrary, in poor governed banks, risk is not managed well leading to poor 
performance. For example, smaller boards may possess the ability to hold frank 
meetings and involve mostly in effective monitoring (Ntim et al., 2017), therefore, 
smaller boards can reduce bank risk to improve bank performance. Contrary, bigger 
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boards can impair their efficacy of monitoring in the form of excessive managerial 
play (Ntim et al., 2017) which cannot help to reduce the impact of bank risk on 
performance. Similarly, independent directors provide advice and monitoring role 
(Knyazeva et al., 2013), and they are also experts in management and making 
decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Nguyen & Nielson, 2010). Therefore their 
interaction with bank risk can help reduce the impact of bank risk on performance. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that female are more risk averse in making 
financial decisions than men (Berger et al, 2014; Nelson, 2015, Sila et al, 2016) and 
bring different views to the board room (Upadhyay & Zeng, 2014). It is also believed 
that the likelihood that female directors will take aggressive acquisition strategies is 
less and even if they do they offer less bid premium (Levi, Li & Zhang, 2014). 
Therefore, it is expected that when female directors interact with bank risk, the risk 
is likely to be reduced to improve bank performance. Also, role duality is perceived 
not to be good for bank risk reduction. According to the agency theory, separation 
of CEO and chairman role is good corporate governance practice (Jensen, 1993; 
Syriopoulos and Tsatsaronis, 2012). Duality is considered as self- evaluated when 
chairman is assessed by the same person. According to Switzer and Wang (2013), 
credit risk level will reduce with the situation where the CEO does not hold board 
chairman position at the same time. Therefore, when CEO and chairman positions 
are held by two different people it is expected that bank risk will reduce and improve 
bank performance. Similarly, board meetings will have negative impact on bank risk 
and improve bank performance. Agency theory posit that that the relevant and 
important of frequent corporate board meetings is the increased capacity to advise 
effectively, discipline management and monitor them (Jensen & Meckling, (1976), 
which could reduce bank risk and improve performance. We argue that when 
corporate governance mechanisms in place are good and efficient, we expect risk 
to be managed well to reduce the negative impact it has on bank performance. In 
the event of financial distress, there would be low adverse impact on bank 
performance when corporate governance interacts with bank risk.  
 
3.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has focused on the main theories that support this work namely, 
agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependency theory. The chapter 
also focused on the theoretical literature review of the main themes of the research 
namely, the relationship between bank risk and bank performance, the relationship 
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between bank risk and corporate governance, the relationship between corporate 
governance and bank performance and the moderation effect of corporate 
governance on the relationship between bank risk and performance. The next 
section is chapter four which focuses on the discussion on the previous empirical 
findings on the relationship between bank risk and bank performance, corporate 
governance and bank risk, corporate governance and bank performance and the 
joint effect- of corporate governance and bank risk on bank performance.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
4 Introduction   
This chapter discusses the detailed empirical literature review. The chapter is 
divided into four parts. The first part discusses the detailed empirical literature on 
the relationship between bank risk and bank performance. The second part 
discusses the empirical literature on the relationship between corporate governance 
and bank risk. The third part looks at the empirical evidence on the relationship 
between corporate governance and bank performance. The fourth part also looks 
at the empirical evidence of the moderation effect of corporate governance on the 
relationship between bank risk and bank performance.  
4.1 Empirical literature review on bank risk and bank performance 
The empirical literature on the relationship between bank risk and bank performance 
has been studied quiet extensively. However, the extant literature mainly focuses 
on developed and emerging countries in Asia (For example Tan, 2016) with little 
attention on Africa. Moreover, the findings from the existing literature are mixed. 
This calls for further research, especially in Africa where studies on bank risk and 
bank performance relationship is very dearth.  
I.Maghyereh and Awartani (2014) analysed the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) 
banking sector efficiency performance with a sample of 70 banks. The main 
motivation of the study was to provide an assessment of whether market power, risk 
taking activities and regulations have any effect on efficiency performance of GCC 
banks. The findings indicate that when the risk was measured by Z-score or even 
by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans has negative effect on efficiency. 
Tan et al, (2017) used a two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) system 
estimator to investigate the effect of risk, competition and cost efficiency on 
profitability of Chinese commercial banks between 2003 and 2013. The empirical 
findings show that credit risk and security risk have significant and negative effect 
on bank profitability, liquidity risk is negatively related to ROE, and capital risk is 
significantly and negatively related to ROA and net interest margin (NIM). Tan and 
Floros (2012) report another similar finding in their evaluation of the determinants of 
bank profitability in China. They used a sample of 101 banks over the period 2003-
2009. Using two step GMM estimators, the results show that credit risk is negatively 
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related to bank profitability, measured as ROA, but positively related to net interest 
margin. In addition, Al-Tamimi, et al, (2015) examined the association between 
financial risk and performance (measured by return on assets and return on equity) 
of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Islamic banks and the relative importance of 
common types of risks, namely credit, liquidity, capital and operational risks. Using 
a sample of 11 banks, they find a significant negative relationship between GCC 
Islamic bank performance and two types of risk, namely capital risk and operational 
risk. Similarly, liquidity risk in Pakistani banks was examined by Arif and Nauman 
Anees (2012). They evaluated its effect on bank performance using data from 
various secondary sources with a sample of 22 Pakinstani banks between 2004-
2009, with a panel data yielding 132 observations. The result indicates that liquidity 
risk has a significant impact on bank performance. The results show that the two 
factors exacerbating risk are liquidity gap and non-performing loan and these two 
have negative relationship with banks profitability. Another similar evidence was 
reported by Boadi et al, (2016). The authors analysed the bank specific, 
macroeconomic and some risk determinants of bank profitability of rural and 
community banks (RCBs) in Ghana. Using fixed effect panel regression analysis 
with a sample of 114 RCBs during 2005-2013, the findings show a sign that funding 
risk is negatively related to RCBs profitability in Ghana.  
Furthermore, the examination of factors that affect the investment banks 
performance in the G7 and Switzerland using a panel analysis by Mamatzakis and 
Bermpei (2014) shows that there is a negative impact of liquidity on cost efficiency 
and bank performance for banks that fall under low liquidity regime. Also, 
Athanasoglou et al (2008) examined the effect of bank-speciﬁc, industry-speciﬁc 
and macroeconomic determinants of bank proﬁtability in Greek covering a period 
from 1985 to 2001 using GMM technique. The empirical results show a reduction in 
profit when there is increase exposure to credit risk. Again, Sufian (2011) reported 
a negative impact of credit risk (proxy as ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans) 
on Korean banks profitability when examined Korea bank profitability from 1992 to 
2003. Moreover, using banks with different ownership structures in Japan, Liu and 
Wilson (2010) examined the determinants of bank profitability over the period 2000 
to 2007. The results show that well capitalised and efficient banks with lower credit 
risk perform better than less efficient banks which have higher credit risk. Consistent 
with the above findings is the findings from Sufian and Chong (2008) who provided 
an examination into the determinants of banks profitability in Philippines from 1990 
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to 2005 with 280 bank-year observations. The findings indicate a negative 
relationship between credit risk and bank profitability. Another negative effect of 
bank risk on performance was provided by Zhang et al, (2013). The authors studied 
the relationship between market concentration, risk-taking and bank performance 
over the period 2003-2010. The results show that banks that take a lower level of 
risks perform better and observed a negative relationship between bank 
performance and market risk, credit risk and overall risk. The exploration of the 
impact of operational risk on bank performance in Kenya by Muriithi and Waweru 
(2017) shows that operational risk has negative impact on bank performance.  
Other studies have provided some empirical evidence of positive association 
between bank risk and performance. For instance, in Turkey, the effects of credit 
risk and market risk (interest rate risk and foreign exchange rate risk) on bank 
performance was investigated by Ekinci (2016). A weekly data from 18th January 
2002 to 30th October, 2005 with 716 observations was employed. The findings of 
this study indicate that credit risk, measured as return of industrial index, and foreign 
exchange risk have strong and positive effect on Turkish banks profitability. Tan et 
al. (2017) examined the effect of risk, competition and cost efficiency on profitability 
of Chinese commercial banks. The findings show that liquidity risk is significantly 
and positively related to ROA and NIM, capital risk has positive effect on ROE and 
commercial banks with higher insolvency risk are associated with higher profitability 
(ROA and ROE). Similarly, Sufian and Habibullah (2009a) examined the 
determinants of Chinese banks profitability from 2000 to 2005. Using a total sample 
of 220 bank-year observations, the empirical result shows that credit risk has 
positive effect on performance of state owned commercial banks in China. Sufian 
and Habibullah (2009b) provided another examination of the performance of 37 
Bangladeshi commercial banks from 1997 to 2004. The empirical findings suggest 
that credit risk has positive impact on bank performance in Bangladesh. In another 
similar study, 4 state-owned commercial banks and 12 joint-stock commercial banks 
were used by Sufian (2009) to investigate the determinants of the profitability of 
banks in China between 2000-2007. The empirical findings suggest that commercial 
banks in China that have higher levels of liquidity and credit risks have greater 
profitability. Also, using a sample of 25 commercial banks in Bangladesh for a period 
ranges from 2006 to 2013 to investigate the determinants of bank profitability, 
Rahman et al, (2015) report a strong and positive relationship between credit risk 
and bank profitability.  
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However, some studies find insignificant or no relationship between bank risk and 
bank performance. For instance, Tan (2016) tested the impacts of competition and 
risk on bank profitability over the period 2003–2011. Using a sample of 41 Chinese 
commercial banks, the results indicate that banks profitability on China persists to 
small extent, the results did not find any robust impact of risk and competition in the 
Chinese banking industry. According to the authors, the unclear impact of risk and 
bank profitability can be attributed to the fact that the China Government still have 
influence or provide strong support to the banks in China, especially the state owned 
commercial banks. The support comes through four assets management 
companies and capital injections (Tan, 2016). In addition, the impact of currency risk 
on multilateral banks performance was investigated by Kamau et al (2015). A 
sample of 53 banks was analysed and the findings indicate that, the currency risk 
has no significant impact on the multilateral banks performance which was 
measured by after-tax accounting profitability or loss.  
As mentioned earlier, the result of bank risk and performance relationship is mixed. 
Some report positive, some report negative relationship while others report 
insignificant or no relationship between bank risk and performance. The conflicting 
nature of the results may be partly due to the fact that the past studies use different 
proxies for risk and performance, different techniques of estimation and different 
countries have different characteristics. In this case, Africa gives an interesting 
research environment to explore the relationship between bank risk and 
performance. In Africa, we expect that bank risk impact on bank performance 
negatively. As a result, we state our first hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant and negative association between bank risk 
and bank performance in Africa 
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4.2 Empirical literature review on corporate governance and bank risk  
The empirical literature focuses on the relationship between bank risk and five 
corporate governance variables namely, board size, female directors, board 
independence, role or CEO duality and board meetings.  
4.2.1 Board size and bank risk 
Empirically, there is still limited literature on the relationship between board size and 
bank risk. The available empirical findings are still not conclusive and provide mixed 
results. Some studies provide evidence of negative relationship between board size 
and bank risk (e.g. Pathan, 2009; Switzer & Wang, 2013; Lu & Boateng, 2017)). 
Some other evidence provides positive relationship between board size and bank 
risk (e.g. Chan et al, 2016; Battaglia & Gallo, 2017) while some provide evidence of 
no significant relationship between board size and bank risk (e.g. Akbar et al (2017).  
Pathan (2009) examines the impact of bank board structure on bank risk-taking 
relevance. Using a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997–
2004, the findings suggest that smaller and less restrictive board has positive effect 
on bank risk taking. This means there is a negative relationship between board size 
and bank risk, which is in line with the resource dependency theory. According to 
Pathan (2009), this finding suggests that the board structure of the bank is a vital 
determinant of bank risk-taking. Pathan (2009) added that given that the structure 
of the board is instrumental to the risk-taking of the bank, intensive monitoring 
should be done by regulators to the banks where interests of both managers and 
shareholders are aligned in a way to control extreme risk-taking. Similarly, Wang 
and Hsu (2013) provide an investigation into the association that exist between 
board composition and operational risk events of financial institutions from 1996 to 
2010. The results show that board size is negatively and non-linearly associated 
with the possibility of operational risk events. 
 Again, Lu and Boateng (2017) reported a negative relationship between board size 
and bank risk using a sample of 79 UK banks between 2000 and 2014. Also, the 
relationship between credit risks of banks and the corporate governance structures 
of these banks from the perspective of creditors was explored by Switzer and Wang 
(2013). The sample of the study consists of all the US commercial banks (SIC: 
6020), federally chartered saving banks (SIC: 6035) and non-federally chartered 
saving banks (SIC: 6036) from Compustat during the period 2001–2010. The final 
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sample consists of a panel of 228 banks with 782 observations. After controlling for 
firm specific characteristics and market variables which include leverage, market-
to-book-ratio and profitability which is measured by return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE), the results reveal that commercial banks with larger boards 
are associated with significantly lower credit risk levels, which is consistence with 
the resource dependency theory. The authors reveal that banks with greater market 
to book ratios are linked to higher probabilities of default and small banks and higher 
leverage banks and lower ROA have more probability to default. Moreover, Rachdi 
et al, (2013) find that small and dual functions boards are associated with an 
increase in insolvency risk using a sample of 11 Tunisian conventional banks over 
the period from 2001 to 2011. 
Contrary, using a sample of 16 listed commercial banks in China from 2003 to 2011, 
Chan et al, (2016) provide empirical evidence that smaller board size leads to lower 
exposure to risk in China. This implies a positive relationship between board size 
and bank risk. Similarly, Battaglia and Gallo (2017) report that smaller bank board 
causes less bank risk taking, using 40 European banks from 2006 to 2010.  
However, the examination of the link between board structures and risk taking of 
corporates in the financial sector in UK by Akbar et al (2017) shows no significant 
effect of board size on bank risk taking. Based on the above discussion and findings, 
we state our second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant positive association between board size and 
bank risk in Africa 
4.2.2 Female directors and bank risk 
There are a number of authors who have included gender diversity as a corporate 
governance mechanism in their studies (Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Wang & Kelan, 
2013; Chapple & Humphrey, 2014; Lakhal, 2015; Nelson, 2015; Ward & Forker, 
2017). These studies have focused on the relationship between gender diversity 
and other variables, whiles the relationship between gender diversified board and 
bank risk has been ignored. Therefore, there is a very limited study on board gender 
diversity and bank risk. Within the African context, the empirical study of the 
relationship between female directors and bank risk is hard to find.  
Since little is known about demographic characteristics of executive teams effect on 
corporate governance in banking, Gulamhussen and Santa (2015) gave an 
assessment into the role of women in the boardroom of banks. They use a sample 
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of 461 banks from OECD countries and controlled for country and bank specific 
effects. The results find a negative association between the female presence in the 
bank boardrooms and risk-taking. Similar finding was reported by Chan et al, (2016). 
They anaylised 16 commercial banks in China from 2003 to 2011 to find the effect 
of board of director’s socio-economic background on bank risk-taking behaviour. 
The empirical evidence finds that a higher proportion of female directors reduce the 
risk of Chinese listed commercial banks. Using a sample of 612 European banks 
from 20 European countries to investigate the European Union corporate board 
gender diversity, Cabo et al, (2012) also find that the number of female directors is 
bigger on the banks boards which have lower risk. Moreover, Dong (2017) 
investigates the impact of board governance characteristics on bank efficiency and 
risk taking. The findings show that the proportion of female directors on bank board 
is associated with lower traditional banking risk. Furthermore, Palvia et al (2015) 
examined if default risk and capital ratios of banks are associated with the gender 
of the bank’s CEO and Chairperson of the board using a sample of 6729 US banks 
between 2007 to 2010.  The findings of the study indicate a negative association 
between bank default risk during the recent financial crises and female CEOs and 
Chairwomen. A study by Lu and Boateng (2017) also finds the presence of female 
directors on bank board has negative and significant effect on credit risk, using a 
sample of 79 UK banks for the period of 2000-2014. Furthermore, Dong et al (2017) 
find the presence of female directors on bank board leads to lower banking risk, 
using 105 commercial banks from 2003 to 2011 in China 
Contrary to the above findings, Berger et al (2014) investigate how age, gender and 
education of executive teams affect the financial institutions portfolio risk in 
Germany. The study uses a sample of 10,719 bank-year observations. The 
regression equation for the analysis contained several control variables including 
bank size and capital adequacy ratio. The findings indicate that, the rise in female 
board representation increases the portfolio risk of the German banks, even though 
the change is statistically and economically marginal. Similarly, using a sample of 
101 banks over a period from 2003 to 2011, Yu et al (2017) report a positive 
relationship between the percentage of female directors and bank risk.  
Few other empirical evidence that concentrate on gender difference in banking and 
risk is limited to loan officers and does not give examination of bank board executive 
members. For instance, Bellucci et al, (2010) report that female officers are more 
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risk-averse than male officers and as a result tend to limit credit accessibility to new 
and un-established borrowers more than their counterparts who are males. 
Similarly, Beck et al. (2013) show that loans default rate on loans issued by female 
loan officers tend to be lesser than those which are issued by male loan officers. 
Rad et al, (2013) find that female loan officers concentrate more on collateral as a 
proxy for risk aversion when evaluation their loan application for the first time than 
men. However, they also show that as far as risk aversion is concerned, there are 
no substantial differences between male and female loan officers when evaluating 
subsequent loan applications. These findings suggest that gender diversified board 
is likely to reduce bank risk levels. Therefore, we state our third hypothesis as 
follows:  
Hypothesis 3: There is a significant negative association between the presence of 
female directors on bank board and bank risk in Africa. 
 
4.2.3 Board independence and bank risk 
Empirically, the literature on board independence and bank risk is very limited. This 
gives a very fertile ground for future research in this area, especially in Africa where 
the literature on this relationship is almost nil. Some of the limited literature on board 
independence and bank risk are highlighted here. Minton et al, (2010) study how 
risk taking and firm value are related to board independence and financial expertise 
using a sample of 652 banks and other financial firms from 2000 to 2008. The results 
show that the percentage of independence board directors and risk are negatively 
related. Similarly, Chan et al, (2016) used a sample of 16 listed commercial banks 
from 2003 to 2011. The result indicates that a higher proportion of independent 
directors on the board reduce bank risk taking. Again, Switzer and Wang (2013) 
examined the association that exist between credit risk of banks and corporate 
governance structures. The empirical findings show that boards with more 
independent executive directors have lower credit risk levels. Recently, using a 
sample of 40 European banks from 2006 to 2010, Battaglia and Gallo (2017) find 
European banks with more independent directors have lower default probability 
using z-score as risk measure. Moreover, using a sample of 276 financial firms in 
the UK, Akbar et al (2017) record that a financial board with more independent 
directors would take less risk. Again, using a sample of 212 US BHCs over 1997-
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2004, Pathan (2009) reports that board independence and bank risk are negatively 
related. 
Contrary, Rachdi et al (2013) use a sample of 11 Tunisian conventional banks from 
2001 to 2011. The empirical results show that the presence of independent directors 
within the board causes an increase in global risk. A study by Vallascas et al (2017) 
shows that board independent increases bank risk taking after the recent financial 
crisis, using a sample of 262 banks between 2004 and 2014. Similar result was 
recorded by Lu and Boateng (2017) who find that board independence has positive 
impact on bank risk, using 79 UK banks from 2000 to 2014. Within the African 
context, we expect that the presence of independence directors on bank board will 
cause a reduction in bank risk. Therefore we state our fourth hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 4: There is a significant negative association between board 
independence and bank risk in Africa 
 
 4.2.4 Role or CEO duality and bank risk 
In general, the empirical literature and findings on CEO duality and bank risk is very 
scanty. The literature on CEO duality and bank risk is not just limited within African 
context but the entire literature on developed and emerging countries as well. The 
limited available empirical literature shows a mix results regarding the relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance. For instance CEO duality was found to 
be negatively related to bank performance (For example Grove et al, 2011; Mollah 
& Zaman; 2015) while a positive association between bank performance and CEO 
duality was recorded by Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013). There are empirical 
evidence which shows either CEO duality or separation of the two posts has no 
relation with bank performance (for example Carty & Weiss, 2012; Bukair & 
Rahman, 2015). In relation to bank risk, Rachdi et al, (2013), examined how board 
characteristics affect banking industry using a sample of 11 Tunisian conventional 
banks from 2001 to 2011. The result shows the evidence that duality board is 
associated with insolvency risk. Using a sample of 79 banks, Lu and Boateng (2017) 
find a significant and positive effect of CEO duality on credit risk of UK banks. 
Contrary, using a sample of 276 UK financial firms, Akbar et al (2017) show that 
CEO duality has negative impact on bank risk taking. In general, the relation 
between CEO duality and bank risk has been largely ignored. Based on the 
available literature and empirical findings, we expect the separation of CEO and 
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chairman role to cause a reduction in bank risk in Africa. As a result, we state our 
fifth hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 5: There is a significant negative association between CEO or role 
duality and bank risk in Africa.   
4.2.5 Board meetings and bank risk  
Another area that has a very limited study within the corporate governance literature 
is the association between board meetings and bank risk. In fact, this literature has 
been largely ignored in developed countries, emerging countries in Asia as well as 
developing African countries. The previous empirical literature shows a mixed 
results regarding the relationship between board meeting and performance in the 
banking and non-banking industries. In the non-banking industries, Brick and 
Chidambaran (2010) recorded a positive impact of board activities on firm value. 
Mangena and Tauringana   (2008), Ntim and Osei (2011) and Hoque et al (2013) 
found positive effect of board meetings on firm performance. However, Vafeas 
(1999) recorded a negative relationship between board meetings and firm 
performance .In the banking industry, there are few empirical findings that shows 
positive relationship between board meetings and bank performance (see Grove et 
al, 2011; Liang et al, 2013; and Salim Arjomandi & Seufert, 2016). With regards to 
bank risk, Battaglia and Gallo (2017) recorded a negative relationship between the 
number of board meetings and bank risk using a sample of 40 European banks 
between 2006 and 2010. A mentioned earlier, the relationship between board 
meetings and bank risk has been largely ignored. A bank board that meets 
frequently means that any issues related to risk will be identified and resolved 
immediately to minimise the risk. We expect that when African banks boards meet 
more frequently, they will be in the position to identify and resolve their risk on time. 
Therefore, we state our sixth hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 6:  There is a significant negative association between frequency of 
banks board meetings and bank risk in Africa 
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4.3. Empirical literature review on corporate governance and bank 
performance  
This literature review focuses on the relationship between bank performance and 
five corporate governance variables namely, board size, female directors, board 
independence, role or CEO duality and board meetings.  
4.3.1 Board meetings and bank performance  
Empirically, there is not enough evidence on the association between board 
meetings and bank performance. This provides a fertile ground for further research. 
As a result. This study aims to find out how board meetings affect the performance 
of banks in Africa. The exploration of a set of board characteristics and analysis of 
their impacts on the performance of bank asset quality in China using a sample of 
50 largest Chinese banks during the period of 2003–2010 by Liang et al (2013) find 
that the number of board meetings  have positive impact on bank performance 
(ROA). Similarly, in Australian banks, Salim et al., (2016) find a positive effect of 
frequency of board meetings on bank performance. Consistent with the above 
findings and the agency theory, Grove et al, (2011) used US commercial banks to 
examine the corporate governance and performance in the wake up of the financial 
crisis. They employed multiple regression model with a sample of 236 public 
commercial banks in the US. Consistent with their hypothesis, the findings reveal 
that the frequency of board meetings is positively associated with financial 
performance. The results indicate that the boards of US public commercial banks 
that meet more frequently increase the financial performance of those banks. More 
recently, Abdul Gafoor (2018) finds that board meeting has significant and positive 
association with bank performance, measured by ROA. Based on the above 
discussion and empirical findings, we expect that more board meetings will improve 
the performance of African banks. Therefore, our seventh hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 7: There is a significant positive association between the frequency of 
banks board meetings and bank performance in Africa 
4.3.2 Role or CEO duality and bank performance. 
The available empirical literature relating to the relationship between role duality and 
bank performance gives a mix results, which include positive relationship (Al-Saidi 
& Al-Shammari, 2013), negative relationship (Grove et al, 2011; Mollah & Zaman, 
2015; AlManaseer et al, 2012) and no relationship (Bukair & Rahman, 2015; Carty 
& Weiss, 2012; Abdul Gafoor et al. (2018).  
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Grove et al, (2011) examine corporate governance and performance in the wake up 
of financial crises using US commercial banks. The authors use a sample of 236 
public commercial banks and controlled for bank size and opportunity to grow. Using 
multiple regression model to examine the impact of corporate governance factors 
on financial performance, the results find a negative relationship between CEO 
duality and bank performance. This result confirms that CEO duality shows a 
weakness in corporate governance and affect firm performance negatively, which is 
consistent with agency theory. Similarly, Mollah and Zaman (2015) examined if 
Shariah supervision as a cornerstone of Islamic banking helps Islamic banks 
perform better and create shareholder value over 2005-2011 year period. Using a 
sample of 172 banks, the results find a negative effect of CEO duality on Islamic 
banks performance. Moreover, Dong et al (2017) report a negative relationship 
between CEO duality and bank performance using 105 commercial banks in China.  
Recently, Sarkar and Sarkar (2018) find that the impact of CEO duality on state-
owned bank performance in India is negative 
Contrary, Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013) examined the relationship between 
board composition and bank performance using a sample of nine Kuwait listed 
banks between 2006 and 2010. Using regression to test such relationship and 
controlling for bank size, leverage (debt ratio), capital adequacy and ownership 
concentration, they report a positive association between role duality, where the 
chairman is the same person as the CEO, and bank performance. This finding is 
consistent with stewardship theory and inconsistent with the agency theory 
proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). AlManaseer et al. (2012) reported a 
negative relationship between separation of CEO and chairman role and bank 
performance in Jordan, using a sample of 15 Jordanian banks. 
However, there are some empirical studies which support neither agency theory nor 
stewardship theory and provide no support for role duality or separation of CEO and 
chairman roles. For instance, Bukair and Rahman (2015) examined the relationship 
between board structure, investment account holders (IAHs) and social contribution 
and bank performance. A sample of 40 Islamic banks operating in the countries 
within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) between the period from 2008 – 2011 
were selected for the study. After controlling for other factors (such as bank size and 
leverage) that can affect bank performance within the selected countries, the results 
indicate that the separation of CEO and chairman roles has no effect on bank 
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performance. This means there is no relationship between CEO duality and bank 
performance in the GCC countries. Similarly, Carty and Weiss (2012) investigated 
whether CEO duality is associated with bank failure and whether bank regulators, 
as can be expected, are opposed to CEO duality. Using a sample of 1297 US 
publicly traded banks by employing a structured interviews, the results indicate no 
correlation between bank failure and CEO duality. The findings suggest that CEO 
duality is a less important factor in corporate management than suggested by many 
previous researchers and policy makers. Moreover, using a sample of 36 banks 
from 2001 to 2014, Abdul Gafoor etal (2018) find no significant improvement in bank 
performance when the role of chairman is separated from the CEO. Based on the 
above discussions we expect that separation of CEO and chairman role to improve 
African banks performance. As a result, we state our eighth hypothesis as follows:   
Hypothesis 8: There is a significant negative association between CEO or role 
duality and bank performance in Africa. 
4.3.3 Female board directors and bank performance 
The link between female directors and bank performance has not been extensively 
researched. As a result, the empirical findings on the association between the 
presence of female directors on board and bank performance is very limited. This 
provides a very fertile ground for a research especially in Africa where studies on 
the nexus between female directors and bank performance is almost not available. 
One of the reasons may be unavailability of data or difficulties in obtaining data to 
examine such relationship. Gulamhussen and Santa (2015) provide assessment of 
role of women in the boardrooms using a sample of 461 banks from OECD 
countries. The study controls for bank and country specific effects. Regression 
analysis was employed and the results indicate a positive relationship between the 
presence of female directors in the boardrooms and bank performance. This 
findings indicate that the presence of female directors on the bank board have a 
positive influence on the bank performance which is consistence with the resource 
dependency theory.  
Similarly, Pathan and Faff (2013) study to find out if board structure (gender, board 
size and independence) in banks have any relationship with bank performance, 
measured by six alternative methods, including return of average assets (ROAAs), 
return on average equity (ROAE) and Tobin’s Q ratio (Q). The study uses a panel 
of US bank holding companies (BHC) between 1997 – 2011. Using a sample of top 
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212 BHCs in the US, the  results show that the presence of female directors on 
board has a positive effect on bank performance in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) time (1997-2002), even though this positive effect of gender diversity on bank 
performance diminished in the post SOX period (2003-2006). Moreover, García-
Meca et al (2015) analyse the effect of board diversity on banks performance using 
a sample of 159 banks in nine countries between 2004 -2010. The result suggests 
that gender diversity has positive effect on bank performance and therefore 
increases bank performance. Again, Dong et al (2017) find a positive association 
between the presence of female directors on bank board and bank performance. In 
Africa, we expect that female directors will bring different ideas on the bank board 
to support their male counterparts to provide better bank performance. Therefore 
we state our ninth hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 9: There is a significant positive association between the presence of 
female directors on bank executive board and bank performance in Africa. 
4.3.4 Board size and bank performance        
Empirical studies have reported a mixed results on the association between board 
size and firm performance. Some studies find positive association between board 
size and bank performance (for example Chahine & Safieddine, 2011; Salim et al, 
2016; O’Sullivan et al, 2016; Adams & Mehran, 2012), and some find negative 
association (For instance Liang et al, 2013; Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015; Mollah & 
Zaman, 2015) between board size and bank performance. Chahine and Safieddine 
(2011) investigate the impact of board size and its composition on the performance 
of banks in the context of an emerging market. The study uses a sample of 749 firm 
years of data on the Lebanon banking sector from 1992 to 2006. The data includes 
all nationwide banks in operation in any year over the whole study period. After 
controlling for a number of factors that may affect Lebanon bank performance, the 
results find that there is a positive association between board size and Lebanon 
bank performance, as measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE).  
Similarly, Adams and Mehran (2012) analyse the association between board 
governance and bank performance measured by Tobin’s Q. The study uses a 
sample of banking firms which spans 34 years. The authors employed regression 
analysis and the findings indicate that board size is positively associated with bank 
performance. The findings provide evidence that increase in board size as a result 
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of adding directors with subsidiary directorships may increase the value to the bank 
since these directors may be principally appropriate for dealing with organisational 
complexities when they arise. Another similar findings was reported by Salim et al 
(2016) who provide an empirical evidence of the link between corporate governance 
and Australians banks efficiency over 1999 to 2013 period. The study uses a sample 
of 11 Australian Banks. The study also uses a two-stage double-bootstrap data 
envelopment analysis. The findings suggest that board size has a significant and 
positive effect on the efficiency of the banks. This findings suggest that larger boards 
bring higher knowledge into the decision and supervisory process.  
Moreover, in the US, O’Sullivan et al (2016) provide the examination between the 
associations between some board characteristics and bank holding company 
performance, measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA) before and during 
the recent financial crisis. The study uses a sample of 150 largest US bank holding 
companies from 1999 to 2009. The results find a positive association between board 
size and bank holding performance. However, the positive association between 
board size and bank performance diminished during the financial crisis. Also, the 
result finds the association between board size and bank holding performance 
during the financial crisis to be negative. The findings during the crises supports 
Jensen’s (1993) argument that boards have less chance to function effectively when 
it is larger. More recently, Abdul Gafoor et al (2018) find significant and positive 
relationship between board size and bank performance, measured by ROA. Again, 
Nahar et al (2016) report a significant and positive association between board size 
and bank performance (measured by both ROA and ROE) using a sample of 30 
listed banks in Bangladesh from 2006 to 2012. Also, using a sample of 372 banks 
Aebi et al (2012) report a significant and positive relationship between board size 
and bank performance.  
Contrary to the above findings, Liang et al (2013) explored a set of board 
characteristics and analysed their impacts on the performance of bank asset quality 
in China. They used a sample of 50 largest Chinese banks during the period of 
2003–2010. Consistent with the agency theory, the result found that board size has 
a significant negative impact on bank performance. The findings give a suggestion 
that when it comes to banks supervision and advice functions, smaller boards in 
China tend to be more efficient. Similarly, Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2015) provide 
an investigation into the impact of corporate governance on the US investment 
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banks performance over the period of 200-2012. The study uses a sample of 23 
listed investment banks which are headquartered in the US. After controlling for 
some other variables and using dynamic panel analysis, the authors find a negative 
association between board size and bank performance. The threshold analysis of 
the study reveals that the negative effect is higher when the size of the board 
increase beyond the critical number of around ten board members. This means that 
above a threshold value the increasing cost of monitoring and communication 
worsens the investment banks performance (Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015), 
Moreover, Mollah and Zaman (2015) examined if Shariah supervision as a 
cornerstone of Islamic banking assists Islamic banks perform better and generate 
value to shareholders. They used a sample of 172 banks over 2005 – 2011 period. 
The relationship was tested using both accounting (ROA) and market based 
(Tobin’s Q) performance measures. The results find a negative relationship between 
board size and Islamic banks performance. Recently, using a sample of 84 
Japanese banks listed on Tokyo Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2011, Sakawa and 
Watanabel (2018) report a significant and negative association between board size 
and bank performance. 
However, Georgantopoulos and Filos (2017) assess the impact of board structure 
on bank performance for the case of Greek banks. They used a sample of 13 Greek 
banks and collected data from 2008 to 2014. The empirical results show an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between board size and bank performance. We expect that 
smaller board size will bring better performance for African banks and therefore 
support the agency theory which state that due to coordination and communication 
problems, and internal conflicts among directors, larger boards are inefficient. 
Therefore we state our tenth hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 10: There is a significant negative association between bank board size 
and bank performance in Africa.  
4.3.5 Board independence and bank performance 
The empirical literature on the relationship between board independence and bank 
performance shows a mixed results, negative (e.g. Pathan & Faff, 2013), positive 
(e.g. Abdul Gafoor et al, 2018; Dong, 2016; Liang et al, 2013; Pathan et al, 2007; 
Lee & Carlson, 2007), U-shape (e.g. Georgantopoulos & Filos, 2017), and no 
relationship (e.g. Adams & Mehran, 2012). The available empirical literature shows 
an inconclusive results and for that matter needs further investigation, especially in 
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Africa where there is very limited literature on this area. The presence of directors 
who are independent on the board should indicate a positive relation to the firm’s 
performance. If there is negative relationship or no relationship with firm’s 
performance then such independent directors’ performance on the board were 
jeopardised (Fuzi, Halim & Julizaerma, 2016).  
Georgantopoulos and Filos (2017) investigated corporate governance mechanisms 
of Greek banks. They used a sample of 13 Greek banks and collected data from 
2008 to 2014. The results find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the 
percentage of independent board directors and bank performance. Pathan et al 
(2007) examine the effect of independent directors and board size on the local 
commercial banks performance. The relationship over 1999-2003 was examined 
using a panel fixed effect in the individual regression model. The study controlled 
for other factors that can affect bank performance such as bank size and leverage. 
They find a statistically significant positive association between the number of 
independent directors on the bank board and bank performance. In China, Liang et 
al (2013) explore a set of board characteristics and analyse their impact on the 
performance of bank asset quality. The authors use a sample of 50 largest Chinese 
banks during the period of 2003–2010. The result finds a significant and positive 
association between the proportion of independent directors and both bank 
performance and asset quality.  
Similarly, Lee and Carlson (2007) use sample of S&P 500 firms and find that boards 
with most independent board members perform significantly better than firms with 
less independent boards. Furthermore, Abdul Gafoor et al (2018) find a significant 
and positive relationship between board independence and bank performance using 
a sample of 36 commercial banks. Also, Dong et al (2017) investigated how board 
governance characteristics affect bank efficiency and risk taking. The results 
indicate that board independence is linked with increase in banks profit efficiency. 
Moreover, Yeh et al (2011) explored whether the financial institutions performance 
is higher with more independent directors on different committees during the 2007-
2008 financial crisis. The study uses a sample of 20 largest financial institutions from 
the G8 countries. The results show that during the financial crisis of 2007-2008, 
performance was higher for financial institutions which have more independent 
directors on the risk and audit committees. This means there is a positive 
relationship between committee independence and firm performance during the 
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crises. Recently, Sarkar and Sarkar (2018) find that the proportion of independent 
directors has a positive effect on the performance of private banks in India. 
Contrary to the above findings, Pathan and Faff (2013) examined the relationship 
between banks board structure (gender, board size and independence) and bank 
performance using a sample of top 212 bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US. 
Using a panel of US bank holding companies (BHC) between1997 – 2011, the 
results indicate that board independence decreases bank performance, measured 
by different proxies including ROAA, ROAE and Tobin’s Q. This means there is a 
negative association between board independence and bank performance in 
America. More recently, Sarkar and Sarkar (2018) find that the proportion of 
independent directors has a negative impact on the performance of state-owned 
banks in India. 
However, the association between board governance and bank performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q was analysed by Adams and Mehran (2012). The study 
uses a sample of banking firms which spans 34 years. The findings indicate that 
board independence is not related to bank performance. This means that there is 
no association between board independence and bank performance. In view of the 
above discussions, we expect that the independent board directors should give 
proper monitoring scrutiny on the decisions and strategies of management of African 
banks in order to bring better performance of African banks. As a result, we state 
our eleventh hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 11: There is a significant positive association between board 
independence and bank performance in Africa. 
4.4 Empirical literature review on moderation effect of corporate governance 
on the relationship between bank risk and bank performance 
The previous empirical literature report a negative relationship between bank risk 
and bank performance (e.g. I.Maghyereh & Awartani, 2014; Al-Tamimi, Miniaoui & 
Elkelish, 2015; Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2014; Sufian & Chong, 2008; Athanasoglou 
et al, 2008; Sufian, 2011; Liu & Wilson, 2010; Zhang et al, 2013). Contrary to the 
above findings, Ekinci   (2016) find a very strong and positive   relation   between 
bank risk   and performance while Tan (2016) and Kamau et al, (2015) report no 
relation between bank risk and bank performance. 
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There are also some previous empirical findings on the relationship between 
corporate governance and bank performance. For instance, Chahine and 
Safieddine (2011), Adams and Mehran (2012) and Salim, Arjomandi and Seufert 
(2016) report a positive while Mollah and Zaman (2015) and Mamatzakis and 
Bermpei (2015) report a negative association between board size and bank 
performance. Frequent board meetings has positive impact on bank performance 
(e.g. Liang et al, 2013; Salim Arjomandi & Seufert, 2016; Grove et al, 2011; Abdul 
Gafoor, 2018). Al-Saidi and   Al-Shammari   (2013)   report   a   positive   relation   
between   role   duality   and   bank performance while Grove et al, (2011), 
AlManaseer et al. (2012), Mollah and Zaman (2015) report   a   negative   
relationship   between   role   duality   and   bank   performance. However, Bukair 
and Rahman (2015) and Carty and Weiss (2012) find no evidence on the impact of 
role duality on bank performance. For independent directors, the empirical evidence 
shows a mix results. For instance, Pathan and Faff (2013) report a negative 
association while Yeh et al (2011) and Liang et al (2013) report a positive 
association between board independence and bank performance. Empirical 
evidence has also been reported by Gulamhussen and Santa (2015), Pathan and 
Faff (2013) and García-Meca, García-Sánchez, and Martínez-Ferrero (2015) and 
show that the presence of female director on banks board improve performance.  
However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the empirical literature on 
moderation effect on the relationship between bank risk and bank performance has 
largely been ignored. Based on the empirical findings on the relationship between 
bank risk and bank performance and the relationship between corporate 
governance and bank performance, we expect corporate governance to moderate 
the relationship between bank risk and bank performance in Africa. Therefore, we 
state our twelve hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 12: Corporate governance moderate the relationship between bank risk 
and bank performance in Africa 
4.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has focused on four main themes, empirical literature on the 
relationships between bank risk and bank performance, corporate governance and 
bank risk, corporate governance and bank performance and the moderation effect 
of corporate governance on the relationship between bank risk and bank 
performance. It has been observed that as we have some previous empirical 
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literature on the relationship between bank risk and bank performance, the 
relationship between corporate governance and bank risk, and the relationship 
between corporate governance and bank performance, there is no literature on the 
moderation effect of corporate governance on the relationship between bank risk 
and bank performance. As it has been mentioned in Chapter ten, the literature on 
this area is very scarce so this study recommends more studies on the moderation 
effect of corporate governance on the relationship between bank risk and bank 
performance.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
5 Introduction 
This chapter covers detailed discussion of the research design and methodology. 
The chapter looks at the sample selection, different sources of data for this work, 
criteria for the sample selection and data collection. This chapter also discusses the 
methodology used to achieve the objectives of this research. Firstly, it discusses 
how each of the variable used have been measured. Secondly, it presents the 
justification of the control variables used. Thirdly, this section presents the ordinary 
least square (OLS) assumptions. Specifically, the chapter discusses the various 
assumptions that should be met before conducting the OLS regression. Finally, this 
chapter presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used, which is followed 
by the chapter summary.   
5.1 Sample selection and data sources 
5.1.1 Sample selection 
The sample of banks used for this research were obtained from BankScope 
database provided by Bureau van Dijk. As of 8th December 2016, a total of 1502 
African banks were on BankScope database. All these banks were exported from 
the database. The criteria used to select the final sample has been explained under 
sample selection criteria. Table 3 shows the specialisation of each bank selected 
and the number of banks included under each specialisation in the final sample. The 
specialisation of these banks are bank holding company, central bank, clearing and 
custody institution, commercial bank, corperative bank, credit institution, finance 
company, investment and trust corporation, investment bank, Islamic bank, micro-
finance institution, multilateral governmental bank, other non-banking credit 
institution, private banking/asset management company, real estate and mortgage 
bank, saving bank and securities firm.  
5.1.2 Data sources 
With regards to data sources, the first category of data is the data on the bank 
specific variables. All the data on the bank specific variables were extracted from 
BankScope data base with the exception of 2016 data of some banks which were 
obtained from Orbis bank focus database, which is also provided by Bereau van 
Dijk. The reason is that, when the information of the banks were exported from 
BankScope database in December 2016, some banks did not have 2016 information 
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at the time. Therefore, 2016 information of those banks were later obtained from the 
Orbis bank focus, which is similar database which was replaced by Bereau van dijk 
when BankScope disappeared in December 2016. The second category of data is 
the data on corporate governance variables. The data on the internal corporate 
governance variables were tapped from the annual reports of the sampled banks. 
These annual reports were downloaded direct from the website of the sampled 
banks. However, there are corporate governance information of some few banks 
which were obtained from Boardex database. The third category of the data is data 
on some variables included in the control variables. These variables are GDP and 
corruption. Data on corruption which is one of the variables of the six world 
governance indices (wgi) was downloaded from the Worldbank website, 
info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi. Data on GDP rate was also obtained from the 
worldbank website at data.worldbank.org/indicator. 
5.1.3 Sample selection criteria 
For a bank to be included in the sample, the bank suppose to have five or more 
year’s financial information between 2000 – 2016. The year 2000 was chosen as 
the beginning because the idea was to have more years, more financial information 
and also to capture more banks within the sample. 2016 was chosen as the end 
year because it was the most recent year in which financial information was 
available when collecting the data. Unlike the majority of studies which concentrate 
only on listed banks, the sample for this study included both listed and unlisted 
banks. This allowed this study to include more banks. Also, unlike other studies that 
concentrate only on larger banks, this study considered small, medium and large 
banks. The main reason for choosing both listed and unlisted banks is to get a bigger 
sample for the study in order to get a broader picture from the findings of the 
research.  The sample size and the study period can enhance the generalisation of 
the results of this study. This criteria enabled panel study analysis to be applied to 
this study. According to Gujarati (2003) and (Wooldridge (2009), the advantages of 
using panel data include, firm’s heterogeneity in individual variables can be 
controlled when using panel data.  
As mentioned earlier, 1502 African banks were found on BankScope at the time of 
exporting the banks from the database. Some banks were repeated two or three 
times and some banks had less bank year information. Banks which were selected 
are those which have five or more years information. The rest were not selected 
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because they were considered not having enough information to be included in the 
final sample. Also, if the same bank is repeated more than one, only one is selected. 
In all 635 banks were selected and included in the final sample and the total bank-
years observation is 10795. 
It is important to note that, as bank specific information was obtained from the year 
2000, corporate governance information was obtained from 2005. The reason is that 
we did not find many banks with annual reports prior to 2005. We did not find annual 
reports of some banks at all. Some banks also had annual reports but did not contain 
any corporate governance information that we were looking for. In all, 365 banks 
contain corporate governance information that we were looking for in their annual 
reports. The annual reports of these banks were downloaded manually and the 
corporate governance information were tapped from them. Since all the 635 
sampled banks did not have annual reports, the analysis of this research involving 
corporate governance information can be described as unbalanced panel data 
analysis.  
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Table 2: Number of banks selected from each country 
No
. 
Country No. Of 
Banks 
selecte
d 
Total No. of 
banks 
found in 
BankScop
e 
No
. 
Country No. of 
Banks 
selecte
d 
Total No. of 
banks 
found in 
BankScop
e 
1 Algeria 17 19 25 Madagascar 5 7 
2 Angola 17 18 26 Malawi 12 13 
3 Benin 5 7 27 Mali 8 11 
4 Botswana 16 17 28 Mauritania 7 7 
5 Burkina 
Faso 
7 9 29 Mauritius 16 21 
6 Burundi 5 7 30 Morocco 18 23 
7 Cameroo
n  
9 14 31 Mozambiqu
e 
16 17 
8 Cape 
Verde 
6 9 32 Namibia 10 14 
9 Central 
African 
Republic 
2 2 33 Niger 4 6 
10 Chad 3 5 34 Nigeria 28 42 
11 Cote 
D'Ivoire 
12 18 35 Rwanda 9 9 
12 Djibouti 5 6 36 Senegal 11 15 
13 DR. 
Congo 
12 15 37 Seychelles 6 6 
14 Egypt 26 29 38 Sierra 
Leone 
7 12 
15 Ethiopia 15 27 39 South Africa 57 67 
16 Gabon 7 8 40 South 
Sudan 
2 4 
17 Gambia 2 8 41 Sudan 19 26 
18 Ghana 29 43 42 Swaziland 7 7 
19 Guinea 3 6 43 Tanzania 29 38 
20 Guinea 
Bissau 
1 2 44 Togo 10 11 
21 Kenya 43 47 45 Tunisia 31 31 
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22 Lesotho 4 4 46 Uganda 24 24 
23 Liberia 2 7 47 Zambia 22 23 
24 Libya 9 14 48 Zimbabwe 20 35 
 Total no. 
of banks 
selected 
:635 
      
Source: BankScope 
Table 2 above shows the number of countries and the total number of banks 
selected from each country for this study. In all, the total number of banks selected 
for this study were selected from 48 countries out of the 54 countries in Africa. There 
is only one bank selected from Guinea Bissau representing the country with the 
smallest number of banks. 57 banks were selected from South Africa which 
represents the country with the highest number of banks, from table two.  
 
Table 3 below shows the total number of banks and the percentage of banks 
selected under each banks specialisation. In all, the 635 banks selected for this 
study come from at least one of the 17 bank’s specialisation in table 3. From table 
3, Clearing and custody institution recorded only one bank, other non-banking credit 
institution recorded only one bank while private banking / Asset Mgt. Company also 
recorded only one bank. These bank specialisations represent only 0.2% each, 
which is the lowest number of banks. The specialisation with the greatest number 
of banks is commercial bank which has 399 banks representing 62.8%.  
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Table 3 Specialisation of the banks selected for the study 
No. Bank specialisation No. of 
banks 
Percentage 
1 Bank holdings company 33 5.2% 
2 Central bank 26 4.1% 
3 Clearing and custody institution 1 0.2% 
4 Commercial bank 399 62.8% 
5 Corperative bank 2 0.3% 
6 Credit institution 27 4.3% 
7 Finance company 27 4.3% 
8 Investment & trust corperation 2 0.3% 
9 Investment bank 51 8.0% 
10 Islamic bank 24 3.8% 
11 Micro-finance institution  18 2.8% 
12 Multi-lateral governmental bank 6 0.9% 
13 Other non-banking credit institution 1 0.2% 
14 Private banking / Asset mgt. comp 1 0.2% 
15 Real estate & mortgage bank 8 1.3% 
16 Savings bank 6 0.9% 
17 Securities firm 3 0.5% 
Source: BankScope 
5.2 METHODOLOGY 
This subsection of the research discusses all the methodological approach used to 
answer the research questions. This section in particular discusses the explanatory 
variables and how they are measured. The justification for choosing the firm 
characteristics variables and how they are measured are also discussed. Moreover, 
the model specification and different statistical tests which were performed to 
achieve the research aims and objectives are also discussed in this section.  
5.2.1 Measurement of bank risk and performance  
One of the objectives of this research is to find out the relationship between bank 
risk and performance in Africa. The main dependent variables for this relationship 
are return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) which are proxies for bank 
performance. ROA and ROE are used because they have been used in recent 
studies and also used by a large body of literature (e.g. Tan, 2016; Bennett et al, 
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2015; Rahman et al, 2015). Both ROA and ROE are measured based on earlier 
studies. ROA is measured as the ratio of net income to total assets (e.g. Tan, 2016; 
Bennett et al, 2015). ROE is measured as the ratio of net income to equity (e.g. Tan, 
2016; Bennett et al, 2015). Our bank risk variables are Loan Loss Reserve to Gross 
Loan and Loan Loss Provision to Net Interest Revenue. Loan Loss Reserve to 
Gross Loan is measured as loan loss reserve divided by gross loan (LLR/GL). Loan 
Loss Provision to Net Interest Revenue is measured as Loan Loss Provision divided 
by Net Interest Revenue (LLP/NET INT REV).  
5.2.2 Measurement of Corporate Governance Characteristics 
In all, five corporate governance characteristics have been used in this study. They 
are board size, board meetings, independent directors, presence of female directors 
and role duality. These five variables are used to determine the relationship between 
bank risk and corporate governance, the relationship between corporate 
governance and bank performance, and the moderating effect of corporate 
governance on the relationship between bank risk and performance. The choice of 
these five variables are based on three main reasons. The first reason is the 
availability of data. In general, corporate governance data is very difficult to get. In 
the African context, corporate governance data is very hard to find. Therefore, we 
had to go for variables which have some information and at the same time answer 
the research questions. Secondly, these five corporate governance characteristics 
used in this study are among the most frequently used variables in many studies to 
answer similar research questions. Thirdly, since the data was not available 
anywhere, we had to collect all the corporate governance information from the banks 
annual reports. As a result, we had to choose variables which can be found in the 
annual reports of most of the banks.  
The measurement of corporate governance variables are in line with the previous 
studies. Board size is measured as the number of members on the board at the end 
of the financial year (e.g Sakawa & Watanabel, 2018; Lu & Boateng, 2017). 
Similarly, independent directors is measured as the percentage of independent 
directors on the board at the end of the financial year. Consistence with the previous 
studies (e.g. Liang et al 2013; Aebi et at, 2012), board meetings is measured as the 
number of times that the board meets per year. Presence of female directors is 
measured as the percentage of female directors on the board at the end of the 
financial year. Finally, role duality is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the CEO 
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also takes the role as chairman at the end of its financial year, or  0  if otherwise 
(e.g. Hakimi et al, 2018; Akbar et al, 2017; Lu and Boateng, 2017; Liang et al, 2013; 
Aebi et al, 2012). 
5.2.3 Justification for Control Variables 
To test the hypothesis, other variables apart from the independent variables, have 
been added to control for the potential effects on our dependent variables. This 
subsection outlines and justifies the inclusion of the control variables used in this 
research.  
5.2.3.1 Bank Size 
Bank size has been measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Also, a large 
body of literature has used bank size as control variable to see the potential effect 
it has on bank performance (e.g. Abdul Gafoor et al, 2018; Sakawa & Watanabel, 
2018; Nomran et al, 2018; Tan, 2016; Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2013; Salim et al, 
2016; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011). The size of the bank can have different effects 
on different business activities of the bank including diversification of portfolio, 
opportunities in investments and access to equity capital (Zhan et al, 2008; Rahman 
et al, 2015). Theoretically, larger banks can make entry difficult by creating barriers 
which allow them to make investments and generate funds easily to improve their 
profitability (Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2013; Short & Keasey, 1999). It has been 
argued that a large size bank may results to economies of scale which can lead to 
a reduction in the cost of gathering and processing information (Elsas, 2010; Tan, 
2016; Rahman et al, 2016; Salim et al, 2016). The reduction of cost will ultimately 
increase bank profitability (Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007). Dietrich and Wanzenried 
(2011) add that, the degree of product and diversification of loan is more associated 
with bigger banks than smaller banks. As a results, the risk of larger banks are 
reduced and due to economies of scale which is possible with bigger size, there is 
possibility of positive relationship between bigger bank size and performance 
(Smirlock, 1985). However, as a result of agency cost, cost related to managing 
large firms and the overhead bureaucratic processes, it may be possible to see a 
negative association between size and performance of banks that become very 
large (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011;  Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007).   
On the other hand, it has been argued that smaller and diversified banks can reduce 
problems of information asymmetry leading to a negative effect of size on 
performance (Tan, 2016). Moreover, smaller banks can achieve economies of scale 
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through increasing their size to a certain level where additional increase in the size 
brings about diseconomies of scale (Tan, 2016). As a result of the above, 
Athanasoglou et al (2008) argue that performance increases with size at the initial 
stage and then reduces at a later stage through reasons such as bureaucracy. Short 
and Keasey (1999) posit that the bigger the bank, the easier for it to generate 
internal funds and access external funds as well. A reduction in financial difficulties 
assist larger banks to make bigger profitable investments which can increase their 
performance. In general, the impact of bigger size on bank performance has proven 
to be positive to some extent. However, due to bureaucratic and other reasons, 
bigger bank can have adverse impact on performance when the bank grows 
extremely large (Athanasoglou et al, 2008).  
Moreover, due to higher ability to diversify their business activities, bigger banks 
could be less risky (Lu, and Boateng, 2017; Akbar et al., 2017). In addition, bigger 
banks are perceived to have easy access to financial products, and in effect aid 
better portfolio diversification and ultimately reduce banks risk (Chan et al, 2016). 
Also, due to the fact that bigger banks have ability and resources to make enquiries 
for information about their customers and profile of their risk, bigger banks could 
have lower risk (Lu, & Boateng, 2017). Berger et al. (2014) posit that, because 
bigger banks have the ability to absorb risk and due to the fact that some institutions 
are considered as too important to fail, we expect a positive association between 
bank risk and size.  
Sakawa and Watanabel (2018) find bank size to be significant and positively related 
to bank performance. Similarly, using a sample of 25 banks in Bangladesh from 
2006 to 2013, Rahman et al, (2015) report a significant and positive relationship 
between bank size and performance and add that size confirms an existence of 
economies of scale. Also, Tan et al. (2017) find significant and positive association 
between bank size and performance, measured by both ROA and ROE when they 
investigated into the impact of risk, competition and efficiency on bank profitability 
in China. Recently, Shawtari (2018) examined bank performance of the Yemeni 
banking sector using ROA, ROE and bank margins as bank performance measures. 
Using a sample of 16 banks, from 1996 to 2013, the findings indicate that bank size 
has positive impact on bank performance (ROA and ROE). Similar recent finding 
was recorded by Hasanov et al., (2018). They examined the bank-specific and 
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macro-economic determinants of bank profitability. Using 22 banks in Azerbaijan, 
the results indicate that bank size has positive impact on profitability.  
Contrary, using a sample of 82 Chinese banks with GMM estimator, Tan (2016) 
finds that bank size has significant and negative association with performance. 
Similarly, Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013) report a negative and significant 
relationship between firm size and performance using a sample from 1988 to 1992. 
Furthermore, Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) find the evidence that smaller and 
bigger banks perform better than medium sized-banks. Also, Elyasiani and Zhang 
(2015) report a negative association between bank size and performance measured 
by ROE. Doumpos et al (2015) find that smaller bank size result to higher bank 
soundness, using a sample of 1756 commercial banks from 94 countries. However, 
using a sample of 10 commercial banks in Tunisia, Bougatef (2017) shows that bank 
size has a negative but insignificant impact on ROA. Similarly, using a sample of 50 
largest Chinese banks during the period of 2003–2010 by Liang et al, (2013), the 
result shows that bank size has positive but insignificant impact on bank 
performance, measured by ROA.  
However, using a sample of 212 US bank holding companies from 1997 to 2004, 
Pathan (2009) finds that bank size has negative relationship with total risk, 
idiosyncratic risk and assets return risk, during an examination of the impact of 
structure banks on bank risk-taking relevance. Similarly, using a sample of 228 
banks, Switzer and Wang (2013) examined the relationship between credit risk of 
banks and the corporate governance structures of these banks from the perspective 
of creditors. The findings indicate that bank size has significant negative impact on 
risk. Moreover, Chan et al. (2016) analyse 16 commercial banks in China from 2003 
to 2011 to find the effect of board of director’s socio-economic background on bank 
risk-taking behaviour. The findings suggest that bigger bank size reduces systemic 
risk. Furthermore, Berger et al (2014) examined how age, gender and education of 
executive teams affect the financial institutions portfolio risk. Using a sample of 
10,719 bank-year observations, the findings show that lager banks are associated 
with a reduction in bank risk in Germany.  
Contrary, Dong (2016) investigated the impact of board governance characteristics 
on bank efficiency and risk taking. The findings show that bank size has positive 
impact on bank risk. However, Lu and Boateng (2017) report a negative but 
insignificant relationship between bank size and bank risk using a sample of 79 UK 
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banks between 2000 and 2014. Similarly, Akbar et al. (2017) find negative and 
insignificant relationship between bank size and risk, using 276 UK financial firms 
from 2003 to 2012.  
5.2.3.2 Cost to Income Ratio 
Cost-to-income-ratio, also known as cost efficiency, measures banks operational 
efficiency. This variable has been used because of data availability and also it is 
considered as one of the important factors to determine bank’s risk and 
performance. In addition, a number of past studies have included cost-to-income 
ratio as a determinant of bank profitability (e.g. Rahman et al, 2015; Dietrich & 
Wanzenried, 2011; Elsas et al, 2010; Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007). The cost-to-
income ratio has been defined by Dietrich & Wanzenried (2011) as the operating 
costs (such as staff salaries administrative costs, and property costs, excluding 
losses due to bad and non-performing loans) over total generated revenues. The 
ratio of cost-to-income ratio provide information on the impact of efficiency of 
management concerning expenses on banks performance. The higher the ratio of 
cost-to-income ratio, the less efficiency of the management, the more risk and less 
performance banks incur. The ratio can also show the cost of running the bank and 
benefits of staff and their salaries are the main elements of it (Rahman et al, 2015).   
Some previous studies demonstrate a negative relationship between banks 
performance and cost-to-income ratio (e.g. Rahman, 2015; Syafri, 2012; Dietrich & 
Wanzenried, 2011). Using a sample of 372 commercial banks over the period 1992 
to 2009, Dietrich & Wanzenried (2011) examined the determinants of bank 
profitability before and during the financial crisis. The empirical results indicate that 
cost-to-income ratio has significant and negative effect on bank profitability in 
Switzerland. Similarly, Goddard (2013) examined the determinants and 
convergence of banks from 1992 to 2007. Using a sample of 4787 from eight 
European countries, the findings indicate that cost to income ratio has significant 
negative impact on banks performance. Empirical relationship between cost-to-
income ratio and bank risk has largely been ignored.  
5.2.3.3 Equity to total asset 
This is a measure of capital adequacy of the bank and it is used as proxy for bank 
capital (for example Djalilov & Piesse, 2016). It has been used in a number of past 
studies to find out how it influences banks performance (e.g. Djalilov & Piesse; 2016 
Daly & Frikha, 2017; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011) and bank risk (e.g. Pathan, 2009; 
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Chan et al., 2016; Minton et al., 2010; Dong, 2016). The ratio of equity to total asset 
is expected to have positive impact on bank performance and negative impact on 
bank risk since it represents the amount of available funds to back operations of the 
bank, and for that matter serve as safety net in case of adverse events (Djalilov & 
Piesse, 2016; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). In addition, when a bank has higher equity 
to asset ratio, it is perceived to be safer, and for that matter we expect the risk to be 
lower (Chan et al., 2016).  It also shows the ability of the bank to honour its 
engagements to its clients based on its own resources (Daly and Frikha, 2017). 
 Moreover, an increase in the bank’s capital indicates a good future for the bank 
(Djalilov & Piesse, 2016). Therefore, the higher this ratio, the lower the risk and the 
higher the performance of the bank and vice versa. For instance, a bank is 
considered relatively less risky and safer when it has higher ratio of capital-to-asset. 
Contrary, a bank with lower capital-to-asset ratio is considered as unsafe and more 
risky (Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011). Also, a higher equity-to-asset ratio bank will 
have lesser need for external funding than a bank with lower equity-to asset ratio 
(Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011). The more efficient an institution is likely to be, the 
higher this ratio is, based on the ‘moral hazard hypothesis (Daly & Frikha, 2017). 
According to Ariyadasa et al. (2017), most studies find the impact of capital on 
performance to be positive and significant. This is an indication that well capitalised 
banks perform better. Contrary, some studies suggest that capital does not have 
any significant impact on banks performance and risk. All things being equal, banks 
that have lower equity-to asset ratio and need more external funding will have higher 
interest to pay and has lesser profit and more risky than the counterparts which need 
less external funding and pay less interest.  
Using GMM technique from 2000 to 2013, Djalilov and Piesse (2016) find banks 
equity to total asset to be positively related to ROA, a measure of bank performance. 
Similar to the above finding, Daly and Frikha (2017) report a significant and positive 
correlation between equity-to-asset and bank performance (both ROA and ROE). 
Recently, Hasanov et al. (2018) examined the bank-specific and macro-economic 
determinants of bank profitability. Using a sample of 22 banks, the findings show 
that equity to asset ratio has significant and positive impact on bank profitability. 
Moreover, using a sample of 10 commercial banks in Tunisia, Bougatef (2017) finds 
that equity to asset has significant and positive impact on bank performance, 
measured by ROA. In addition, using a sample of 50 largest Chinese banks during 
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the period of 2003–2010, Liang et al, (2013) find that the equity to assets ratio has 
significant positive impact on bank performance, indicating that banks with high 
degree of capital perform better in China.  
Contrary, using a sample of 372 commercial banks between 1992 to 2009, Dietrich 
and Wanzenried (2011) examined the determinants of bank profitability before and 
during the financial crisis. The results show that equity to asset ratio has significant 
and negative impact on bank profitability in Switzerland during the financial crisis 
2007-2009. Similarly, Mollah and Zaman (2015) examined whether Shariah 
supervision as a cornerstone of Islamic banking helps Islamic banks perform better 
and create shareholder value. Using data from 2005-2011, with a sample of 172 
banks, the results show that equity to assets ratio has significant negative impact 
on Islamic banks performance. Another similar finding was reported by Dong et al., 
(2017) who report a significant negative association between equity to assets ratio 
and profit efficiency of Chinese banks.  
Using a sample of 212 US bank holding companies from 1997 to 2004, Pathan 
(2009) finds that a higher capitalised banks are exposed to higher risk, during an 
examination of the impact of structure banks on bank risk-taking relevance. The 
finding indicates a positive relationship between bank capital and risk. Contrary, 
Chan et al. (2016) analysed 16 commercial banks in China from 2003 to 2011 to 
find the effect of board of director’s socio-economic background on bank risk-taking 
behaviour. The findings suggest that banks with higher capital ratios have lower 
systemic risk. Similarly, Minton et al. (2010) study how risk taking and firm value are 
related to board independence and financial expertise using a sample of 652 banks 
and other financial firms from 2000 to 2008. The results indicate that the equity to 
asset ratio has negative relationship with bank risk. However, Dong (2016) 
investigated the impact of board governance characteristics on bank efficiency and 
risk taking. The findings indicate that equity to asset ratio has positive but 
insignificant impact on bank risk.  
5.2.3.4 Net loans to total assets  
Loans-to-assets ratio represents the investments of banks in loans and advances 
(Sun et al, 2017). When the level of loans is high, it indicates that the traditional 
lending activities involve by the bank is high at the same time, operational cost is 
increased as a result of the bank subject to increasing level of default risk (Sun et 
al, 2017). In sum, a high net loans to assets ratio will result to high bank risk and 
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low performance. Dong et al., (2017) find a significant positive impact of net loans 
to assets ratio on Chinese banks profit efficiency. Daly and Frikha (2017) find that 
the ratio of net loans to total assets have positive and significant effect on bank 
performance using ROA and bank efficiency as proxy of bank performance. Mollah 
and Zaman (2015) examined whether Shariah supervision as a cornerstone of 
Islamic banking helps Islamic banks perform better and create shareholder value. 
Using data from 2005-2011 year period, with a sample of 172 banks, the results find 
that net loans to assets ratio has insignificant effect on Islamic banks performance. 
Dong et al. (2017) investigated the impact of board governance characteristics on 
bank efficiency and risk taking. The findings indicate that the loan to asset ratio has 
positive but insignificant impact on bank risk.  
5.2.3.5 GDP growth 
When considering macroeconomic factors that affect bank performance and bank 
risk, GDP is no exception. As a result, some studies have used GDP to determine 
how it affects bank performance (for example Albertazzi & Gambacorta, 2009; 
Boateng et al., 2015; Mollah et al., 2017) and bank risk (e.g. Berger et al, 2014). 
This study also seek to adopt how GDP as a macroeconomic variable impact on the 
risk and performance of African banks. GDP measures the size of economy. 
According to Boateng et al., (2015), a higher GDP growth causes a higher demand 
which encourages firms to borrow more to produce more goods and services to 
meet the higher demand for goods and, consequently decrease bank risk and 
increase their profitability. Shawtari (2018) posits that a favourable condition in a 
country at any point in time causes people to borrow from banks which cause a 
favourable condition for banks to make more profit.  
Using a data for 10 industrialised countries to examine the link that exists between 
the profitability of bank and the business cycle, Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) 
find significant and positive impact of GDP on bank performance, measured by 
ROA. Similarly, Mollah and Zaman (2015) examined whether Shariah supervision 
as a cornerstone of Islamic banking helps Islamic banks perform better and create 
shareholder value. Using data from 2005-2011 year period, with a sample of 172 
banks, the results indicate that GDP has significant positive impact on Islamic banks 
performance. A more recently, Shawtari (2018) provided an examination into bank 
performance of the Yemeni banking sector using different proxies of bank 
performance, namely ROA ROE and bank margins. Using a sample of 16 banks, 
  
107 
  
from 1996 to 2013, the findings show that GDP has positive impact on bank 
performance.   
Contrary to the above findings, there are few empirical findings that indicate a 
negative relationship between GDP and bank performance (e.g. Boateng et al., 
2015). Using a sample of 111 Chinese commercial banks between 2000 to 2012, 
Boateng et al., 2015) find a negative relationship between GDP and bank 
performance. The authors suggest that a higher GDP growth is associated with 
higher costs and increased loan loss provision, which causes a negative impact on 
bank performance.  Similarly, Safrali and Gumus (2010) report a negative 
relationship between GDP and bank performance when they examined how 
macroeconomic factors impact on bank performance in Azerbaijan. Another similar 
findings is also reported by Rashid and Jabeen (2016). These authors analyse the 
performance determinants of both Islamic and conventional banks in Pakistan and 
their findings show that GDP has negative relationship with bank performance. 
 However, using a sample of 156 Islamic banks from 2005 to 2013, Mollah et al 
(2017) find that GDP has no significant impact on bank performance (ROA). 
Similarly, using a sample of 10 licensed banks from 2006-2014 in Sri Lanka, 
Ariyadasa (2017) find no significant impact of GDP on banks performance in Sri 
Lanka. Berger et al (2014) examined how age, gender and education of executive 
teams affect the financial institutions portfolio risk. Using a sample of 10,719 bank-
year observations, the result indicates that GDP growth has a positive impact on 
bank risk in Germany. The relationship between bank GDP and bank risk has largely 
been ignored.   
5.2.3.6 Corruption 
Corruption is very prevalent and it is important issue around the globe which has 
made it an important topic for discussion in the last decade. Corruption can be 
defined as misuse of entrusted power for personal gain (Arshad and Rizvi, 2013). 
Corruption comes in different forms and its impact on people and businesses is very 
high. A public office is said to be abused when an officer accepts or offers bribe. 
Some form of corruption include stealing state assets, money laundering and 
nepotism (Arshad and Rizvi (2013).  According to World Bank (2017), individuals 
and businesses spend about $1.5 trillion in bribes each year which is about 2% of 
global GDP. Corruption can adversely impact service delivery, for example when a 
police officer asks for bribe before performing a routine task, corruption can unfairly 
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influence the decision on who wins a government contract, and also affect how 
institutions such as banks’ operate (World Bank, 2017). The slow development 
within African can partly be attributed to the high degree of corruption and poor 
governance. This is manifested in the Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI), where majority of African countries fall below the list of 180 
countries. When the activities involving corruption within various sectors of African 
countries are high without any proper interventions to curb the situation, the major 
impact would be slow economic development which can lead to a very high increase 
in bank risk and poor bank performance.   
There are very few empirical evidence within the banking industry that indicate that 
corruption has impact on banks’ performance. Some of these limited findings are 
reported by Bougatef, (2017), Arshad and Rizvi (2013) and Aburime (2009). Using 
GMM technique, Bougatef (2017) finds that corruption has significant and positive 
relation with ROA, a measure of bank performance. According to Bougatef (2017), 
commercial banks in Tunisia take advantage of corruption to make profit. Contrary, 
using a sample of 10 banks, Arshad and Rizvi (2013) find significant negative 
correlation between corruption and bank performance, measured by ROA. 
Moreover, using a sample of 48 banks from 1996 to 2006, Aburime (2009) reports 
a negative relation between corruption and bank performance (ROA) in Nigeria. The 
empirical evidence between corruption and bank risk has largely been ignored. 
Based on the above discussion, we expect the relationship between corruption and 
bank performance in Africa to be negative and bank risk to be positive.  
5.2.4 Model Specification 
Due to the number of countries (48) and banks (635) involved in this study, it 
became impossible to apply either qualitative or mixed methods in this study. As a 
result, quantitative method rather than qualitative or mixed methods is used in this 
research. Specifically, the countries and the number of banks involved in this 
research are too many to apply qualitative or mixed methods. Also, using 
quantitative methods provides greater accuracy, objectivity and generalisation of 
results. 
Although this study treated African as a monolithic whole, the researcher 
recognises, that there are some differences between different countries and 
different parts of Africa. Such differences include, culture, bank regulations, judicial 
systems, population size, security systems, and the level of employment. All these 
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can affect bank risk and performance of banks in Africa. However, we feel that 
presenting Africa as one uniform block is justified in our case, as we did not find any 
differences between the banks. In addition, we use GMM to account for differences 
between the banks if any. As mentioned in chapter 10, future research can look at 
different African regions (north, south, east and west) separately to see whether any 
significant differences are observed.  
However, the hypothesis which has been developed and will be examined in this 
research have been summarised below.    
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant and negative association between bank risk and 
bank performance in Africa.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant positive association between board size and 
bank risk in Africa. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a significant negative association between the presence of 
female directors on bank board and bank risk in Africa. 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a significant negative association between board 
independence and bank risk in Africa 
Hypothesis 5: There is a significant negative association between role duality and 
bank risk in Africa.   
 Hypothesis 6:  There is a significant negative association between the frequency of 
banks board meetings and bank risk in Africa.  
Hypothesis 7: There is a significant positive association between the frequency of 
banks board meetings and bank performance in Africa 
Hypothesis 8: There is a significant negative association between role duality and 
bank performance in Africa. 
Hypothesis 9: There is a significant positive association between the presence of 
female directors on bank executive board and bank performance in Africa. 
Hypothesis 10: There is a significant negative association between bank board size 
and bank performance in Africa.  
Hypothesis 11: There is a significant positive association between board 
independence and bank performance in Africa.  
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Hypothesis 12: Corporate governance moderate the relationship between bank risk 
and bank performance in Africa. 
The study uses GMM as main estimation method, where the dependent variables 
were regressed on explanatory variables to examine the above hypothesis. The 
regression equations are specified below:  
First, the study finds the relationship between bank risk and performance. 
To find the relationship between bank risk and performance using LPNR as risk 
measure, the following econometric models were used 
ROAit = β0 + β1LPNRit + β2SIZEit + β3EQTAit + β4NLTAit + β5COSTit + β6CORit + 
β7GDPit + δ0 + εit                                                                                                                                                           (1) 
ROE it = β0 + β1LPNRit + β2SIZEit + β3EQTAit + β4NLTAit + β5COSTit + β6CORit   + 
β7GDPit + δ0 + εit                                                                                                                                                         (2) 
To find the relationship between bank risk and performance using LLGL as risk 
measure, the following econometric models were used 
ROA it = β0 + β1LLRGLit + β2SIZEit + β3EQTAit + β4NLTAit + β5COSTit + β6CORit + 
β7GDPit + δ0 + εit                                                                                                                                                            (3) 
ROE it = β0 + β1LLRGLit + β2SIZEit + β3EQTAit + β4NLTAit + β5COSTit + β6CORit + 
β7GDPit + δ0 + εit                                                                                                                                                            (4)   
Second, the study finds the relationship between corporate governance and bank 
risk. To determine such relationship the following econometric models were used 
LPNRit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit + 
β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALEit + β11INDEPit + δ0 + εit       (5) 
LLRGLit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit + 
β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALEit + β11INDEPit + δ0 + εit       (6) 
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Third, the study finds the relationship between corporate governance and bank 
performance. Below are econometric models used: 
ROAit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit + 
β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALEit + β11INDEPit + δ0 + εit      (7) 
ROEit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit + 
β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALEit + β11INDEPit + δ0 + εit       (8) 
Fourth, the study finds the moderating effect of corporate governance on the 
relationship between bank risk and performance 
To find the moderating effect using LPNR as risk measure, below econometric 
models were used 
ROAit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit + 
β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALEit + β11INDEPit + β12LPNRit + 
β13(LPNR*SIZE)it + β14(LPNR*MEETINGS)it + β15(LPNR*DUAL)it + β16 
(LPNR*FEMALE)it + β17(LPNR*INDEP)it +δ0 + εit                                                                          (9) 
ROEit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit + 
β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALEit + β11INDEPit + β12LPNRit + 
β13 (LPNR*SIZE)it + β14(LPNR*MEETINGS)it + β15(LPNR*DUAL)it + β16 
(LPNR*FEMALE)it + β17 (LPNR*INDEP)it +δ0 + εit                                                                         (10) 
Finally, to find the moderating effect using LLRGL as risk measure, the following 
econometric models were used 
ROAit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit + 
β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALEit + β11INDEPit + β12LLRGLit + 
β13 (LLRGL*SIZE)it + β14(LLRGL*MEETINGS)it + β15(LLRGL*DUAL)it + β16 
(LLRGL*FEMALE)it + β17 (LLRGL*INDEP)it +δ0 + εit                                                                  (11) 
ROEit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit + 
β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALE + β11INDEP + β12LLRGLit + 
β13(LLRGL*SIZE)it + β14(LLRGL*MEETINGS)it + β15(LLRGL*DUAL)it + β16 
(LLRGL*FEMALE)it + β17 (LLRGL*INDEP)it +δ0 + εit                                                                  (12)  
 
 
  
112 
  
Where, 
ROAit is performance of country i at time t  
ROEit is performance of country i at time t  
LPNRit is loan loss provision to net interest revenue of country i at time t 
LLRGLit is loan loss reserve to gross loan of country i at time t 
SIZEit is bank size of country i at time t 
EQTAit is equity to assets of country i at time t 
NLTAit is net loans to assets of country i at time t 
COSTit is cost-to-income-ratio of country i at time t 
CORit is corruption of country i at time t 
GDPit is gross domestic product of country i at time t 
BSIZEit is board size    of country i at time t 
MEETINGSit is the number of board meetings of country i at time t 
DUALit is role duality of country i at time t  
FEMALEit is the female directors of country i at time t 
INDEPit is the independent directors of country i at time t 
(LPNR*BSIZE)it represents the joint effect of LPNR and BSIZE of country i at time t 
(LPNR*MEETINGS)it  represents the joint effect of LPNR and MEETINGS of country 
i at time t 
(LPNR*DUAL)it represents the joint effect of LPNR and DUAL of country i at time t 
(LPNR*FEMALE)it represents the joint effect of LPNR and FEMALE of country i at 
time t 
(LPNR*INDEP)it represents the joint effect of LPNR and INDEP of country i at time 
t 
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(LLRGL*BSIZE)it represents the joint effect of LLRGL and BSIZE of country i at time 
t 
(LLRGL*MEETINGS)it represents the joint effect of LLRGL and MEETINGS of 
country i at time t 
(LLRGL*DUAL)it represents the joint effect of LLRGL and DUAL of country i at time 
t 
(LLRGL*FEMALE)it represents the joint effect of LLRGL and FEMALE of country i 
at time t 
(LLRGL*INDEP)it represents the joint effect of LLRGL and INDEP of country i at time 
t 
β1 to β17 represent the coefficient of each variable 
β0 is the intercept  
δ0 is dummy for the crisis period, 1represent 2007/2008 and 0 represent other years 
εit is the error term of country i at time t 
5.2.5 Classification of variables: performance, risk, corporate governance, 
interacting and control variables 
We classify our variables into different types and how these variables are measured 
is presented in table 4. In the first place, our main dependent variables are the bank 
performance variables which are the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE). Second, our bank risk variables are loan loss provision divided by net 
interest revenue (LPNR) and loan loss reserve divided by gross loan (LLRGL). It 
should be noted that the two bank risk variables which serve as independent 
variables in the bank risk and performance relationship become dependent 
variables in the bank risk and corporate governance relationship. The third variable 
group consist of independent corporate governance characteristics namely, board 
size (BSIZE), board meetings (MEETINGS), female directors (FEMALE), 
independent directors (INDEP), and duality (DUAL).  The fourth group of variables 
are the control variables which are total assets (LNTA), cost-to-income ratio 
(COST), equity to total asset (EQTA), net loan to total asset (NLTA), GDP (LNGDP) 
and control of corruption (COR). Furthermore, we include 2007/2008 financial crisis 
as control variable to determine how it impacted on bank performance in Africa.  
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Table 4: Variables and how to measure them. 
VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
Panel A: Performance 
Variables 
 
ROA Net income/total assets (%) 
ROE Net income/shareholder’s equity (%) 
Panel B: Risk Variables  
LLPNR  Loan loss provisions divided by net interest revenue (%) 
LLRGL Loan loss reserve divided by gross loans (%) 
Panel C: Corporate 
governance variables 
 
BSIZE The number of directors on a bank’s board per year 
INDEP Percentage of independent directors on bank board per 
year 
DUAL A binary number that equal to 1 if the CEO also take the 
role as chairman at the end of its financial year, or  0  if 
otherwise 
FEMALE Percentage of female directors on bank board per year 
MEETINGS The number of times that the board meets per year 
Panel D: Control Variables  
LNTA Natural log of total assets 
COST Overheads / net interest revenue plus other operating 
income (%) 
EQTA Equity divided by total assets (%) 
NLTA Net loans divided by total assets (%) 
LNGDP Annual GDP growth rate   
COR Control of corruption by World bank  
CRISIS Dummy variable for 2007/2008 financial crisis 
Notes: ROA represents return on asset, ROE represents return on equity, LLPNR denotes loan loss 
provision/net interest revenue, LLRGL represents loan loss reserve/gross loan, BSIZE represents 
board size of the bank, INDEP denotes percentage of independent directors, DUAL represents role 
duality, FEMALE denotes the percentage of female directors on bank board, MEETINGS represents 
the number of board meetings per year, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes cost to 
income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, LNGDP 
represents Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS represents 2007/2008 
financial crisis.  
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Note: There might be many different ways in which corruption is measured (for 
instance, based on opinions and perceptions) and accounted for. The way a country 
may be described as corrupt might not give the true picture of corruption in that 
particular country. Therefore, the researcher acknowledges that there might be a 
problem with the way in which corruption is measured since corruption is impossible 
to measure with complete accuracy. However, this thesis uses the same corruption 
across different countries. This makes the researcher consistent, so the results are 
easily comparable across individual countries in our sample. Also, looking at the 
scarcity of the quantitative studies related to this topic, there is good justification for 
pursuing this quantitative analysis. In addition, using GMM controls for country fix 
effects 
5.3 Ordinary least squares assumptions and descriptive statistics 
This subsection discusses how the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assumptions 
were met before conducting the analysis. It is important to note that the main OLS 
assumptions were met before conducting the actual analysis. To meet the 
assumptions, a number of statistical tests were conducted to address the OLS 
assumptions. In addition to the discussion of OLS assumptions, the section also 
presents the descriptive statistics. 
5.3.1 Ordinary least squares assumptions 
In the first place, because the study includes small, medium and large banks, it was 
noticed that some control variables have extreme values, very small and very large. 
This situation can violate OLS assumptions and can also lead to spurious results. 
To deal with the problem of outliers, the outliers were minimised by winsorising the 
affected variables at 5% and 95% levels.  Secondly, according to Cizek et al (2005), 
when using panel data, it must be checked whether series have unit roots or not. 
Non- stationarity data causes spurious results. In view of this, it was determined 
whether series is stationary or not. As a result, we conducted a unit-root test of each 
variable used by performing Fisher-type unit-root test, which work well with an 
unbalanced panel data. With the Fisher-type unit-root test, the null hypothesis states 
that ‘all panels contain unit-root’ while the alternative hypothesis states that ‘at least 
one series in the panel is stationary. After the unit-root test, it was observed that no 
variable has unit-root. Therefore the null hypothesis was rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis was accepted. The results of the test are presented in table 5 below.  
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Table 5: Results of Fisher-type Unit Root Test 
Variables Fisher-type Unit Root Test 
ROA 0.0000 
ROE 0.0000 
LLPNR 0.0000 
LLRGL 0.0000 
BSIZE 0.0000 
INDEP 0.0000 
DUAL(dummy variable) 1.0000 
FEMALE 0.0000 
MEETINGS 0.0000 
LNTA 0.0000 
COST 0.0000 
EQTA 0.0000 
NLTA 0.0000 
LNGDP 0.0000 
COR 0.0000 
Notes: ROA represents return on asset, ROE represents return on equity, LLPNR denotes loan loss 
provision/net interest revenue, LLRGL represents loan loss reserve/gross loan, BSIZE represents 
board size of the bank, INDEP denotes percentage of independent directors, DUAL represents role 
duality, FEMALE denotes the percentage of female directors on bank board, MEETINGS represents 
the number of board meetings per year, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes cost to 
income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, LNGDP 
represents Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption 
Third, in order to make sure that the model does not suffer from heteroscedasticity 
problem, we run heteroscedasticity robust standard error (Robust OLS). Thus the 
regressions are based on robust standard error. This automatically removes any 
issues of heteroscedasticity if there is any. Therefore our test is free from 
heteroscedasticity problems.  
Four, in order to avoid multicollinearity problem, the study checked whether the 
explanatory variables are highly correlated. Two statistical techniques were used to 
test this. First, we use Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to test for multicollinearity 
problems. According to Gujarati (2003), when VIF exceeds 10 and the correlation 
coefficient between any two variables is greater than 0.8, then the problem of 
multicollinearity is expected. Tables 6 and 7 below show VIF test and correlation 
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matrix respectively. The two tables show no issues of multicollinearity as the highest 
VIF test is 3.52 and the correlation matrix table does not show any problem of 
multicollinearity. The two statistical techniques indicate that OLS assumptions have 
not been violated as a result of multicollinearity.   
Table 6: Multicollinearity test using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Variables VIF 
ROA 3.52 
ROE 3.35 
LLPNR 1.03 
LLRGL 1.09 
BSIZE 1.40 
INDEP 1.26 
DUAL 1.15 
FEMALE 1.20 
MEETINGS 1.15 
LNTA 1.46 
COST 1.03 
EQTA 1.06 
NLTA 1.12 
LNGDP 1.31 
COR 1.32 
Notes: ROA represents return on asset, ROE represents return on equity, LLPNR denotes loan loss 
provision/net interest revenue, LLRGL represents loan loss reserve/gross loan, BSIZE represents 
board size of the bank, INDEP denotes percentage of independent directors, DUAL represents role 
duality, FEMALE denotes the percentage of female directors on bank board, MEETINGS represents 
the number of board meetings per year, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes cost to 
income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, LNGDP 
represents Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption
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Table 7: Pearson (left) and Spearman (right) correlation matrices of the variables 
 Correlations 
Variables 
RO
A 
RO
E 
LLRG
L 
LLPN
R 
LNT
A 
EQT
A 
NLT
A 
LNGD
P 
CO
R 
COS
T 
CRISI
S 7_8 
BSIZ
E 
DUA
L 
MEETING
S 
FEMAL
E 
INDE
P 
ROA 1 .765
** 
-
.165** 
-.331** -
.071*
* 
.319*
* 
-
.024* 
-.005 .017 -
.551*
* 
.059** -.043 -
.061*
* 
-.058* .087** -.017 
ROE .732
** 
1 -
.216** 
-.299** .075*
* 
-
.182*
* 
-
.079*
* 
.018 .000 -
.493*
* 
.072** -.043 .013 -.057* .044 -.059 
LLRGL -
.143
** 
-
.198
** 
1 .391** -
.144*
* 
.056*
* 
-
.167*
* 
-.144** -
.062
** 
.046*
* 
-.044** -
.078** 
.020 .081** -.042 -.008 
LLPNR -
.356
** 
-
.363
** 
.363** 1 -
.019 
-
.105*
* 
.109*
* 
-.062** .001 -
.038*
* 
-.061** .083** -.028 .001 .028 -.019 
LNTA -
.055
** 
.033
** 
-
.136** 
-.034** 1 -
.250*
* 
.047*
* 
.266** -
.036
** 
.004 -.050** .070** .052* .082** .143** .165** 
EQTA .206
** 
-
.135
** 
.139** -.027* -
.184*
* 
1 .070*
* 
-.027* -
.004 
-
.090*
* 
-.024* -.028 -
.134*
* 
-.011 .063** .033 
NLTA -
.007 
-
.051
** 
-
.208** 
.027* .035*
* 
-.017 1 -.019 .236
** 
-
.054*
* 
-.012 .019 -
.179*
* 
-.052 .020 .178** 
LNGDP -
.012 
-
.009 
-
.073** 
-.044** .224*
* 
-
.053*
* 
-
.017 
1 -
.298
** 
.115*
* 
.002 .245** -
.128*
* 
.127** .093** -.062* 
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COR .067
** 
.025
* 
-
.063** 
-.027* -
.051*
* 
.117*
* 
.232*
* 
-.304** 1 -
.105*
* 
.018 -
.126** 
.056* .028 .124** .315** 
COST -
.581
** 
-
.560
** 
.091** .034** .012 -
.027* 
-
.093*
* 
.090** -
.101
** 
1 -.025* -.023 -
.097*
* 
-.004 .005 .093** 
CRISES7
_8 
.039
** 
.053
** 
-.019 -.055** -
.054*
* 
.003 -
.012 
.000 .014 -.019 1 .023 .032 .029 -.083** .031 
BSIZE -
.045 
-
.045 
-
.095** 
.031 .081*
* 
-.041 .030 .277** -
.085
** 
-.032 .032 1 -
.184*
* 
.076** .059** -
.146** 
DUAL -
.023 
.023 .014 -.023 .045 -
.076*
* 
-
.209*
* 
-.117** .056
* 
-
.051* 
.032 -
.190** 
1 .042 -.096** -
.180** 
MEETING
S 
-
.068
* 
.034 .048 -.003 .041 -.031 -
.096*
* 
.029 -
.084
** 
.037 .011 -.010 .102*
* 
1 .115** .159** 
FEMALE .080
** 
.022 -.036 -.042 .105*
* 
.153*
* 
-
.015 
.054* .125
** 
.003 -.079** .033 -
.057* 
.013 1 .110** 
INDEP -
.001 
-
.045 
.000 -.038 .137*
* 
.142*
* 
.157*
* 
-.051 .298
** 
.060 .036 -
.133** 
-
.183*
* 
.168** .142** 1 
Notes: ROA represents return on asset, ROE represents return on equity, LLPNR denotes loan loss provision/net interest revenue, LLRGL represents loan 
loss reserve/gross loan, BSIZE represents board size of the bank, INDEP denotes percentage of independent directors, DUAL represents role duality, 
FEMALE denotes the percentage of female directors on bank board, MEETINGS represents the number of board meetings per year, LNTA denotes the size 
of the bank, COST denotes cost to income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, LNGDP represents Gross 
Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS represents 2007/2008 financial crisis. 
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Finally, normality assumption has to be met. Therefore the study test for any 
departures from normality and minimise non-normalities within the variables. 
Therefore, the study computes the skewness and kurtosis to check the extent in 
which the variables are normally distributed (Gujarati, 2003). The statistical results 
of the skewness and kurtosis show that the variables deviate from a normal 
distribution. The natural log of some of the variables were taken to minimise the non-
normality. Secondly, when the variables were winsorised to reduce the outliers, it 
helped improve the normality of the variables. Also, the impact of non-normality is 
expected to be minimised or removed due to robust OLS regression which was done 
to correct the issue of heteroscedasticity. In general, the various statistical tests 
conducted are expected to take care of any issue of non-normalities, serial 
correlations, multicollinearities heteroscedasticities, and non-linearity. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the OLS assumptions were met before conducting the 
analysis of this study.  
5.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
This subsection of the research provides detailed information on the descriptive 
statistics on all the variables used for achieving the research aims and objectives. 
The descriptive statistics is shown in table 8 below. 
Table 8: Summary descriptive statistics of all variables. 
Variables Mea
n 
Media
n 
Std. 
Dev. 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
Skewne
ss 
Kurtos
is 
Observatio
ns 
Panel A: 
Performan
ce 
variables 
        
ROA 1.77 1.71 2.74 -6.91 9.30 -0.35 5.72 7439 
ROE 13.9
6 
14.03 19.5
4 
-49.36 60.33 -0.65 5.33 7439 
Panel B: 
Risk 
variables 
        
LLPNR 21.4
1 
12.43 29.5
5 
-16.94 134.88 2.14 8.06 5990 
LLRGL 6.65 4.17 7.02 0.25 31.50 1.93 6.59 5743 
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Panel C: 
Corp. 
governanc
e variables  
        
BSIZE 10.4
9 
10.00 3.49 2.00 23.00 0.72 3.24 2027 
INDEP 4.89 4.5 3.18 0.00 18 0.82 3.31 1020 
DUAL 0.16 0 0.37 0.00 1.00 1.83 4.33 2032 
FEMALE 1.49 1 1.45 0.00 9 1.14 4.64 2013 
MEETING
S 
6.26 5 4.20 0.00 38.00 3.59 20.94 1447 
Panel D: 
Control 
Variables 
        
LNTA 3.56 3.17 1.71 -1.70 9.65 0.28 2.92 7515 
COST 62.6
7 
58.99 28.3
8 
14.46 159.21 1.23 5.41 6815 
EQTA 16.3
3 
11.76 14.5
1 
2.70 72.91 2.45 9.10 7498 
NLTA 47.6
0 
48.85 21.3
9 
2.77 90.01 -0.16 2.50 7243 
LNGDP 6.74 7.32 2.46 -0.81 11.15 -0.24 2.16 10773 
COR 35.3
9 
32.70 22.2
2 
0.48 85.85 0.25 1.87 10141 
CRISIS7_
8 
0.12 0 0.32 0 1 2.37 6.63 10795 
Notes: ROA represents return on asset, ROE represents return on equity, LLPNR denotes loan loss 
provision/net interest revenue, LLRGL represents loan loss reserve/gross loan, BSIZE represents 
board size of the bank, INDEP denotes percentage of independent directors, DUAL represents role 
duality, FEMALE denotes the percentage of female directors on bank board, MEETINGS represents 
the number of board meetings per year, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes cost to 
income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, LNGDP 
represents Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 represents 2007/2008 
financial crisis 
Panel A of table 8 shows that the first measure of performance, ROA ranges from a 
minimum of -6.91% to a maximum of 9.30%, with an average of 1.77%. The second 
performance measure, ROE on the other hand has a minimum value -49.36% and 
a maximum of 60.33% with an average value of 13.96%.  ROA and ROE have a 
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standard deviation of 2.74% and 19.54% respectively. The negative signs on the 
minimum values of ROA and ROE means that the shareholders of some of the 
African banks are losing instead of gaining, because those banks are not making 
profit. However, since the mean values are positive, it can be concluded, that on 
average the banks in Africa are making profit. Panel B shows the two risk measures, 
Loan loss provision to net interest revenue (LPNR) and Loan Loss Reserve to Gross 
Loan (LLRGL). The minimum values of LPNR and LLRGL are -16.94 and 0.25 
respectively and their maximum values are 134.88 and 31.50 respectively. While 
LLPNR has an average value of 21.41 with a standard deviation of 29.55, LLPGL 
has average value of 6.65% and a standard deviation of 7.02%.  
Panel C of table 8 presents all the independent corporate governance variables. 
The Board size of African banks ranges from a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 23. 
On average the board size of African banks is 10.49 and a median number of 10. 
This value is within the board size (i.e. between 8 and 10) recommended by Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992), for efficiency of a board. Jensen (1993) also argue that any 
board bigger than seven to eight members is not beneficial to the effective function 
of the board due to high chances for animosity and retribution between the board 
members. The standard deviation of the board size is 3.49. The number of 
independent directors on African bank board ranges from a minimum of 0 to a 
maximum of 18 with a standard deviation of 25.30. The average number of 
independent directors on African bank board is about 4.89. This value portrays that 
the number of independent directors who suppose to scrutinise the executives’ 
decision during board meetings is less than the executive directors. This can pose 
a problem for the independent non -executive directors in scrutinising the executive 
decisions when a particular decision has to go on voting.  
The next corporate governance variable is role duality which is a dummy variable 
with minimum number of 0 and a maximum number of 1, with a mean value of 0.16 
and a standard deviation of 0.37. This means, on average the 16% of the sample 
banks have a combined role of CEO/Chairman position. The next variable to DUAL 
on the table is female directors on African boards with a minimum value of 0% and 
a maximum value of 9. The number of female directors has an average value of 
1.49 and standard deviation of 1.45. This means the average number of female 
directors on the banks board is only 1.49 which is very small number compare to 
average board size of 10.49. The last but not the least independent corporate 
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governance variable on the table is board meetings. The board meeting has a 
minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 38 with a standard deviation of 4.20. 
The average number of board meetings which is held by African banks within a year 
is around 6 (6.26).  
Apart from the independent variables, there are other factors which can also affect 
bank risk and bank performance in Africa. As a result, we control for a number of 
these factors. Panel D of table 8 shows all the control variables used in this study. 
The first control variable is the bank size which is the natural log of the total assets 
of the banks. The minimum banks size is -1.70 and the maximum is 9.65 with a 
standard deviation of 1.71. The mean value of total asset (LNTA) of the African 
banks is 3.56. The second control variable is cost-to income ratio. Cost-to income 
ratio has a minimum value of 14.46 and a maximum value of 159.21 with a standard 
deviation of 28.38. The mean value of cost-to-income ratio is 62.67%. The lower the 
value of cost to income ratio the higher the efficiency of the bank. Equity/total asset 
is the third control variable. 2.70% represents the minimum value while 72.91% 
represents the maximum value and has a standard deviation of 14.51. It has a mean 
or average value of 16.33 %. The fourth control variable is net loan/total asset. This 
ratio is used to assess the liquidity of a bank. The banks have a minimum net 
loan/total asset of 2.77% and a maximum value of 90.01% with a standard deviation 
of 21.39. The average net loans to total asset ratio is 47.60%. If this ratio is very 
high it implies that it may not be possible for the bank to have enough liquidity in the 
event of unforeseen fund requirements.  
GDP is the fifth control variable. The minimum GDP recorded from the 48 countries 
selected for this study is -0.81 and a maximum of 11.15 with a standard deviation of 
2.46. The average GDP of all the countries is 6.74. The sixth control variable is 
corruption. A high number means very clean while a low number means very 
corrupt. The minimum corruption figure is as low as 0.85 and a maximum of 85.85 
with a standard deviation of 22.22. The average corruption value in the 48 countries 
selected for this study is 35.39. This value suggest that corruption is very prevalent 
in Africa which can affect their bank risk and performance.  Finally, financial crisis 
of 2007/2008 is a dummy variable with a minimum number of 0 and a maximum 
number of 1. Financial crisis has a mean of 0.12 and a standard deviation of 0.32. 
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5.4 Chapter summary  
This chapter has focused on research design and methodology. The chapter first 
describe the sample selection and sources of data. In this regard, all the banks were 
selected from BankScope database. The selected banks come from 48 countries in 
Africa and from different bank specialisation and the majority of the sample banks 
are commercial banks. The data of the banks specific information are obtained from 
BankScope and Orbis bank focus databases provided by Bereau van Dijk. The data 
on the internal corporate governance variables were obtained from the annual 
reports of the sampled banks. These annual reports were downloaded direct from 
the website of the sampled banks. However, there are corporate governance 
information of some few banks which were obtained from Boardex database. 
Corruption and GDP data were obtained from the World Bank website. 
The sample and sample selection criteria have been explained in this chapter. The 
study cover a seventeen year period from 2000 to 2017. The study uses a panel 
data analysis and 635 banks are used as the final sample for the study. The data 
on these banks have been used to analyse and test the relationship between bank 
risk and performance, bank risk and corporate governance, corporate governance 
and bank performance, and the moderating effect of corporate governance on the 
relationship between bank risk and performance. All the variables and how they are 
measured have been explained in this chapter in addition to the justification for 
control variables. One of the main things this chapter focused is the OLS 
assumptions. Under this, the various OLS assumptions that must be met before the 
actual analysis is carried out have been discussed. Finally, the chapter presented 
and discussed the summary statistics of all the variables used in this study.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANK RISK AND 
BANK PERFORMANCE 
6 Introduction 
The aim of this section of the research is to investigate the relationship between 
bank risk and performance. In order words, the main research aim is to find out the 
impact of bank risk on the performance of African banks. As mentioned earlier, we 
follow previous studies (e.g. Tan, 2016) and use GMM as our main statistical model 
and OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS for our robustness analyses. GMM is used as our 
main estimator because of the number of advantages which are derived from such 
technique including resolving the problems of endogeneity, unobserved 
heterogeneity, autocorrelation and profit persistence, which other techniques may 
not be able to resolve (see for example, Tan, 2016). We use two bank risk measures 
in our analyses, Loan Loss Provision to Net Interest Revenue (LLPNR) and Loan 
Loss Reserve to Gross Loan (LLRGL); and two bank performance measures, 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). Discussions and robustness 
analyses which test the relationship between bank risk and performance are 
presented in this section. This section relates to hypothesis one.     
6.1. Empirical result of bank risk and bank performance using LLPNR as 
bank risk measure  
To find the impact of bank risk on bank performance using LLPNR as risk measure, 
the following models were used as mentioned in chapter four; the results are 
presented in tables 9 and 10.  
ROAit = β0 + β1LPNRit + β2SIZEit + β3EQTAit + β4NLTAit + β5COSTit + β6CORit 
+ β7GDPit + δ0 + εit                                                                                                                                                            (1)  
ROE it = β0 + β1LPNRit + β2SIZEit + β3EQTAit + β4NLTAit + β5COSTit + β6CORit 
+ β7GDPit + δ0 + εit                                                                                                                                                            (2) 
6.1.1. Results of independent variable 
From tables 9 and 10, LLPNR is significant and negatively correlated with both ROA 
and ROE at 1% level of significance. These findings are consistent with hypothesis 
one, which postulated a statistically significant negative association between bank 
risk and bank performance in Africa. These results indicate that the risks incurred 
by African banks including credit risk, operational risk, interest rate risk and foreign 
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exchange risk have significant and adverse impact on bank performance in Africa. 
Due to poor performance of many business activities in Africa, the greater part of 
bank risk may have come from credit risk resulting from unpaid loans of businesses 
and individuals. The negative impact of bank risk on bank performance in Africa 
means that the banking cost becomes higher when there is bank risk and eventually 
decreases the profit of the banks. The result lends empirical support to previous 
empirical literature which find negative impact of bank risk on bank performance 
(e.g. Tan et al, 2017; Al-Tamimi, et al, 2015; I.Maghyereh and Awartani, 2014; 
Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 2014; Athanasoglou et al, 2008; Sufian, 2011; Liu and 
Wilson, 2010; Sufian and Chong, 2008; Zhang et al, 2013; Muriithi and Waweru, 
2017). Contrary, this significant negative relationship between bank risk and bank 
performance is inconsistent with some of the previous empirical literature which 
document a significant positive relationship between bank risk and performance 
(e.g. Ekinci, 2016; Tan et al, 2017; Sufian, 2009; Sufian and Habibullah; 2009a; 
Sufian and Habibullah, 2009b). Again, the significant negative effect of bank risk on 
performance is also not in line with Tan (2016), Kamau et al. (2015) and Rahman et 
al. (2015) who find insignificant effect of bank risk on performance. The inconsistent 
of this result with some previous empirical literature may come from differences in 
how the variables are measured.  
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Table 9: Results of impact of bank risk on bank performance using LLPNR 
as bank risk measure and ROA as bank performance measure 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES         OLS   Fixed effect       2SLS       GMM 
     
LLPNR -0.0297*** -0.0271*** -0.0272*** -0.0160*** 
     (0.00111) (0.000764) (0.000740) (0.00392) 
 
LNTA -0.0198 -0.0532*** -0.0574*** 0.0142 
 (0.0176) (0.0203) (0.0167) (0.0328) 
 
EQTA 0.0372*** 0.0448*** 0.0421*** 0.0462*** 
 (0.00345) (0.00312) (0.00256) (0.0125) 
 
NLTA -0.00875*** 0.000205 -0.00373** -0.0246** 
 (0.00141) (0.00191) (0.00161) (0.00998) 
 
COST -0.0558*** -0.0656*** -0.0629*** -0.0702*** 
 (0.00142) (0.00114) (0.00103) (0.00609) 
     
LNGDP 0.0106 -0.186* 0.0236 0.403*** 
 (0.0127) (0.103) (0.0218) (0.0922) 
 
COR -0.00189 0.00524 0.000481 0.0201** 
 (0.00141) (0.00319) (0.00206) (0.00990) 
 
CRISIS7_8 0.183 0.135** 0.148*** 0.0769 
 (0.130) (0.0552) (0.0552) (0.0798) 
 
Lag of dependent 
variable 
   0.186*** 
    (0.0247) 
     
Constant 5.698*** 6.938*** 5.775*** 3.053*** 
 (0.202) (0.717) (0.219) (0.993) 
     
Observations 5,502 5,502 5,502 4,920 
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R-squared                                                       0.515 0.509   
Notes: LLPNR denotes loan loss provision/net interest revenue, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, 
COST denotes cost to income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net 
loans/total assets, LNGDP represents Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, 
CRISIS7_8 represents 2007/2008 financial crisis, ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% 
respectively, Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
Table 10: Results of impact of bank risk on bank performance using LLPNR 
as bank risk measure and ROE as bank performance measure 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 2SLS         GMM 
     
LLPNR -0.229*** -0.214*** -0.213*** -0.101*** 
 (0.00957) (0.00614) (0.00589) (0.0276) 
 
LNTA 0.534*** -0.215 -0.285** 0.133 
 (0.146) (0.164) (0.131) (0.257) 
 
EQTA -0.197*** -0.0455* -0.118*** -0.0662 
 (0.0178) (0.0251) (0.0196) (0.105) 
 
NLTA -0.0930*** -0.0221 -0.0624*** -0.208*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0153) (0.0124) (0.0669) 
     
COST -0.391*** -0.484*** -0.446*** -0.521*** 
 (0.0105) (0.00918) (0.00799) (0.0415) 
 
LNGDP -0.151 -4.571*** -0.00528 4.147*** 
 (0.0932) (0.827) (0.153) (0.734) 
 
COR 0.00437 0.0553** 0.0189 0.176** 
 (0.0100) (0.0257) (0.0151) (0.0707) 
 
CRISIS7_8 4.914*** 1.986*** 2.323*** 1.767*** 
 (1.002) (0.443) (0.444) (0.589) 
 
  
129 
  
L.ROE    0.185*** 
    (0.0220) 
 
Constant 46.60*** 80.17*** 51.03*** 21.14*** 
 (1.469) (5.748) (1.596) (7.718) 
     
Observations 5,516 5,516 5,516 4,932 
 
R-squared  0.491 0.457   
Notes: LLPNR denotes loan loss provision/net interest revenue, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, 
COST denotes cost to income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net 
loans/total assets, LNGDP represents Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, 
CRISIS7_8 represents 2007/2008 financial crisis, ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% 
respectively, Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
6.1.2 Results of control variables 
The results of control variables are presented in Tables 9 and 10. From These 
tables, we find that LNTA, which measures bank size in terms of total asset is 
insignificant and positively correlated with both ROA and ROE. The positive impact 
of bank size on performance indicates that the economies of scale enjoyed by larger 
banks enable them to reduce cost and make more profit. A reduction in cost help 
the banks to improve their performance. The positive correlation between bank size 
and performance can also mean that a rise in total asset absorbs the rise in net 
income.  Moreover, the positive coefficient could also suggest that the bigger banks 
in Africa get benefits through diversification of the activities of their loan portfolios 
which leads to higher bank performance. However, the banks in Africa are not able 
to utilise the advantages that bigger bank size brings to make profit. Therefore, the 
positive effect of size on performance is insignificant. The insignificant nature of this 
result may come from measurement error or multicollinearity. Although this issue 
were resolved before the analyses, issues like multicollinearity might not be 
removed completely. This finding is consistent with the finding of Bougatef (2017) 
who finds insignificant association between bank size and bank performance in 
Tunisia. However, the finding is inconsistent with the findings of prior literature which 
report a significant positive correlation between bank size and performance (e.g. 
Sakawa and Watanabel, 2018; Rahman et al., 2015; Tan et al., 2017;  Shawtari, 
2018; Hasanov et al., 2018). The insignificant positive relationship between bank 
size and performance is also not consistent with the findings of Tan (2016), Al-
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Shammari (2013), Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011), Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) and 
Doumpos et al (2015) who report significant negative correlation between bank size 
and performance. The inconsistence of this result with other empirical results may 
come from differences in sample size and study time frame.   
Equity to asset ratio (EQTA), which measures bank capitalisation is significant and 
positively correlated with ROA at 1% level of significance but insignificant and 
negatively correlated with ROE. The inconsistent result of ROA and ROE may come 
from the fact, that the behaviour of equity and debt holders (ROA) may be different 
from the behaviour of equity holders (ROE), hence the results of ROA and ROE can 
be different. For instance, debt and equity holders (ROA) may accept certain level 
of losses whiles equity holders (ROE) may not accept any losses at all, they only 
demand their returns from the bank whether the bank incurs loss or makes profit. 
The positive correlation between equity to asset ratio and bank performance implies 
that banks with higher degree of capitalisation perform better in Africa. The findings 
can also be explained by the fact that well capitalised banks in Africa can change 
their funds to higher income earnings to make them more profitable. The finding 
supports the theoretical argument by Djalilov and Piesse (2016) and Athanasoglou 
et al., (2008) who argue that, the ratio of equity to total asset is expected to have 
positive impact on bank performance because it represents the amount of available 
funds to back operations of the bank, and for that matter serves as safety net in 
case of adverse events, which could increase bank performance. This finding is in 
line with the findings of some past empirical findings (e.g. Bougatef, 2017; Djalilov 
and Piesse, 2016; Hasanov et al., 2018). However, this finding is not in line with the 
negative correlation between equity to asset ratio and bank performance recorded 
by prior empirical literature (e.g. Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). The differences in 
the findings may be due to different time frame of the studies and different ways in 
which the variables were measured.   
Contrary, the negative correlation between equity to assets ratio and bank 
performance suggests that less capitalised banks are able to increase their 
profitability compared to a well-capitalised banks. It also suggests that high capital 
protection is penalised with low profit in Africa, but this is not significant in the case 
of Africa, which may be due to measurement error and extreme values within the 
data.   
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Loans to asset ratio (NLTA), which assesses the liquidity of banks, is highly 
significant and negative related to both ROA and ROE at 5% and 1% significance 
levels respectively. This indicates that when the ratio of loans to assets decreases, 
banks in Africa have enough liquidity to cater for any unforeseen fund requirement. 
This gives confidence to their depositors to deposit more funds. When more funds 
are deposited, the banks get opportunity to invest some of the deposits, which help 
the banks to earn more profit. The negative coefficient on net loans to assets also 
suggests that African banks have the ability to manage, control and monitor their 
loans very efficiently, they do not have a record of more bad loans, and subsequently 
reduce cost leading to higher bank performance. The findings are not in line with the 
findings of Daly and Frikha (2017), Dong et al., (2017), Mollah and Zaman (2015) 
who document a positive relationship between net loans to assets ratio and bank 
performance. This may be due to differences in the study time frame and differences 
in measuring the variables. 
Cost to income ratio (COST) is found to be significant and negatively associated 
with ROA and ROE at 1% level of significance. The result indicates that banks with 
low cost-to-income ratio perform better in Africa than those with high cost-to-income 
ratio. The negative coefficients on ROA and ROE imply that banks in Africa have 
good management team who are experts and skilled in managing their operations 
efficiently and for that matter making good profit. This findings lend some support to 
the theoretical argument which states that, the higher the ratio of cost-to-income 
ratio the less efficiency of the management, which could reduce bank performance 
and vice versa (see for example, Rahman et al, 2015). The significant negative 
association between cost to income ratio and bank performance is in line with the 
findings of some previous empirical studies (e.g. Rahman, 2015; Syafri, 2012; 
Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011; Goddard, 2013).  
We find that GDP (LNGDP) has significant and positive impact on both ROA and 
ROE. The higher GDP growth which is positively related to bank performance 
indicates that higher growth causes a higher demand for lending which ultimately 
leads to higher bank profitability. On the other hand, this result means that there is 
a high probability of higher demand for lending during a period of cyclical upswing 
which may result to higher bank performance. The positive impact of GDP on bank 
performance supports the theoretical statement by Boateng et al., (2015) who 
suggest that higher GDP growth results to a higher demand which encourages firms 
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to borrow more to produce more goods and services to meet the higher demand for 
goods and, subsequently increase banks performance. The significant and positive 
impact of GDP on bank performance lend empirical support to some previous 
empirical findings of Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), Shawtari (2018). Contrary, 
this findings do not lend empirical support to Boateng et al., (2015), Safrali and 
Gumus (2010), Rashid and Jabeen (2016) who record significant negative impact 
of GDP on bank performance. In addition, the findings do not lend empirical support 
to the findings of Mollah et al (2017) and Ariyadasa (2017) who document no 
significant impact of GDP on bank performance. The inconsistent of this result and 
other previous empirical results may come from differences in measuring the 
variables and differences in sample size.  
In terms of control of corruption (COR), there is significant and positive relationship 
between COR and bank performance based on both ROA and ROE at 5% 
significant levels. The positive sign means an increase in Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI), which is a reduction in corruption. This means that when Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) increases (a reduction in corruption), banks performance 
significantly increases. The result shows that an increase in corruption within the 
institutions including banks in Africa is not good for improvement of performance of 
banks in Africa. Therefore, a reduction in corruption will help improve the 
performance of African banks. The result is consistent with Bougatef (2017) and 
contrary to Aburime (2009) and Arshad and Rizvi (2013) who find a significant 
negative relationship between corruption and bank performance. 
For the impact of financial crisis, we find insignificant and positive correlation 
between CRISIS and bank performance based on ROA but significant and positive 
correlation between CRISIS and bank performance based on ROE at 1% 
significance level. The insignificant result of ROA may be due to measurement error, 
multicollinearity and extreme values. The positive coefficient on financial crisis may 
indicate that, the crisis hit more in the developed countries with a very little or no 
impact on African countries. As a result, the banks in Africa were still able to embark 
on their business activities to make profit during the crisis period.  
 
 
 
  
133 
  
6.2 Empirical result of bank risk and bank performance using LLRGL as 
bank risk measure  
To find the impact of bank risk on bank performance using LLRGL as risk 
measure, the following econometric models were used as stated in chapter four. 
The results are presented in Tables 11 and 12 below.  
ROA it = β0 + β1LLRGLit + β2SIZEit + β3EQTAit + β4NLTAit + β5COSTit + β6CORit 
+ β7GDPit + δ0 + εit                                                                                                                                                         (3) 
 
ROE it = β0 + β1LLRGLit + β2SIZEit + β3EQTAit + β4NLTAit + β5COSTit + β6CORit 
+ β7GDPit + δ0 + εit                                                                                                                                                          (4)  
 
6.2.1     Result of independent variables 
From Tables 11 and 12, LLRGL has insignificant and negative impact on bank 
performance based on both ROA and ROE. The insignificant of these results may 
be caused by measurement error, autocorrelation, extreme values and 
multicollinearity. These issues were dealt with before the analysis, it is possible that 
they cannot be removed completely. The findings mean that hypothesis one, which 
postulates a significant negative association between bank risk and performance in 
Africa is rejected. However, the negative impact of bank risk on bank performance 
implies that risks associated with the businesses of banks which are caused by 
factors such as non-performing loans, lack of proper risk management strategies 
and policies and inefficient banking operations have adverse effect on bank 
performance in Africa. The findings is consistent with Tan (2016), Kamau et al. 
(2015) and Rahman et al. (2015) who document insignificant association between  
bank risk and performance. Contrary, the findings do not lend empirical support to 
previous empirical literature (e.g. Tan et al, 2017; Al-Tamimi, et al, 2015; 
I.Maghyereh and Awartani, 2014; Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 2014; Athanasoglou et 
al, 2008; Sufian, 2011; Liu and Wilson, 2010; Sufian and Chong, 2008; Zhang et al, 
2013; Muriithi and Waweru, 2017) which document a significant negative 
association between bank risk and performance. In addition, the insignificant 
negative relationship between bank risk and performance is inconsistent with 
previous empirical literature which document significant positive relationship 
between bank risk and performance (e.g. Ekinci, 2016; Tan et al, 2017; Sufian, 
2009; Sufian and Habibullah; 2009a; Sufian and Habibullah, 2009b). The 
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inconsistent of this result with some past literature may cause by differences in study 
time frame, sample size and variable measurement.  
Table 11: Results of impact of bank risk on bank performance using LLRGL 
as risk measure and ROA as performance measure 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 2SLS GMM 
     
LLRGL -0.0542*** -0.0475*** -0.0495*** -0.0119 
 (0.00638) (0.00481) (0.00444) (0.0145) 
 
LNTA -0.0617*** -0.0554** -0.0531*** -0.0503 
 (0.0206) (0.0237) (0.0191) (0.0383) 
 
EQTA 0.0440*** 0.0671*** 0.0545*** 0.0509*** 
 (0.00381) (0.00387) (0.00308) (0.0140) 
 
NLTA -0.0153*** -0.00581** -0.00945*** -0.0537*** 
 (0.00161) (0.00228) (0.00189) (0.0102) 
 
COST -0.0576*** -0.0662*** -0.0636*** -0.0539*** 
 (0.00158) (0.00130) (0.00116) (0.00684) 
 
LNGDP 0.0436*** 0.0721 0.0542** 0.285*** 
 (0.0143) (0.119) (0.0239) (0.101) 
 
COR 0.000530 0.00225 0.000272 0.0360*** 
 (0.00153) (0.00375) (0.00231) (0.0102) 
 
CRISIS7_8 0.0798 0.243*** 0.240*** 0.230** 
 (0.152) (0.0639) (0.0638) (0.0922) 
 
L.ROA    0.189*** 
    (0.0274) 
 
Constant 5.827*** 5.080*** 5.466*** 3.748*** 
 (0.230) (0.817) (0.248) (1.038) 
     
Observations 5,017 5,017 
 
5,017 4,517 
R-squared 0.439 
 
0.421 
 
  
Notes: LLRGL denotes loan loss reserve/gross loan, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST 
denotes cost to income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total 
assets, LNGDP represents Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 
represents 2007/2008 financial crisis, ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
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Table 12: Results of impact of bank risk on bank performance using LLRGL 
as risk measure and ROE as performance measure 
MODEL (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed 
effect 
 2SLS GMM 
      
LLRGL -0.451*** -0.373***  -0.397*** -0.151 
 (0.0478) (0.0395)  (0.0354) (0.111) 
 
LNTA 0.274 -0.385**  -0.322** -0.295 
 (0.174) (0.196)  (0.153) (0.292) 
 
EQTA -0.171*** 0.0709**  -0.0717*** -0.100 
 (0.0199) (0.0319)  (0.0239) (0.134) 
 
NLTA -0.136*** -0.0476**  -0.0916*** -0.276*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0188)  (0.0148) (0.0751) 
 
COST -0.407*** -0.479***  -0.445*** -0.386*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0107)  (0.00923) (0.0495) 
 
LNGDP 0.0559 -2.575***  0.184 2.893*** 
 (0.108) (0.974)  (0.171) (0.740) 
 
COR 0.00912 -0.00640  -0.000760 0.0716 
 (0.0116) (0.0309)  (0.0172) (0.0693) 
 
CRISIS7_8 5.160*** 2.872***  3.054*** 1.764*** 
 (1.167) (0.526)  (0.524) (0.672) 
 
L.ROE     0.241*** 
     (0.0261) 
 
Constant 47.71*** 66.28***  49.26*** 29.63*** 
 (1.732) (6.705)  (1.840) (8.175) 
      
Observations 5,026 5,026 
 
 5,026 4,525 
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R-squared 0.395 
 
0.335 
 
   
Notes: LLRGL denotes loan loss reserve/gross loan, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST 
denotes cost to income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total 
assets, LNGDP represents Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 
represents 2007/2008 financial crisis, ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
 
 6.2.2 Result of control variables 
Results of the control variables are presented in Tables 11 and 12. With regards to 
control variables, we confirm the following findings: (1) LNTA in terms of total asset 
has insignificant and negative impact on both ROA and ROE. The insignificant of 
the results may be caused by measurement error and multicollinearity. The negative 
coefficient on performance indicates that the smaller banks in Africa are easily 
managed by the managers to make more profit. It can also be explained by the fact 
that managers of the banks in Africa are more efficient when they concentrate on 
smaller number of businesses, which lead to higher banking performance. However 
these are not significant in the case of Africa, based on our result. This finding is in 
line with the finding of Bougatef (2017) who documents insignificant relationship 
between bank size and performance in Tunisia. However, the finding is not in line 
with the findings of prior literature which report a significant positive relationship 
between bank size and bank performance (e.g. Sakawa and Watanabel, 2018; 
Rahman et al., 2015; Tan et al., 2017;  Shawtari, 2018; Hasanov et al., 2018). The 
insignificant negative relationship between bank size and performance is also not in 
line with the findings of Tan (2016), Al-Shammari (2013), Dietrich and Wanzenried 
(2011), Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) and Doumpos et al (2015) who document a 
significant negative correlation between bank size and performance. The 
inconsistent of this result and the result of some previous studies may be due to the 
differences in sample size and the way in which the variables are measured.  
Banks capitalisation measured by EQTA is found to have significant and positive 
impact on ROA at 1% level of significance but insignificant and negative impact on 
ROE. The insignificant of ROE may be caused by measurement error. Moreover, 
due to the differences in the behaviour of equity and debt holders (ROA) and the 
behaviour of equity holders (ROE), sometimes the results of ROA and ROE  is 
expected to be different. For instance, debt and equity holders (ROA) may accept 
certain level of losses whiles equity holders (ROE) may not accept any losses at all, 
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they only demand their returns from the bank whether the bank incurs loss or makes 
profit. The significant positive relationship between equity to asset ratio and bank 
performance suggests that banks which have high capital perform better in Africa. 
The findings also suggest that well capitalised banks in Africa can change their 
funds to higher income earnings to make more profit. The finding supports the 
theoretical argument by Djalilov and Piesse (2016) and Athanasoglou et al., (2008) 
who argue that, the ratio of equity to total asset is expected to have positive impact 
on bank performance because it represents the amount of available funds to back 
operations of the bank, and for that matter serves as safety net in case of adverse 
events, which could increase bank performance. This finding is consistent with 
previous empirical findings (e.g. Bougatef, 2017; Djalilov and Piesse, 2016; 
Hasanov et al., 2018). However, this finding is not consistent with the significant 
negative relationship between equity to asset ratio and bank performance 
documented by prior empirical literature (e.g. Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011).  
Bank’s liquidity, measured by loans to asset ratio (NLTA) is highly significant and 
negatively associated with ROA and ROE at 1% significant levels. This implies that 
banks may have enough liquidity to cater for any unforeseen fund requirement when 
the ratio of loans to assets decreases. This gives confidence to depositors to deposit 
more funds which help the banks to invest more to earn more profit. The negative 
coefficient on net loans to assets also suggests that when the loan exposure is very 
high (low liquidity), it causes higher bank performance. This is a suggestion that 
banks in African are able to control, manage, and monitor their loans very efficiently, 
and in effect decrease cost which could lead to improvement in bank performance. 
The finding lends empirical support to the past studies that find a negative 
association between bank risk and performance (e.g. Tan, 2016). However, the 
finding does not lend empirical support to the past studies that find a positive 
association between bank risk and performance (e.g. Daly and Frikha (2017), which 
may come from differences in samples size and sample period. 
The relationship between cost to income ratio (COST) and bank performance is 
negative and significant at 1% significant level based on both ROA and ROE. The 
negative relationship indicates that the banks’ operations are efficiently managed by 
the management and as a result causing a reduction in operational cost, which in 
effect increasing banks performance. This result supports the argument from the 
theory which indicates that, the lower the value of cost-to-income ratio the higher 
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the efficiency of the management, which could improve bank performance and the 
higher the ratio of cost-to-income ratio the less efficiency of the management, which 
could reduce bank performance (Rahman et al, 2015). The significant negative 
relationship between cost to income ratio and bank performance is consistent with 
the findings of Rahman (2015), Syafri (2012), Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) and 
Goddard (2013) who find similar result.    
With regards to GDP, we record a significant positive relationship between GDP and 
bank performance at 1% significance level in terms of both ROA and ROE. The 
positive coefficient on GDP suggests that high growth leads to a high demand for 
lending which finally brings about high bank performance. The result also indicates 
that during a period of cyclical upswing, there is a high probability of higher demand 
for lending, which could cause an increase in bank performance. The positive 
relationship between GDP and bank performance lends some support to the 
theoretical argument by Boateng et al., (2015) who suggest that high GDP growth 
leads to high demand, which encourages firms to borrow more to produce more 
goods and services to meet the higher demand for goods and, subsequently causes 
an increase in banks performance. The significant and positive relationship between 
GDP and bank performance is consistent with prior empirical literature (e.g. 
Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009; Shawtari, 2018). In contrast, probably due to the 
differences in sample size, sample period and the way in which variables are 
measured, this finding is not consistent with the past empirical literature which find 
a significant negative relationship between GDP and bank performance (e.g. 
Boateng et al., 2015; Safrali and Gumus, 2010; Rashid and Jabeen, 2016). 
Moreover, the finding is also inconsistent with insignificant relationship between 
GDP and bank performance reported by prior empirical studies (e.g. Mollah et al., 
2017; Ariyadasa, 2017).   
Corruption (COR) has significant and positive impact on ROA but insignificant and 
positive impact on ROE. The insignificant impact on ROE may be caused by 
measurement error. The significant positive coefficient on ROA implies that as CPI 
increases (a reduction in corruption), bank performance significantly increases. The 
result shows that adverse effect of corruption on the institutions including banks is 
not good for improving the performance of banks in Africa. On the other hand, a 
reduction in corruption will help improve the performance of African banks. The 
result is consistent with Bougatef (2017) and contrary to Aburime (2009) and Arshad 
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and Rizvi (2013) who find a significant negative relationship between corruption and 
bank performance.  
Financial crisis (CRISIS) has significant and positive impact on bank performance 
based on both ROA and ROE. These findings may indicate that, the crisis hit more 
in the developed countries with a very little or no impact on African countries. As a 
result, the banks in Africa were able to embark on their businesses to make profit 
during the crisis period. 
 6.3 Robustness analysis  
This section discusses how the results of the main model (GMM) are robust or 
sensitive to results of alternative models and estimations. Specifically, this study 
carried out different robustness analysis in order to check the extent at which the 
main results of this study are robust or sensitive to different alternative models and 
estimations. The alternative techniques used is this study are OLS, fixed effect and 
2SLS. Therefore, this section reports the results based on ordinary least square 
model (OLS), results based on fixed-effects model and two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) model and compare them to the main results, GMM. To assist clarity and 
comparison of the results, the mail results (GMM) and the results of the robustness 
tests are presented in the same table. Our tests suggest that the main results are 
robust, although we observe some sensitivities in the magnitude of the coefficient 
and significance levels. 
6.3.1 Results based on LLRGL as bank risk measure and ROA as bank 
performance measure.  
5.3.1.1 Result of independent variables  
From table 11, consistent with the main model, the direction of the coefficients of 
LLRGL under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS is the same as the GMM. Specifically, the 
signs of LLRGL under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS are negative, which are the same 
as the result of the main technique, GMM. With regards to the significance levels, 
the main result is statistically insignificant whiles OLS, fixed effect, and 2SLS are all 
significant at 1% level.    
6.3.1.2 Results of control variables           
The results of control variables are presented in table 11. Bank size which was 
statistically insignificant under the main model is now significant under OLS, fixed 
effect, and 2SLS. However, the significance level of bank size under fixed effect is 
  
140 
  
5% while it is 1% under both OLS and 2SLS.The direction of the coefficient which 
is negative remains negative throughout. Equity to total asset is significantly 
associated with performance under all the four techniques used. Consistent with the 
main technique, the significance levels of the other three techniques is 1%. The 
direction of the coefficient also remains unchanged. Specifically, the coefficients of 
equity to total assets of all the techniques used remain positive. Consistent with the 
main result, the coefficients of Net loans to assets and cost-to-income ratio remain 
the same under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. Specifically, net loans to asset and 
cost-to-income-ratio have negative impact on bank performance under all the four 
techniques used, GMM, OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. Moreover, consistent with the 
main result, net loans to assets and cost-to-income ratio are statistically significant 
under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS techniques. The 1% significance level of the main 
technique remains the same under OLS and fixed effect and 2SLS for cost-to-
income ratio. Apart from fixed effect technique which is significant at 5%, OLS and 
2SLS remain 1% significant levels for net loans to asset ratio. Like the main model, 
the coefficients of GDP remains positive under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. The 
direction of significance of GDP remains 1% under OLS, but changed to 5% under 
2SLS and became insignificant under fixed effect. With regards to control of 
corruption, the direction of coefficients remain unchanged under OLS, fixed effect 
and 2SLS. Specifically, the positive impact of control of corruption remain 
unchanged under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. However, the 1% significance level 
became insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. Finally, the positive impact 
of financial crisis remain the same based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. However, 
the 5% significance level under 2SLS changed to 1% significance level under both 
fixed effect and 2SLS and changed to insignificant under OLS.   
6.3.2 Results based on LLRGL as bank risk measure and ROE as bank 
performance measure.   
6.3.2.1 Results of independent variables 
From table 12, the direction of coefficient of LLRGL remains the same based on 
OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. Specifically, the negative impact of LLRGL under the 
main model (GMM) remains the same under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. However, 
there are differences in the significance levels. Specifically, the main result (GMM) 
which was statistically insignificant is now statistically significant at 1% significant 
level based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS.  
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6.3.2.2 Results of control variables  
The results of the control variables are presented in table 12. For bank size (LNTA), 
the direction of coefficient of the main model which was negative under GMM 
remains negative under fixed effect and 2SLS but changed to positive under OLS. 
On the other hand, consistent with the main model, bank size has negative impact 
on bank performance based on fixed effect and 2SLS but the negative impact 
changed to positive under OLS technique. Equity to assets ratio which was 
insignificant under the main model is now significant based on OLS, fixed effect and 
2SLS. However, there are changes in the significant levels. Equity to assets ratio 
which is insignificant under the main model (GMM) is 1% significant under both OLS 
and 2SLS while it is 5% significant under fixed effect. Moreover, consistent with the 
main model, equity to assets ratio has negative impact on performance based on 
OLS and 2SLS but the negative impact changed to positive under fixed effect 
technique. 
Consistent with GMM model, the negative impact of net loans to assets remains 
unchanged under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. Consistent with the main model, net 
loan to assets remains significant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. However, there 
is a slight change in the significance level under fixed effect model. Specifically, the 
1% significant level under GMM remains unchanged under OLS and 2SLS but this 
changed to 5% significant level under fixed effect model. With regards to cost-to-
income ratio, the direction of the coefficient of the main technique remains 
unchanged under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. Specifically, cost-to-income ratio has 
negative impact on performance based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS, which is 
consistent with the main model. In addition, the direction of the significance levels 
remains unchanged. Specifically, in line with the main model, OLS, fixed effect and 
2SLS remains 1% significant level. The direction of coefficient of GDP which was 
positive under the main model remains positive under OLS and 2SLS but this 
changed to negative under fixed effect. In addition, there are sensitivities in the 
significant levels. In line with the main model, the 1% significance level remains the 
same based on fixed effect. However, the 1% significance level became insignificant 
based on both OLS and 2SLS techniques.  
In line with the main model, the positive impact of control of corruption remains the 
same under OLS but this positive impact changed to negative under fixed effect and 
2SLS techniques. Consistent with the main model, direction of the significance level 
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remains the same under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. Specifically, in line with the 
main model, control of corruption is statistically insignificant under OLS, fixed effect 
and 2SLS. Finally, the direction of the coefficient of financial crisis of the main 
technique remains the same. To be specific, financial crisis has positive impact on 
performance based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS, which is the same as the main 
technique, GMM. In addition, in line with the main model, financial crisis is 
significantly related to bank performance under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. The 
direction of the significance level also remains unchanged. Thus, the 1% 
significance level under the main model remains the same under OLS, fixed effect 
and 2SLS models.  
6.3.3 Results based on LLPNR as bank risk measure and ROA as bank 
performance measure  
6.3.3.1 Empirical results of independent variables  
From table 9, the sign on the coefficient of LLPNR remains negative under OLS, 
fixed effect and S2LS. Secondly, consistent with the main model, LLPNR is 
significantly related to bank performance based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. 
Thirdly, consistent with the main result (GMM), the significant level remains 1% 
under OLS, fixed, and 2SLS. 
6.3.3.2 Empirical results of control variables 
The results of the control variables are presented in table 9. The sign on the 
coefficient on bank size has changed. Specifically, the positive sign changed from 
positive under the main model to negative under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. In 
terms of the significance level, bank size is insignificant related to ROA based on 
OLS, which is in line with the main technique but significant at 1% significance level 
based on fixed effect and 2SLS techniques. Equity to assets ratio has positive 
impact on bank performance under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS techniques, which 
is consistent with the main technique, GMM. The significance level of equity to 
assets ratio based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS remain unchanged. Specifically, 
in line with the main technique, equity to assets ratio is statistically significant related 
to bank performance at 1% significance level under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS 
techniques. The direction of coefficient on net loan to assets ratio remains negative 
under OLS and 2SLS but changed to positive under fixed effect technique. 
Consistent with the main model, net loans to assets ratio is significantly related to 
bank performance under OLS and 2SLS techniques but became insignificant under 
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fixed effect model in column 2. However, the significance level remains 5% under 
2SLS but changed to 1% under OLS.  
The direction of coefficient on cost-to-income ratio remains negative based on OLS, 
fixed effect and 2SLS. That means cost-to-income ratio is negatively associated with 
bank performance based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS, which is in line with the 
main technique. The direction of the significance level also remains the same. 
Specifically, 1% significance level under the main technique remains the same 
under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. With regards to GDP, the 1% significance level 
under GMM changed to 10% under fixed effect technique and became insignificant 
under OLS and 2SLS. The direction of coefficient on GDP remains positive under 
OLS and 2SLS techniques but changed to negative under fixed effect technique. 
The direction of significance of control of corruption changed from 5% significance 
level under the main technique, GMM, to insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 
2SLS techniques. The sign on the coefficient of control of corruption remains 
positive under fixed effect and 2SLS but changed to negative under OLS. The 
direction of the coefficient on 2007/2008 financial crisis remains positive based on 
OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. In line with the main model, 2007/2008 financial crisis 
is insignificant related to performance based on OLS but became significant based 
on fixed effect and 2SLS techniques. However, the significance level under 2SLS is 
1% while fixed effect is 5%.  
6.3.4 Results based on LLPNR as risk measure and ROE as performance 
measure 
6.3.4.1 Results of independent variables 
From table 10, the sign on the coefficient of LLPNR remains negative under OLS, 
fixed effect and S2LS. In line with the main technique, LLPNR is significantly related 
to bank performance based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. Consistent with the main 
result (GMM), the significant level also remains 1% under OLS, fixed, and 2SLS.  
6.3.4.2 Results of control variables   
The results of the control variables are presented in table 10. In line with the main 
model, GMM, The direction of coefficient on bank size remains positive under OLS 
model but changed to negative under fixed effect and 2SLS models. There is 
sensitivity in the significance levels of bank size. Specifically, in line with GMM, the 
result of fixed effect model of bank size remains insignificant but this changed to 1% 
and 5% under OLS and 2SLS respectively. With regards to equity to assets ratio, 
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the direction on coefficient remains negative under OLS, fixed effect, and 2SLS. 
There are sensitivities in the significance levels of equity to assets ratio. Specifically, 
the main model, GMM which was insignificant became 1% significant under OLS 
and 2SLS models and 10% under fixed effect models. The direction of significance 
level of the results of net loans to assets ratio of OLS and 2SLS show similar apart 
from fixed effect model. In particular, net loans to assets ratio is significantly related 
to bank performance at 1% significant level under OLS and 2SLS models, which is 
consistent with the main model but insignificantly related to bank performance under 
fixed effect model, which is inconsistent with the main model. Moreover, consistent 
with the main model, the sign of the coefficient on net loans to assets remains 
negative under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS.  
Consistent with the main model, the direction of coefficient on cost-to-income ratio 
remain negative based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The statistical level 
of significance of cost-to-income ratio has not changed. In particular, the 1% level 
of significance of cost-to-income ratio of the main model remains the same under 
OLS, fixed effect, and 2SLS. With regards to GDP, the coefficient changed from 
positive under the main model to negative under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. There 
are sensitivities within the direction of significance level of GDP. In particular, fixed 
effect model remains 1% significant while OLS and 2SLS models became 
statistically insignificant. The direction of coefficient on control of corruption has not 
changed. Specifically, the positive coefficient on control of corruption remains 
unchanged under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. Consistent with the main model, the 
direction of the significance level of COR remains 5% under fixed effect model but 
became insignificant under OLS and 2SLS models. Finally, the direction of 
coefficient and significance level of financial crisis has not changed. Specifically, the 
significance level of the financial crisis which is 1% based on the main model 
remains unchanged under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. Moreover, the positive 
coefficient on financial crisis under the main model has not changed under OLS, 
fixed effect and 2SLS.  
NB: The reason for the inconsistence of some of the results of the main statistical 
model, GMM, with some of the results of OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS may be partly 
due to the fact that GMM possesses a number of advantages including, resolving 
the problems of endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation and profit 
persistence, which the other techniques may not be possess.  
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6.4 Additional analysis 
6.4.1 Additional Analysis using Z-SCORE as risk measure 
We conduct additional analysis to test for the relationship between bank risk and 
performance using Z-score as risk measure and ROA and ROE as performance 
measures. The results are summarised below and the Tables showing the results 
are in the appendix.  
Using GMM as our main estimation method, the results find that Z-score has 
significant positive relationship with both ROA and ROE at 1% significant levels. The 
lag of ROA and ROE are significant at 1% levels. With regards to control variables, 
we report the following findings. (1) Bank size has insignificant negative relationship 
with ROA and insignificant positive relationship with ROE (1) Equity to total assets 
(EQTA) has significant and positive relationship with ROA and positive but 
insignificant relationship with ROE. Net loans to assets is insignificantly positive 
related to ROA and significantly positive related to ROE at 1% significant level. Cost-
to-income ratio is significantly negative related to both ROA and ROE at 1% and 5% 
significant levels respectively. GDP is significant positive related to ROA at 1% 
significant level and insignificant positive related to ROE. Corruption has significant 
negative relationship with ROA at 10% significant level and significant negative 
relationship with ROE at 5% significant level. Finally, financial crises of 2007/2008 
has insignificant negative relationship with ROA and significant positive relationship 
with ROE at 1% significant level.  
6.4.2 Additional analysis using Tier 1 as risk measure   
We further conduct additional analysis to test for the relationship between bank risk 
and performance using Tier 1 as risk measure and ROA and ROE as performance 
measures. The results are summarised below and the Tables showing the results 
are in the appendix.   
Using GMM as our main estimation method, the results find that Tier 1 has 
insignificant positive relationship with ROA and significant positive relationship with 
ROE at 1% significant level. The lag of ROA and ROE are significant and positive 
at 1% levels. With regards to control variables, we report the following findings. (1) 
Bank size has insignificant negative relationship with both ROA and ROE (1) Equity 
to total assets (EQTA) has insignificant positive relationship with ROA and 
significant negative relationship with ROE at 5% significant levels. Net loans to 
assets is significantly negative related with ROA at 1% significant level and 
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insignificantly negative related with ROE. Cost-to-income ratio is significantly 
negative related to both ROA and ROE at 1% levels. GDP is significant positive 
related to ROA at 1% significant level and insignificant positive related to ROE. 
Corruption has significant positive relationship with both ROA and ROE at 1% 
significant levels. Finally, financial crises of 2007/2008 has significant positive 
relationship with ROA and significant positive relationship with ROE at 5% and 1% 
significant levels respectively.  
6.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has focused on presentation and discussion of empirical results on the 
link between bank risk and bank performance. Specifically, the chapter attempted 
to examine what impact bank risk has on African bank performance. Using GMM 
estimation, the findings indicate that bank risk measured by LLPNR has significant 
negative relationship with bank performance, measured by both ROA and ROE. 
These results are consistent with a number of some previous empirical findings. 
These results imply that different risks incurred by African banks have adverse 
impact on the bank performance, therefore, effective risk management strategies 
are required. This results have policy implications for management and regulatory 
bodies of banks in Africa. However, bank risk measured by LLRGL has negative 
impact on bank performance, based on both ROA and ROE but not significant.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND BANK RISK 
7 Introduction 
The objective here is to investigate the association between African board 
characteristics and bank risk of banks selected from 48 countries for this study. 
Specifically, this section of the research seeks to find out how the board 
characteristics of African banks impact on their bank risk. The dependent variable 
is bank risk which is measured by LLPNR and LLRGL. We regress each risk variable 
on board variables namely, board size, female directors, independent directors, 
CEO or role duality and board meetings. These variables are used based on 
availability of data and also these variables are widely used in the literature. We use 
GMM as our main statistical model and OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS for robustness 
tests. We use GMM as main model due to a number of advantages associated with 
such technique. This include resolving the problems of endogeneity, unobserved 
heterogeneity, autocorrelation and profit persistence, which other techniques may 
not be able to resolve.  
We use two econometric models as mentioned in chapter four and the results are 
presented in Tables 15 and 16. Below are the econometric models.  
LPNRit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit 
+ β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALEit + β11INDEPit + δ0 + 
εit      (5) 
LLRGLit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit 
+ β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALEit + β11INDEPit + δ0 + 
εit      (6) 
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Table 13: Results of corporate governance and bank risk using LLPNR as 
risk measure 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 2SLS GMM 
     
BSIZE 0.464** -1.107** 0.0222 -0.0569 
 (0.224) (0.518) 
 
(0.334) (0.101) 
FEMALE -0.0631 -0.0634 -0.0446 -0.117*** 
 (0.0756) (0.122) (0.0854) 
 
(0.0212) 
INDEP -0.0551 -0.0449 -0.0370 0.00312 
 (0.0382) (0.0630) (0.0445) 
 
(0.00907) 
DUAL -3.822 18.36* -0.668 -10.81*** 
 (3.654) (10.88) (4.863) 
 
(0.494) 
MEETINGS -0.285 -0.274 -0.384 -0.758*** 
 (0.267) (0.472) (0.342) 
 
(0.0386) 
LNTA 2.351*** 1.084 1.641*** 0.968*** 
 (0.629) (0.791) (0.580) 
 
(0.188) 
EQTA 0.188** 0.0745 0.152* -0.155*** 
 (0.0794) (0.164) (0.0899) 
 
(0.0155) 
NLTA 0.120** 0.156 0.152** 0.254*** 
 (0.0531) (0.107) (0.0648) 
 
(0.0188) 
COST 0.136** 0.126* 0.128*** 0.0764*** 
 (0.0674) (0.0730) (0.0455) 
 
(0.0205) 
COR -0.121*** -0.0458 -0.132** -0.106*** 
 (0.0408) (0.218) (0.0575) 
 
(0.0188) 
LNGDP -0.967*** 12.87 -0.881* 1.122*** 
 (0.332) (9.030) (0.520) 
 
(0.181) 
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CRISIS7_8 -3.850 -0.650 -2.132 -5.078*** 
 (4.451) (3.558) (3.208) (0.182) 
 
L.LLPNR    0.0341*** 
    (0.00291) 
 
Constant 1.265 -71.15 10.01 1.987 
 (7.131) (61.39) (7.572) (2.142) 
     
Observations 631 631 631 570 
R-squared 0.099 0.052   
Notes: LLPNR denotes loan loss provision/net interest revenue, BSIZE represents board size of the 
bank, INDEP denotes percentage of independent directors, DUAL represents role duality, FEMALE 
denotes the percentage of female directors on bank board, MEETINGS represents the number of 
board meetings per year LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes cost to income ratio, 
EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, LNGDP represents Gross 
Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 represents 2007/2008 financial crisis, ***, 
**, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
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 Table 14: Results of bank risk and corporate governance using LLRGL as 
risk measure 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 2SLS GMM 
     
BSIZE -0.117** -0.191** -0.151** -0.0784*** 
 (0.0460) (0.0799) (0.0624) (0.0112) 
 
FEMALE 0.00763 -0.0171 -0.00467 0.0131*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0178) (0.0151) (0.00420) 
 
INDEP -0.0156* -0.0241** -0.0174** -0.0126*** 
 (0.00903) (0.00963) (0.00808) (0.00116) 
 
DUAL 1.210 5.667*** 1.672* -0.166 
 (0.965) (1.752) (0.986) (0.145) 
 
MEETINGS 0.0847 0.136* 0.0927 0.0555*** 
 (0.0549) (0.0708) (0.0607) (0.00981) 
 
LNTA 0.274* 0.169 0.231** 0.406*** 
 (0.147) (0.116) (0.0977) (0.0164) 
 
EQTA 0.0814*** 0.0484* 0.0726*** 0.00428* 
 (0.0205) (0.0269) (0.0193) (0.00231) 
 
NLTA -0.0560*** -0.101*** -0.0781*** -0.00634*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0165) (0.0124) (0.00240) 
 
COST 0.0218** -0.00463 0.00323 0.0165*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.00825) (0.00238) 
 
COR -0.00609 -0.00102 0.000646 -0.00632** 
 (0.00812) (0.0348) (0.0126) (0.00299) 
 
LNGDP -0.0911 2.437* -0.0717 0.0783*** 
 (0.0616) (1.365) (0.116) (0.0182) 
 
CRISIS7_8 -1.858** -0.336 -0.745 -0.190*** 
 (0.836) (0.559) (0.536) (0.0239) 
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L.LLRGL    0.730*** 
    (0.00967) 
 
Constant 6.265*** -5.006 8.989*** -0.359* 
 (1.149) (9.235) (1.521) (0.188) 
     
Observations 614 614 614 558 
 
R-squared 0.184 
 
0.157  
 
 
Notes: LLRGL denotes loan loss reserve/gross loan, BSIZE represents board size of the bank, 
INDEP denotes percentage of independent directors, DUAL represents role duality, FEMALE 
denotes the percentage of female directors on bank board, MEETINGS represents the number of 
board meetings per year LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes cost to income ratio, 
EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, LNGDP represents Gross 
Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 represents 2007/2008 financial crisis, ***, 
**, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
7.1 Result of independent variables 
Model 4 of Tables 15 and 16 show the empirical findings of the relationship between 
corporate governance and bank risk based on GMM model. First, the effect of board 
size (BSIZE) on bank risk is found to be negative but insignificant when bank risk is 
measured by LLPNR but this became highly significant and negative when the risk 
is measured by LLRGL at 1% significant level. The insignificant impact on bank risk 
is consistent with the finding of Akbar et al (2017). The insignificant result may be 
caused by measurement error and multicollinearity. The statistically significant 
negative impact of board size on bank risk means that hypothesis two, which 
predicted significant positive association between board size and bank risk can be 
rejected. Although smaller board size is perceived to be better corporate 
governance practice, it is not good for African banks since it increases bank risk. 
This suggests that bigger board is better for risk management and reduction in Africa 
as compared to smaller board. The result can also be explained by the fact that 
African banks would benefit from different ideas, opinion and experience which are 
brought together by many different board members to reduce bank risk. Also, the 
result can mean that African banks could benefit from bigger board which is 
associated with more monitoring in order to reduce bank risk. This result lend some 
theoretical support to resource dependency theory, which suggests that larger board 
could bring access to resources, expertise, quality advice and it is difficult for 
insiders to control bigger board, which could help to minimise banks risk levels. 
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Contrary, this does not support agency theory which argues that due to 
communication and coordination problems as well as internal clashes among 
directors, larger board is not efficient, and could increase bank risk. The negative 
impact of board size on bank risk is consistent with prior empirical findings (e.g. 
Pathan, 2009; Wang & Hsu, 2013; Lu & Boateng, 2017; Switzer & Wang, 2013; 
Rachdi et al, 2013). However, this result is not consistent with Chan et al. (2016) 
and Battaglia and Gallo (2017), who report a significant positive effect of board size 
on bank risk. Differences in sample size and the way in which variables are 
measured may be the cause of inconsistencies of our findings with the previous 
empirical findings.   
Second, the results show that DUAL has insignificant negative impact on LLRGL 
and significant negative impact on bank risk, measured by LLPNR at 1% level of 
significance. The insignificant of our result may be due to measurement error and 
autocorrelation. The significant negative impact of duality on bank risk supports 
hypothesis five, which predicted a significant negative association between duality 
and bank risk. This finding means that the same person holding CEO and chairman 
role at the same time is good for bank risk reduction in Africa. Splitting CEO and 
chairman roles to be handled by two different individuals, is considered by the 
market as a good corporate governance practice. However, this does not work well 
for African banks because it causes an increase in bank risk. The result also 
suggests, that African banks may benefit from a single person who is 
knowledgeable, experienced and has shareholders interest at heart to hold the 
positions of CEO and Chairman at the same time, to reduce bank risk. Duality also 
causes quick decision making, which could help minimise bank risk in Africa. 
Theoretically, the negative impact of duality on bank risk supports the stewardship 
theory argument, that CEO duality helps to make timely and best decisions within a 
firm since the CEO knows how to run the business because of the in-depth 
knowledge of the business already gained by the CEO (Brickley et al. 1997; 
Syriopoulos and Tsatsaronis, 2012), which could reduce bank risk. The finding is in 
line with the finding of Akbar et al (2017), who documents a significant negative 
relationship between duality and bank risk. However, the finding is not in line with 
Rachdi et al, (2013) and Lu and Boateng (2017) who find significant positive 
relationship between duality and bank risk. Differences in study time frame and 
measurement of variables may be the result of our finding being not consistent with 
the findings of some previous empirical findings.  
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Third, the impact of board meetings (MEETINGS) on bank risk, measured by LLPNR 
is significant and negative at 1% significance level. This finding supports hypothesis 
six, which postulated significant negative association between frequent board 
meetings and bank risk. This suggests that smaller number of meetings by the board 
of directors causes the risk of the banks in Africa to increase. Also, some African 
banks may have many issues which require more attention and frequent meetings 
to resolve them. Therefore, smaller number of meetings may not be sufficient to 
resolve the issues of problem banks, hence the risk of these banks will increase. 
The negative impact of board meetings on bank risk can also be explained by the 
fact that a high frequency of board meetings indicates that the board plays a 
proactive role and increase monitoring, which is associated with lower bank risk in 
Africa. The negative impact of board meetings on bank risk lend some theoretical 
support to the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which states that frequent 
corporate board meetings is the increased capacity to advise effectively, discipline 
management and monitor them, which could reduce bank risk and improve financial 
performance. This finding is consistent with Battaglia and Gallo (2017) who record 
a significant negative relationship between the number of board meetings and bank 
risk using a sample of 40 European banks between 2006 and 2010.  
However, the result shows significant positive impact of board meetings on bank 
risk measured by LLRGL at 1% level of significance. The positive impact of board 
meetings on bank risk rejects hypothesis six, which predicted a significant negative 
association between board meetings and bank risk in Africa. This finding means that 
frequent board meetings is not good because it leads to higher bank risk in Africa. 
This result means that agency cost associated with more board meetings including 
refreshments, sitting allowance and transport cost of board members, is more than 
the benefits that more board meetings can bring. Also, the board members may be 
dominated by friends and family, and they may go for meetings to discuss more 
about their private life (such as issues relating to marriage and funerals) and little 
discussions on the main purpose of the board meeting. In such circumstance, more 
meetings will increase the risks of the banks instead of reducing them. The positive 
impact of board meetings on bank risk does not support agency theory, which 
recommends corporate boards to have more meetings, because this could lead to 
higher bank risk in Africa.  
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The main cause of conflicting results of the impact of board meetings on LLPNR 
and LLRGL may be due to differences in a way in which LLPNR and LLRGL are 
measured. On the other hand, since the two risks variables are measured differently, 
sometimes different result can be expected.  
 Four, female directors (FEMALE) has significant negative impact on bank risk, 
measured by LLPNR at 1% level of significance. This result supports hypothesis 
three, which predicted significant negative association between the presence of 
female directors on bank board and bank risk. This means African banks with 
smaller number of female directors increase bank risk. This result can be explained 
by the fact that the qualities, experience and contributions that more female directors 
bring to the board help to reduce bank risk in Africa. It is also perceived that women 
are risk averse and for that matter do not take risk unnecessarily. Therefore, they 
will challenge their male counterparts on the board to take the right decision when 
it comes to risk taking. Females are also perceived to be careful and more 
responsible of their actions. As a result, more female directors on African banks 
board may help reduce bank risk. The finding lend theoretical support to resource 
dependency theory, which argues that board diversity, which includes the presence 
of female directors, brings distinct information sets which are available to 
management improved decision making (Carter et al, 2010), which could reduce 
bank risk. The finding also supports other theoretical view which suggests, that the 
presence of female directors in the boardroom brings competitive advantage 
because females are likely to have non-business background and have advanced 
degrees (García-Meca, García-Sánchez & Martínez-Ferrero, 2015), which could 
reduce bank risk. The negative relationship between female directors and bank risk 
is consistent with some previous empirical findings (e.g. Gulamhussen & Santa, 
2015; Chan et al, (2016; Cabo et al, 2012; Dong, 2017; Palvia et al., 2015; Lu & 
Boateng, 2017; Dong et al, 2017). Contrary, this result is not consistent with Berger 
et al (2014) and Yu et al (2017), who report significant positive association between 
the presence of female directors and bank risk, probably due to differences in 
sample size and differences in study time frame. 
However, the impact of FEMALE on bank risk became significant and positive at 1% 
significance level when risk was measured by LLRGL, rejecting hypothesis three. 
This finding means that the presence of female directors in the boardroom does not 
help bank risk reduction but rather increases bank risk in Africa. The general notion 
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that female are risk averse and for that matter could help reduce bank risk does not 
manifest within African context, based on our findings. Moreover, the inclusion of 
more female directors is considered to be good corporate governance practice, 
which could reduce bank risk. However, within the African context, female directors 
may not have enough qualification, skills and experience necessary to contribute 
efficiently during board meetings. In addition, the boardroom of African banks is 
dominated by males with only small number of females. In this case, the female 
presence in the boardroom can be described as a token, and therefore may not be 
possible for them to challenge their male counterparts when needed. Therefore, 
their presence on the board may not help reduce bank risk. The positive effect of 
female directors on bank risk does not lend any support to resource dependency 
theory which recommends diversified board such as inclusion of female directors. 
The positive effect of female directors on bank risk is in line with the findings of 
Berger et al (2014) and Yu et al (2017). However, the finding is in contrast with the 
past studies that document a significant negative association between female 
directors and bank risk (e.g. Gulamhussen & Santa, 2015; Chan et al, 2016; Cabo 
et al, 2012; Dong, 2017; Palvia et al., 2015; Lu & Boateng, 2017; Dong et al, 2017). 
The inconsistence of our result and some previous empirical results can be caused 
by differences in a way in which the variables are measured.  
 Five, the presence of independent directors (INDEP) is insignificant positively 
related to LLPNR but significant negatively related to LLRGL at 1% level of 
significance. The inconsistence of the results may be due to differences in a way in 
which LLPNR and LLRGL are measured. Different results can be expected since 
LLPNR and LLRGL are measured differently. The significant negative relationship 
between board independent and bank risk is in line with hypothesis four which 
predicted a significant negative association between board independence and bank 
risk in Africa. The result suggests that the smaller number of independent directors 
on bank board of directors increases bank risk in Africa. This may imply that smaller 
number of independent directors may be dominated by executive board members, 
and for that matter they may not be able to challenge the executive directors to 
prevent them from taking decisions which may cause the risk of the banks to 
increase. This result also implies that the presence of more independent directors 
contribute to minimise bank risk in Africa. In other words the greater proportion of 
board independence is associated with lower bank risk levels in Africa. The result 
could also mean that the greater number of independent directors in Africa on the 
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banks board provide more monitoring and scrutinise management decisions to 
make sure that unjustifiable risk decisions which may not help the banks are 
prevented. Therefore when there is small number of independent directors, the risk 
of the banks increases. The negative effect of board independence on bank risk 
support Wang et al. (2014) and Chang et al. (2016), who argue that a large number 
of independent directors can decrease the behavior of bank’s risk-taking. This result 
also supports the theoretical argument, that independent board directors provide 
unbiased decisions, reduce agency problems (Fuzi et al., 2016), and provide extra 
monitoring to ensure a reduction of risk of management inflicting danger on firms 
(Pathan, 2009; Chang et al, 2016), which could reduce bank risk. The significant 
negative effect of independent directors on bank risk is consistent with a number of 
some previous studies (e.g. Pathan, 2009; Switzer & Wang, 2013; Chan et al., 2016; 
Akbar et al., 2017; Battaglia and Gallo, 2017). However, the result is not consistent 
with positive association between board independence and bank risk reported by 
Rachdi et al (2013), Lu and Boateng (2017), and Vallascas et al (2017), probable 
due to differences in sample size and measurement of the variables.  
However the insignificant positive impact of board independence on bank risk, 
measured by LLPNR may be caused by measurement error, extreme values and 
multicollinearity. The positive sign means that the presence of more independence 
directors increases bank risk in Africa. Independent directors are to provide a 
monitoring role, however, they may not have the knowledge, skills and experience 
to perform such function and therefore their presence may increase bank risk. 
However this is not significant in the African context based on our findings.  This 
result is not consistent with the findings of prior empirical literature that document 
significant positive relationship between board independence and bank risk (e.g. 
Rachdi et al., 2013; Lu and Boateng, 2017; Vallascas et al., 2017) and significant 
negative relationship between board independent and bank risk (e.g. Pathan, 2009; 
Switzer and Wang, 2013; Chan et al., 2016; Akbar et al., 2017; Battaglia and Gallo, 
2017).  
7.2 Result of control variables 
These results are presented in Tables 15 and 16. Regarding the control variables 
impact on bank risk under GMM regression, we report the following findings: Bank 
size measured by LNTA is statistically significant positive related to both LLPNR and 
LLRGL at 1% significant level. The findings indicate that the management of African 
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banks are unable to manage bigger banks properly and as a result increase the risk 
of the banks. Also, because bigger banks have more customers who apply for loans, 
there is likelihood that many of the customers who borrow the loans in Africa will 
default the payment, and as a result increase the risk of the banks. In addition, 
bigger banks in Africa cannot take advantage of economies of scale to reduce their 
risk. The result is in line with the theoretical prediction, that due to bureaucracy, 
bigger banks can have adverse effect when the banks grow extremely large 
(Athanasoglou et al, 2008), which could increase risk. This finding is consistence 
with some prior literature (e.g. Dong, 2016) and contrary to others (e.g. Pathan, 
2009; Chan et al., 2016; Berger et al., 2014) who find negative impact of bank size 
on risk probable due to sample size and time frame of studies.  
Equity to asset ratio (EQTA) is significant and negative related to LLPNR at 1% 
significant level. This result indicates that less capitalised banks in Africa are 
associated with higher bank risk. This result shows that in the event of high demand 
of capital or withdrawal of funds, the more funds available serve as a safety net for 
higher capitalised banks in Africa and for that matter reduce their risk. The higher 
capitalised banks in Africa are able to take advantage of their available funds to hire 
skilled and experienced personnel who can manage the risk of their banks, therefore 
they are exposed to less risks. In the event where banks capital is low, the risk of 
the banks can increase, which is being manifested in Africa, based on this finding. 
Theoretically, the result support Daly and Frikha (2017), who show that well 
capitalised bank is the ability of the bank to honour its engagements to its clients 
based on its own resources, which could reduce its risk. The significant negative 
impact of equity to assets ratio on bank risk is consistent with the findings of Chan 
et al. (2016) and Minton et al, (2010) and contrary to Pathan (2009) and Dong (2016) 
who report significant positive and insignificant impact of equity to assets ratio on 
bank risk respectively. The inconsistence of our result and other previous results 
may be due to differences in the way in which the variables are measured. 
Contrary, our result shows that equity to assets ratio is significant and positively 
related to LLRGL. The result indicates that larger capitalised banks in Africa are 
punished with high risk. The high capital banks in Africa may be tempted to grant 
more loans to different customers, and some of them have high probability to 
default. This will mean that the banks may be prone to high default risk. If the banks 
have poor risk management techniques, they may not be able to save the banks 
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from incurring high risk. This finding is consistent with findings of Pathan (2009) and 
contrary to the findings of some prior literature (e.g. Chan et al., 2016; Minton et al., 
2010) which report a significant negative relationship between equity to asset ratio 
and bank risk. The reason for the inconsistency of the results may be that their 
sample size and the way they measured their variable may be different from this 
study.  
The inconsistency of the results of the impact of equity to asset ratio on bank risk 
may be caused by differences in the way in which LLPNR and LLRGL are measured. 
Since the two risk variables are measured differently, different results can be 
expected sometimes.  
The impact of net loans to asset ratio (NLTA) on bank risk, measured by LLPNR is 
significant and positive at 1% significant level. The result implies that African banks 
lend more to their customers. More borrowing by customers make the banks prone 
to high default risk as many of the borrowers may not be able to repay their loans. 
High net loans means the banks will lose a lot of profit and spend more to manage 
the loans. The banks may not be in the position to embark on some vital operations 
and activities due to high loans with little profit, which may pose big danger to the 
banks and increase risk. Our result lend theoretical support to Sun et al. (2017) who 
posit, that when the level of loans is high, it indicates that the traditional lending 
activities involve by the bank is high at the same time, operational cost is increased 
as a result of the bank subject to increasing level of default risk. Our result is not in 
line with Dong et al., (2017) who find insignificant effect of net loans to assets on 
bank risk.  
However, the result shows that net loans to assets has significant and negative 
impact on bank risk, measured by LLR/GL at 1% significant level. The result means 
that smaller level of net loans increase bank risk. This is because, although the level 
of net loans may be small, the loans offered may still not be managed probably due 
to poor risk management techniques used by the banks in Africa.  
The inconsistency of the results of the impact of NLTA on bank risk may be caused 
by differences in the way in which LLPNR and LLRGL are measured. Since the two 
risk variables are measured differently, different results can be expected sometimes.  
The impact of cost-to-income ratio (COST) on bank risk measured by both LLPNR 
and LLRGL is significant and positive at 1% significant levels. This result implies 
  
159 
  
that the total operational cost incur by African banks exceeds their total generated 
income, and as a result, increases the risk of the banks. The result can also mean 
that the efficiency of management of the banks in Africa concerning expenses on 
banks performance is low, and for that matter exposes the banks to higher risk.     
Control of corruption (COR) has significant negative impact on bank risk, measured 
by both LLPNR and LLRGL. The significant negative coefficient on corruption 
indicates an increase in corruption. This findings indicates that the high corrupt 
activities in Africa pose high threat to the activities of banks, which reduce their 
revenues and increase their risk. Therefore, an increase in corruption in Africa 
causes an increase in their bank risk. 
The impact of GDP (LNGDP) on bank risk, measured by both LLPNR and LLRGL 
is statistically significant and positive at 1% significant levels. These findings may 
mean that during the period of cyclical upswings demand for loans and other bank 
services increases. The high demand for loans will increase the probability of default 
as a result of non-payment of some of the loans. In the situation where the banks in 
Africa have no proper credit risk management strategies in place, the risk of the 
banks will go high, hence the positive impact of GDP on bank risk in Africa. The 
findings support Shawtari (2018) who posits that a favourable condition in a country 
at any point in time causes people to borrow from banks to invest, and high 
borrowing could increase the banks default risk.  
The impact of financial crisis of 2007/2008 (CRISIS) on bank risk is significant and 
negative based on both risk measures, LLPNR and LLRGL at 1% significant levels. 
Our findings mean that, the financial crisis hit developed countries more and has 
little or no impact on Africa, in terms of risk, hence the crisis could not increase the 
risk of African banks. Also, it can mean that the African banks put more measures 
in place during the crisis period to manage their risk well in order to avoid the impact 
of the crisis, hence a reduction of their risk during the crisis period.  
7.3 Robustness analysis 
As mentioned earlier, this study uses GMM as the main model to analyse the 
relationship between corporate governance and bank risk. In addition, the study 
uses additional techniques to test how robust our main technique is. This section 
discusses how the main results (GMM) are robust or sensitive to alternative models 
and estimations. Specifically, this study carried out different robustness analysis in 
order to check the extent at which the main results of the relationship between bank 
  
160 
  
risk and corporate governance in Africa are robust or sensitive to different alternative 
models and estimations. The alternative techniques used in this study to test for this 
robustness are OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. As a result, this section reports the 
results based on ordinary least square model (OLS), fixed-effects model and two-
stage least squares (2SLS) model and compare them with the results of the main 
results, GMM. To assist clarity and comparison of the results, the main results 
(GMM) and the results of the robustness tests are presented in the same table. 
These results are presented in tables 15 and 16. Our tests suggest that the main 
results are robust, although we observe some sensitivities in the magnitude of the 
coefficient and significance levels.  
7.3.1 Results based on LLRGL as bank risk measure and corporate 
governance variables.   
7.3.1.1 Result of independent variables   
From Table 16, consistent with the results of the main model, the negative 
coefficient on board size has not changed under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. The 
direction of the significance level of board size changed slightly. Specifically, 1% 
significant level of board size under the main model, GMM became 5% under OLS, 
fixed effect and 2SLS models. The coefficient on female directors of the main model 
remains the same under OLS model but changed under fixed effect and 2SLS 
models. Specifically, the positive impact of female directors on bank risk based on 
the main model remains unchanged based on OLS but the impact of female 
directors on bank risk became negative based on fixed effect and 2SLS models. In 
terms of the significance levels, apart from the result of the main model of female 
directors which is 1% significant, the results of female directors based on OLS, fixed 
effect and 2SLS became insignificant. The negative coefficient on the result of 
independent directors under the main model remains the same under OLS, fixed 
effect and 2SLS. However there are some sensitivities in the direction of the 
significance level of the results of independent directors. In particular, 1% 
significance level of the results of independent directors under the main model 
became 5% under fixed effect and 2SLS models and changed to 10% under OLS 
model. 
Duality is negatively related to bank risk based on the main result. However, duality 
became positively related to LLRGL based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. 
Consistent with the result of the main model, the result of duality under OLS is not 
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significant but this became 1% significant under fixed effect model and changed to 
5% significant under 2SLS model. Finally, the positive coefficient on the result of 
board meetings under the main model has not changed under OLS, fixed effect and 
2SLS models. The 1% significance level of the coefficient on the result of board 
meetings under the main model became 10% significant under fixed effect model 
and changed to insignificant under OLS and 2SLS. 
7.3.1.2 Result of control variables  
These results are presented in Table 16. Consistent with the main model, the 
direction of coefficient of the result on bank size remains positive under OLS, fixed 
effect and 2SLS. However, there are some sensitivities in the direction of the 
significance level of the coefficients of the results of bank size. Specifically, the 1% 
significant level of the result of bank size under the main model became 5%, 10% 
and insignificant under 2SLS, OLS and fixed effect models respectively. The 
direction of coefficient on the results of equity to assets ratio has not changed. 
Specifically, the positive impact of equity to assets ratio under the main model 
remains the same under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. Consistent with the 
result of the main model, the significance level of the coefficient on equity to assets 
ratio remains 10% under fixed effect model but this became 1% significance under 
OLS and 2SLS models. Consistent with the main result, the direction of coefficient 
on the result of net loans to assets remains negative under OLS, fixed effect and 
2SLS. The 1% significance level of the coefficient on the results of net loans to 
assets under OLS, fixed effect, and 2SLS models remain the same as the main 
model.  
The positive impact of cost-to-income ratio on LLR/GL under the main model, GMM 
remains positive under OLS and 2SLS models and became negative under fixed 
effect model. The 1% significant level of the result of the impact of cost-to-income 
ratio under the main model became 5% under OLS model and changed to 
insignificant under both fixed effect and 2SLS models. Similar to the main model, 
the direction of coefficient on control of corruption remains negative under OLS, and 
fixed effect models and became positive under 2SLS model. Inconsistent with the 
main results, the coefficient on control of corruption, which was 5% statistically 
significant associated with bank risk under the main result is now statistically 
insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The direction of coefficient 
on GDP which is positive under the main model is similar to that of fixed effect but 
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this changed to negative under OLS and 2SLS models. Inconsistent with the main 
result, the coefficient on GDP, which was 1% significantly related to bank risk based 
on the main model is now 10% significantly related to bank risk based on fixed effect 
model  and insignificantly related to bank risk based on both OLS and 2SLS models. 
Finally, the negative coefficient on the result of 2007/2008 financial crisis under the 
main model, GMM remains negative under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The 
direction of significance of the coefficient on 2007/2008 financial crisis which was 
1% significant under the main model is now 5% significant under OLS model and 
insignificant under fixed effect and 2SLS models.  
7.3.2 Results based on LLPNR as bank risk measure and corporate 
governance variables.   
7.3.2.1 Results of independent variables  
From Table 15, consistent with the results of the main model, the result of board 
size shows statistically insignificant under 2SLS model but this became 5% 
significant under OLS and 2SLS models.  Consistent with the result of the main 
model, the direction of coefficient on board size remains negative under fixed effect 
model but this became positive under OLS and 2SLS models. The direction of 
coefficient on female directors has not changed. Specifically, the negative coefficient 
on female directors of the main model remains negative under OLS, fixed effect and 
2SLS models. However, the level of significance level of female directors which was 
1% significant under the main model is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 
2SLS models. The direction of coefficient on independent directors which was 
positive is now negative based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. However, 
the level of significance level of the main result of independent directors shows 
similar direction. Specifically and consistent with the result of the main model, board 
independence is insignificantly related to bank risk under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS 
models. Duality which is significantly related to bank risk at 1% significance level 
under the main model in now 10% under fixed effect model and insignificant under 
OLS and 2SLS models. The direction of coefficient on duality which is negative 
under the main model has not changed apart from the result of fixed effect model 
which is now positive. The direction of coefficient on board meetings which is 
negative under the main model has not changed based on OLS, fixed effect and 
2SLS models. The direction of significance level of the coefficient on board meetings 
under the main model which was 1% is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect 
and 2SLS models.  
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7.3.2.2 Results of control variables   
These results are presented in table 15. Consistent with the results of the main 
model, the direction of coefficient on bank size has not changed. In particular, the 
positive impact of bank size on bank risk under the main model remains the same 
under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. Consistent with the results of the main 
model, the direction of significance level shows similar level under OLS and 2SLS 
models apart from fixed effect model which became insignificant. Equity to asset 
ratio shows negative impact on bank risk under the main model but this changed to 
positive under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The direction of significance level 
of equity to assets ratio which was 1% significance based on the main model is now 
5%, 10% and insignificant based on OLS, 2SLS and fixed effect models 
respectively. Consistent with the result of the main model, the direction of coefficient 
on net loans to assets ratio remains positive under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS 
models. However, 1% significance level of the result of net loans to assets ratio 
under the main model is now 5% under OLS and 2SLS models and became 
insignificant under fixed effect model. 
Consistent with the main model, the direction of coefficient on cost-to-income ratio 
remains positive under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. Moreover and 
consistent with the result of the main model, the impact of cost-to-income ratio 
remains significant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. However, the 1% 
significance level of the result of cost-to-income ratio under the main model remains 
unchanged under 2SLS model but changed to 5% and 10% under OLS and fixed 
effect models respectively. Consistent with the result of the main model, control of 
corruption has negative impact on bank risk under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS 
models. However, consistent with the main model, the direction of significance level 
of the result of control of corruption remains 1% based on OLS model and became 
5% and insignificant based on 2SLS and fixed effect models respectively. 
Consistent with the result of the main model, the direction of coefficient on GDP 
remains positive under fixed effect model but changed to negative under OLS and 
2SLS models. The 1% significance level of the result of GDP based on the main 
result has not changed under the result of OLS model but became 10% and 
insignificant based on 2SLS and fixed effect models respectively. Finally, consistent 
with the result of the main model, the direction of coefficient of the result on financial 
crisis has not changed and remains negative based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. 
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However, the 1% significant level of the result of financial crisis under the main 
model is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. 
NB: The reason for the inconsistence of some of the results of the main statistical 
model, GMM, with some of the results of OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS, may be partly 
due to the fact that GMM possesses a number of advantages including, resolving 
the problems of endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation and profit 
persistence, which the other techniques may not be able to resolve.  
7.4 Additional analysis using Z-score and TIER 1 as bank risk measures 
We conduct additional analysis to test for the relationship between corporate 
governance and bank risk using Z-SCORE and TIER 1 as risk measures. The 
results are summarised below and the Tables showing the results are in the 
appendix.   
Using GMM as our main estimation method, we find the following results. The 
results show that the lag of both Z-score and Tier 1 are significant positive at 1%. 
The results show that board size has significant positive relationship with Z-score at 
1% significant level and insignificant negative relationship with Tier 1. The presence 
of female directors has insignificant negative relationship with Z-score and 
significant positive relationship with Tier 1 at 1% significant level. The presence of 
independent directors has significant positive impact on Z-score and significant 
negative impact on Tier 1. Both Z-score and Tier 1 are significant at 1% significance 
levels. Duality has insignificant positive impact on Z-score and significant and 
positive impact on Tier 1 at 1% significant level.  Board meetings has significant 
negative impact on Z-score and significant and positive impact on Tier 1, both are 
significant at 1% significant levels.  
With regards to the control variables, we report the following findings: Bank size has 
significant and negative impact on Z-score at 1% significant level and significant and 
positive impact on Tier 1 at 1% significant level. Equity to assets ratio is significant 
and positive correlated with Z-score at 5% significant level and significant positive 
correlated with Tier 1 at 1% significant level. Net loans to asset is insignificant 
positive correlated with Z-score and significant negative correlated with Tier 1 at 1% 
significant level. Cost-to-income ratio is significant negative correlated with both Z-
score and Tier 1 at 1 % significant levels. Corruption has significant negative impact 
on Z-score at 1% significant level and significant positive impact on Tier 1 at 1% 
significant level. The relationship between GDP and Z-score is significant and 
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negative at 1% significant level, the relationship between GDP and Tier 1 is negative 
and insignificant. Finally, 2007/2008 financial crisis has significant positive impact 
on Z-score at 1% significant level and significant negative impact on Tier 1 at 1% 
significant level. 
7.5 Chapter summary  
This chapter has focused on presenting and discussing the empirical results of the 
relationship between internal corporate governance structures and bank risk of 
African banks. Specifically, this chapter attempted to find out how different corporate 
governance characteristics help reduce or increase bank risk in Africa. This chapter 
addresses hypothesis 2 to 6. Two bank risk measures were used namely, Loan Loss 
Provision to Net Interest Revenue (LLPNR) and Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loan 
(LLRGL). Our independent corporate governance variables used are board size, 
board meetings, role or CEO duality, female directors and independent directors. 
Using GMM estimation, we recorded the following findings, board size has 
significant negative impact on bank risk, measured by LLRGL but insignificant 
negative impact on bank risk, measured by LLPNR. These results suggest that 
bigger board is more efficient for African banks in order to reduce bank risk. Board 
meetings has significant negative relationship with LLPNR and significant positive 
relationship with LLRGL. The relationship between CEO or role duality and bank 
risk, based on LLPNR, is found to be significant and negative and insignificant and 
positive based on LLRGL. Independent directors has significant negative impact on 
LLRGL and insignificant positive impact on LLPNR. Finally, the results revealed that 
female directors has significant negative association with bank risk, measured by 
LLPNR and significant positive association with bank risk, measured by LLRGL. The 
results show that board characteristics are important factors which determine bank 
risk levels of African banks.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND BANK PERFORMANCE 
8 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the relationship between corporate 
governance and bank performance. To be specific, this chapter presents the impact 
that corporate governance characteristics have on bank performance in Africa. In 
this relationship, our dependent bank performance measures are return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Our independent corporate governance 
variables are board size (BSIZE), board meetings (MEETINGS), role duality 
(DUAL), presence of female directors (FEMALE) and presence of independent 
directors (INDEP). We use GMM as our main statistical model and OLS, fixed effect 
and 2SLS for our robustness analysis. We use GMM as the main estimator due to 
a number of advantages that go with such technique. These include resolving the 
problems of endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation and profit 
persistence, which other techniques may not be able to resolve. 
To achieve this, two econometric models are used and the results are presented in 
Tables 15 and 16. Below are the econometric models: 
ROAit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit + 
β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALEit + β11INDEPit + δ0 + εit          (7) 
ROEit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit + 
β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALEit + β11INDEPit + δ0 + εit           (8) 
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Table 15: Results of corporate governance and bank performance using 
ROA as performance measure 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 2SLS GMM 
     
BSIZE -0.0551*** 0.0112 0.00437 -0.0397*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0307) (0.0251) (0.00875) 
 
DUAL -0.0688 -0.785 -0.459 0.0614 
 (0.360) (0.670) (0.413) (0.0967) 
 
MEETINGS -0.0692** -0.00211 -0.0147 -0.0896*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0282) (0.0246) (0.00764) 
 
FEMALE 0.00316 -0.00877 -0.00363 0.0129*** 
 (0.00617) (0.00721) (0.00611) (0.00150) 
 
INDEP 0.000814 0.00128 0.00206 -3.26e-05 
 (0.00417) (0.00378) (0.00325) (0.000841) 
 
LNTA -0.159*** -0.0789* -0.117*** -0.0567*** 
 (0.0596) (0.0468) (0.0393) (0.0170) 
 
EQTA 0.0422*** 0.0265*** 0.0337*** 0.0186*** 
 (0.00872) (0.00895) (0.00679) (0.00189) 
 
NLTA -0.00708 -0.00659 -0.00914* -0.0106*** 
 (0.00482) (0.00616) (0.00471) (0.00135) 
 
COST -0.0533*** -0.0505*** -0.0513*** -0.0386*** 
 (0.00522) (0.00395) (0.00323) (0.00111) 
 
COR -0.000721 0.00267 0.00180 -0.0143*** 
 (0.00384) (0.0129) (0.00548) (0.00103) 
 
LNGDP 0.0692** -0.525 0.0354 -0.0525*** 
 (0.0317) (0.525) (0.0532) (0.0124) 
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CRISIS7_8 0.0374 0.350* 0.391** 0.0883*** 
 (0.389) (0.204) (0.191) (0.0245) 
 
L.ROA    0.389*** 
    (0.00789) 
 
Constant 6.200*** 8.691** 5.226*** 5.781*** 
 (0.579) (3.524) (0.654) (0.113) 
     
Observations 682 682 682 640 
 
R-squared 
 
0.426 0.291 
 
  
Notes: BSIZE represents board size of the bank, INDEP denotes percentage of independent 
directors, DUAL represents role duality, FEMALE denotes the percentage of female directors on 
bank board, MEETINGS represents the number of board meetings per year, LNTA denotes the size 
of the bank, COST denotes cost to income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents 
net loans/total assets, LNGDP represents Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, 
CRISIS7_8 represents 2007/2008 financial crisis, ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% 
respectively, Robust standard errors in parenthesis     
Table 16: Results of corporate governance and bank performance using 
ROE as performance measure 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 2SLS GMM 
     
BSIZE -0.219 0.155 0.121 -0.297*** 
 (0.146) (0.223) (0.176) (0.0466) 
 
DUAL 0.771 3.061 0.180 -1.312* 
 (2.434) (4.886) (2.785) (0.779) 
 
MEETINGS -0.438** -0.00973 -0.0538 -0.525*** 
 (0.171) (0.206) (0.174) (0.0373) 
 
FEMALE 0.123*** -0.0146 0.0209 0.0436*** 
 (0.0409) (0.0525) (0.0433) (0.0126) 
 
INDEP 0.00392 -0.00183 0.00753 -0.0666*** 
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 (0.0257) (0.0276) (0.0230) (0.00501) 
 
LNTA -0.653* -0.198 -0.643** -0.505*** 
 (0.364) (0.341) (0.282) (0.0892) 
 
EQTA -0.210*** 0.0319 -0.0718 -0.208*** 
 (0.0348) (0.0652) (0.0467) (0.0173) 
 
NLTA -0.0459* 0.0789* -0.0145 -0.0486*** 
 (0.0249) (0.0449) (0.0328) (0.00884) 
 
COST -0.321*** -0.333*** -0.323*** -0.215*** 
 (0.0322) (0.0288) (0.0226) (0.0139) 
 
COR 0.0297 0.0548 0.0239 0.0227** 
 (0.0239) (0.0940) (0.0357) (0.0108) 
 
LNGDP 0.108 -12.46*** -0.120 -0.531*** 
 (0.211) (3.828) (0.339) (0.105) 
 
CRISIS7_8 3.937 4.576*** 5.937*** 3.335*** 
 (2.872) (1.489) (1.400) (0.112) 
 
L.ROE    0.281*** 
    (0.0129) 
 
Constant 42.35*** 108.9*** 36.36*** 43.05*** 
 (3.640) (25.69) (4.376) (1.439) 
     
Observations 682 682 682 640 
 
R-squared 0.341 0.288   
Notes: BSIZE represents board size of the bank, INDEP denotes percentage of independent 
directors, DUAL represents role duality, FEMALE denotes the percentage of female directors on 
bank board, MEETINGS represents the number of board meetings per year, LNTA denotes the size 
of the bank, COST denotes cost to income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents 
net loans/total assets, LNGDP represents Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, 
CRISIS7_8 represents 2007/2008 financial crisis, ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% 
respectively, Robust standard errors in parenthesis                
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8.1 Results of Independent variables     
Tables 15 and 16 present the results of the association between corporate 
governance characteristics and bank performance under GMM regression model. 
The findings are as follows: Board size is significantly negative related to both ROA 
and ROE at 1% level of significance. The significant negative relationship between 
board size and bank performance implies that hypothesis ten, which expected 
statistically significant negative association between board size and bank 
performance in Africa, is well supported. Our results show that smaller board works 
better; it is effective and efficient to improve bank performance in Africa than bigger 
board size. It also means that bigger board is inefficient governance structure and 
has adverse effect on the performance of banks in Africa. Smaller boards in Africa 
with more experienced people are able to take better decisions to improve bank 
performance. Theoretically, this finding supports agency theory which suggests, that 
because of director’s free rider problems, communication and coordination 
problems, and internal conflicts among directors, bigger boards are not efficient 
(Jensen, 1993). In addition, during decision making , it is difficult for bigger boards 
to organise board meetings, it is more difficult and requires a lot of effort for bigger 
boards to reach consensus ((Jensen 1993; Hoque et al, (2013), which could affect 
the performance of banks negatively. Contrary, the negative impact of board size 
on bank performance does not support resource dependency theory, which 
suggests that bigger board comes with greater expertise, quality advice and access 
to resources, which could improve bank performance. The negative effect of board 
size on bank performance is in line with previous studies (e.g. Liang et al., 2013; 
Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015; Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Sakawa & Watanabel, 2018). 
Contrary, this finding is opposite to previous empirical studies that report a 
significant positive relationship between board size and bank performance (e.g. 
Chahine & Safieddine, 2011; Salim et al, 2016; O’Sullivan et al, 2016; Adams and 
Mehran, 2012). Our finding is not in line with some other previous findings probably 
due to differences in sample size and differences in a way in which the variables are 
measured, not forgetting differences in the time frame in which the studies are 
conducted.  
Duality has insignificant and positive relationship with ROE but significant and 
negative association with ROE at 10% significance level. The insignificant nature of 
our result may be caused by measurement error, autocorrelation and 
multicollinearity. The positive coefficient on duality implies that one person holding 
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the positions of CEO and chairman is better for bank performance improvement, but 
it is not significant in Africa. The positive impact of duality on performance provides 
supports to stewardship and resource dependency theories but this is not significant 
in the case of Africa. The insignificant positive impact of duality on bank performance 
is consistent with previous empirical findings (Liang et al., 2013; Bukair & Rahman, 
2015; Carty & Weiss, 2012; Abdul Gafoor et al., 2018). However, it is not consistent 
with the previous empirical findings which record a significant positive impact of 
duality on bank performance (e.g. Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2013). It is also not 
consistent with the significant negative impact of duality on bank performance 
recorded by past studies (e.g. Grove et al, 2011; Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Dong et 
al., 2017; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2018; AlManaseer et al. (2012). 
However, the negative impact of duality on bank performance supports hypothesis 
eight, which postulated a significant association between role duality and bank 
performance in Africa. This result suggests that the situation whereby a single 
person holds the positions of CEO and chairman at the same time is not a good 
corporate governance practice that improves African banks performance. The result 
implies that the same person (CEO) reporting to himself (as chairman) brings 
conflict of interest which poses risk and subsequently causes adverse effect on bank 
performance. This result also suggests that it is beneficial for African banks to have 
a separate CEO from chairman in order to improve their performance. Our findings 
are in accordance with agency theory, which argues that CEO duality has adverse 
impact on firm performance, and that to prevent managerial entrenchment, 
management and boards should be independent from each other (Fama & Jensen, 
1983a). It also lends some support to Rechner and Dalton (1991) who argue that 
assigning one person as CEO and chairman at the same time brings about a clear 
conflict of interest, which could adversely affect bank performance. This finding also 
supports the corporate governance recommendations by some corporate 
governance codes in Africa including King III in South Africa, which recommend a 
separation of Chairman and CEO roles. The significant negative impact of duality 
on bank performance is in line with some previous empirical findings (e.g. Grove et 
al, 2011; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Dong et al., 2017; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2018; 
AlManaseer et al. (2012). However, this finding is not consistent with the positive 
impact of duality on bank performance recorded by prior empirical literature (e.g. Al-
Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2013), probably due to the differences in the way in which the 
variables are measured.  
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The findings show that the relationship between board meetings and bank 
performance is statistically significant and negative based on both ROA and ROE 
at 1% level of significance. These results reject hypothesis seven, which predicted 
statistically significant positive association between board meetings and bank 
performance in Africa. These findings suggest that having smaller number of 
meetings is good to improve bank performance in Africa than having more meetings. 
The results could imply that agency cost in the form of travel expenses, 
refreshments, directors’ meetings and time which go into more board meetings 
outweigh the advantages that more meetings bring to the banks in Africa. Although 
the market perceives frequent board meetings to be good corporate governance 
practice, board members may not always devote all the time to discuss critical 
issues relating to the welfare of the bank but rather discuss issues relating to their 
personal life and families. Therefore, such meetings will not benefit the bank but will 
only bring cost, which will affect the performance of banks negatively. As a result, 
some banks, for example those in Africa, do not benefit from more board meetings. 
These findings do not lend any support to agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
which suggests that frequent board meetings come with increased capacity to 
advise effectively, discipline management and monitor them, which could result to 
improvement in bank performance. These findings are not in accordance with the 
past empirical studies (e.g. Liang et al, 2013; Salim Arjomandi & Seufert, 2016; 
Grove et al, 2011; Abdul Gafoor, 2018) which find a positive relationship between 
board meetings and bank performance. The inconsistent of this finding and the 
findings of some previous studies may be due to differences in sample size, time 
frame and the way in which the variables are measured.  
The findings show that the impact of female directors on bank performance, 
measured by ROA and ROE is significant and positive based on the two 
performance measures at 1% levels of significance. This result means that 
hypothesis nine, which predicted a significant positive association between the 
presence of female directors and bank performance in Africa, is well supported. 
These results suggest that the experience and qualities female directors bring to the 
board help in no small way to improve bank performance in Africa. It is perceived 
that females are more responsible, they do not take decisions unnecessary, and 
they make sure that their male counterparts do not take decisions which will cause 
adverse effect towards the bank. Therefore, more female directors in the boardroom 
help African banks to improve their performance. These findings lend support to 
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resource dependency theory, which suggests that board diversity, which includes 
the presence of female directors on a board, comes with distinct information sets 
which are available to management enhance decision making (Carter et al, 2010), 
which could increase bank performance. Our result is also in accordance with 
theoretical view, which suggests that female directors presence in the boardroom 
comes with a competitive advantage since females are more likely to possess non-
business background and have advanced degrees (García-Meca, García-Sánchez 
& Martínez-Ferrero, 2015), which could improve bank performance. The positive 
association between female directors and bank performance is consistent with a 
number of previous empirical findings (e.g. Gulamhussen & Santa, 2015; Pathan & 
Faff, 2013; García-Meca et al, 2015; Dong et al., 2017).  
The association between the presence of independent directors and bank 
performance, measured by ROA is statistically insignificant and negative. However, 
the association between the presence of independent directors and bank 
performance, measured by ROE is statistically significant and negative at 1% 
significant level. The significant negative impact of independent directors on bank 
performance rejects hypothesis eleven, which predicted a statistically positive 
association between independent directors and bank performance in Africa. The 
significant negative association between board independent and bank performance 
suggests that more independent directors on the board causes a reduction in bank 
performance in Africa.  
This result can be explained by the fact that more independent directors are chosen 
by the bank for the purpose of regulatory and compliance purposes, and their 
presence do not bring anything good to the banks. The reason may also be that the 
independent directors may not have enough experience and skills to contribute 
during board meetings and their presence can bring cost rather that benefit to the 
banks. Therefore, smaller number of independent directors on board is better for 
improvement in bank performance in Africa. The market perceives more 
independent members on bank board to be best corporate governance practice 
because their presence could increase bank performance, but this is not the case 
in Africa. The theoretical prediction that independent board directors scrutinise the 
management decisions, advice and monitor management activities, which could 
improve bank performance is not the case in Africa. This support the argument by 
Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) who state, that adding more independent directors to a 
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board might not always be helpful. The significant negative impact of independent 
directors on bank performance lend support to the empirical findings of Pathan and 
Faff (2013) and Sarkar and Sarkar (2018) who report a significant negative 
association between independent directors and bank performance. However the 
finding does not lend support to some prior empirical findings (e.g. Abdul Gafoor et 
al, 2018; Dong, 2016; Liang et al, 2013; Pathan et al, 2007; Lee and Carlson, 2007), 
which report positive impact of board independent on bank performance, which may 
be due to differences in sample size and measurement difference of the variables.  
8.2 Results of control variables 
The results of control variables are presented in Tables 15 and 16. The results show 
that bank size (LNTA) has negative impact on both ROA and ROE at 1% significant 
levels. The negative coefficient on bank size implies that the smaller banks in Africa 
are easily managed to make more profit. It also implies that managers of the banks 
in Africa are more efficient when they concentrate on smaller number of businesses, 
which result to a higher banking performance. In addition, the results imply that, 
agency cost related to managing smaller banks and overhead bureaucratic 
processes associated with smaller banks in Africa are all reduced. The reduction in 
agency cost and bureaucratic processes increase the performance of smaller banks 
in Africa. The findings are consistent with the findings (e.g. Tan (2016); Al-Saidi & 
Al-Shammari (2013); Dietrich & Wanzenried (2011); Elyasiani & Zhang;2015; 
Doumpos et al, 2015) and contrary to positive impact of bank risk and performance 
recorded by prior empirical literature (e.g. Sakawa & Watanabel, 2018; Rahman et 
al., 2015; Tan et al., 2017; Shawtari, 2018; Hasanov et al., 2018). 
EQTA has significant and positive relationship with ROA at 1% significant level. The 
result suggests that higher capital banks perform better in Africa. The findings also 
suggest that well capitalised banks in Africa are able to change their funds to higher 
income earnings. In addition, high capital banks in Africa are able to embark on 
more investment activities to make more profit. The finding supports the theoretical 
argument by Djalilov and Piesse (2016) and Athanasoglou et al., (2008) who argue 
that, the ratio of equity to total asset is expected to have positive impact on bank 
performance because it represents the amount of available funds to back operations 
of the bank, and for that matter serve as safety net in case of adverse events, which 
could increase bank performance. The result supports the findings of some previous 
empirical literature (e.g. Liang et al, 2013; Bougatef, 2017; Daly & Frikha, 2017; 
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Djalilov & Piesse, 2016; Hasanov et al., 2018). However, the finding does not 
support the findings of some previous empirical literature that find a significant 
negative relationship between equity to asset ratio and bank performance (e.g. 
Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011). 
 In contrast, we find that equity to assets ratio has significant and negative 
relationship with ROE at 1% significant level. This result suggests that smaller 
capitalised banks in Africa make more profit. The result can be explained by the fact 
that the smaller capitalised banks manage their available little resources efficiently 
and effectively to make more profit. The significant negative impact of equity to 
assets ratio is consistent with the findings of Mollah and Zaman (2015) and Dietrich 
and Wanzenried (2011) but contrast with the significant positive impact found by 
prior literature (e.g. Liang et al, 2013; Bougatef, 2017; Daly and Frikha, 2017; 
Djalilov and Piesse, 2016; Hasanov et al., 2018).  
The inconsistent of the results of impact of equity to assets ratio on ROA and ROE 
may be caused by the difference in the behaviour of equity and debt holders (ROA) 
and equity holders (ROE). Equity holders (ROE) are the real owners of the bank 
and for that matter may accept some level of risk and demand their returns only 
when the bank makes profit and has paid everybody. On the other hand, equity and 
debt holders (ROA) may not accept any risk and may demand their returns whether 
the bank makes profit or not. The difference in the behaviour can cause the result 
of ROA and ROE to be different.  
The relationship between NLTA and bank performance is statistically significant and 
negative based on the two performance measures, ROA and ROE at 1% significant 
levels. A reduced net loans to assets ratio will resort to a lower record of default risk 
by the banks. As a result, the banks do not have to spend too much on managing 
default risk, which could help improve the performance of the banks in Africa. The 
money which would be spent on managing default risk by the banks could be used 
for investment activities for the banks to make more profit. Therefore, the banks in 
Africa make more profit with lower net loans to assets ratio. The findings are not in 
line with the findings of Daly and Frikha (2017), Dong et al., (2017), Mollah and 
Zaman (2015) who document a positive relationship between net loans to assets 
ratio and bank performance.  
COST is statistically significantly negative related to both ROA and ROE at 1% 
significant levels. The negative impact on performance suggests that there is an 
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efficient and prudent operations management within the banks in Africa which help 
them to increase their performance. On the other hand, a lower percentage of cost 
to income ratio means that, the banks in Africa have more money left for investment 
purposes to increase their performance. Theoretically, this findings support Rahman 
et al, 2015) who mention that, when the ratio of cost-to-income is low the higher the 
performance of the bank, and the higher the cost-to-income ratio, the lower the bank 
performance. The significant negative association between cost to income ratio and 
bank performance is consistent with the findings of some previous empirical studies 
(e.g. Rahman, 2015; Syafri, 2012; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011; Goddard, 2013). 
 COR has significant and negative impact on bank performance, measured by ROA. 
This result suggests that as CPI decreases (an increase in corruption), banks 
performance increases. The result suggests that banks in Africa take advantage of 
corrupt activities to make connections and influence key decision and policy makers 
and politicians to make more profit. Some banks may take bribes to award more 
loans to people who do not actually qualify for the loans in order to make profit. 
Some banks in Africa may also pay bribes to engage in some unlawful investment 
activities to increase their profitability. Our finding is consistent with Aburime (2009) 
and Rizvi (2013), who find a negative relationship between corruption and bank 
performance.  
However, the result shows a significant positive relationship between corruption and 
bank performance, measured by ROE. This result shows that as CPI increases (a 
reduction in corruption), banks performance in Africa increases significantly. The 
result suggests that the impact of corruption within institutions including banks in 
Africa is a threat to the activities of the banks. Therefore, a reduction in corruption 
help increase the performance of African banks. The result is consistent with 
Bougatef (2017) who find significant positive relationship between corruption and 
bank performance.  
The inconsistence of the result of the impact of corruption on ROA and ROE may 
probably be due to the fact that the behaviour of debt holders (ROA) and equity 
holders (ROE) are different and for that matter we can expect the result of ROA to 
be different from ROE. . 
The association between GDP and bank performance based on both ROA and ROE 
is statistically significant and negative at 1% level of significance. The findings show 
that, in a bad economic situation in Africa when GDP is low, the demand for loans 
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and other bank services in Africa can increases because individuals and companies 
will need support from banks to survive. The interest on the high demand for loans 
increases the performance of the banks, hence the negative relationship between 
GDP and performance. The result is consistent with the results of previous empirical 
findings (e.g. Boateng et al., 2015; Safrali and Gumus, 2010; Rashid & Jabeen, 
2016) and contrary to Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), Mollah and Zaman (2015) 
and Shawtari (2018) who find a positive impact of GDP on bank performance.  
2007/2008 financial crisis has significant positive impact on both ROA and ROE at 
1% significant levels. The findings suggest that, during the crisis, the banks in Africa 
put more measures in place to manage their operations and risk very well. This 
avoided the adverse effect of the crisis on their performance, hence the banks in 
Africa were able to make profit during the crisis period. 
It is important to note that, the inconsistencies of some of our findings with other 
previous empirical findings may be due to differences in measurement of the 
variables, sample size and time frame of the studies.  
8.3 Robustness analysis 
8.3.1 Results based on corporate governance variables and bank 
performance, measured by ROA 
8.3.1.1 Results of independent variables  
The results are presented in table 15. The negative sign of the coefficient on board 
size under the main model, GMM, remains the same under OLS but changed to 
positive under both fixed effect and 2SLS models. The significance level of board 
size shows some changes. While the 1% significant level of board size under GMM 
remains the same under OLS, it became statistically insignificant under fixed effect 
and 2SLS models. The sign of the coefficient on Duality changed from positive under 
GMM to negative under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. The significance level of duality 
which was statistically insignificant has not changed. The negative sign on 
coefficient of board meetings remains unchanged. However, there are changes in 
the level of significance. Specifically, the coefficient on board meetings which was 
statistically significant at 1% level under GMM is now significant at 5% level under 
OLS and insignificant under both fixed effect and 2SLS models. With regards to 
female directors, the sign on the coefficient which was positive under the main 
model remains the same under OLS model but changed to negative under fixed 
effect and 2SLS models. However, the sign on the coefficient of female directors 
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which was significant at 1% level based on the main model is now insignificant 
based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The coefficient on independent 
directors which was statistically insignificant has not changed. However, the sign of 
coefficient on independent directors which was negative under the main model is 
now positive based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models.   
8.3.1.2 Results of control variables   
The results of the control variables are presented in table 15. The direction of 
coefficient on bank size has not changed. However, the level of significance on 
coefficient of bank size which was 1% under the main model, GMM, remains the 
same under OLS and 2SLS but changed to 10% significant level under fixed effect 
model. The sign of the coefficient and the direction of significance on equity to total 
assets remains unchanged. The sign of the coefficient on net loans to assets ratio 
remains the same. However, the direction of significance of the coefficient on net 
loan to assets has changed. Specifically, the 1% significance level of coefficient on 
net loans to assets ratio under the main model is now 10% significant level under 
2SLS and insignificant under OLS and fixed effect models. The sign of the 
coefficient and the direction of significance of coefficient on cost-to-income ratio 
remains the same. The negative impact of control of corruption on bank 
performance based on the main model remains the same under OLS but became 
positive under fixed effect and 2SLS models. The 1% significance level of the 
coefficient on control of corruption under the main model, GMM, has changed to 
insignificant based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The negative impact of 
GDP on bank performance under GMM remains the same under fixed effect but 
changed to positive under OLS and 2SLS models. Moreover, the significance level 
of the coefficient on GDP which was 1% based on the main model, GMM, is now 
5% based on OLS model and insignificant based on fixed effect and 2SLS models. 
Finally, the sign of coefficient on 2007/2008 financial crisis has not changed. 
However, there is a change in the significance levels. Specifically, the direction of 
significance level of coefficient on financial crisis which was 1% under GMM is now 
5%, 10% and insignificant under 2SLS, fixed effect and OLS models respectively. 
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8.3.2 Results based on corporate governance variables and bank 
performance, measured by ROE  
8.3.2.1 Results of independent variables 
The results are presented in table 16. The negative impact of board size on bank 
performance under the main model, GMM, remains unchanged under OLS model 
but changed to positive under fixed effect and 2SLS models. The direction of 
significance level of coefficient on board size which was 1% under the main model 
is now insignificant based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models.  The sign on 
coefficient on Duality which was negative under GMM model changed to positive 
under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. 10% significant level of DUAL under 
GMM became insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The direction 
of significance level of the coefficient on board meetings has not changed. However, 
there are changes in the direction of significance levels. Specifically, the 1% 
significance level of the coefficient on board meetings based on the main model has 
changed to 5% based on OLS model and insignificant based on both fixed effect 
and 2SLS models. The direction of the sign of coefficient on female directors under 
the main model, which was positive remains the same under OLS and 2SLS models 
and changed to negative based on fixed effect model. The significance level of the 
coefficient on female directors which was 1% under the main model remains 1% 
under OLS model but became insignificant under fixed effect and 2SLS models. 
Finally, the negative impact of independent directors on bank performance under 
the main model, GMM, remains unchanged under fixed effect model but changed 
to positive under OLS and 2SLS models. Moreover, the direction of the significance 
level of the coefficient on independent directors which shows 1% significant level 
under the main model is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models.  
8.3.2.2 Results of control variables 
The results of the control variable are presented in table 16. The direction of the 
sign of coefficient on bank size, which was negative under the main model has not 
changed. However, there are changes in the direction of significant levels. 
Specifically, the 1% level of significance of the direction of coefficient on bank size 
under the main model has changed to 10%, 5% and insignificant under OLS 2SLS 
and fixed effect models respectively. The negative impact of equity to assets ratio 
on bank performance based on the main model, GMM, remains unchanged under 
OLS and 2SLS models but changed to positive based on fixed effect model. The 
significance level of the coefficient on equity to assets ratio which was 1% has not 
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changed under OLS model but became insignificant under both fixed effect and 
2SLS models. The direction of the sign of coefficient on net loans to assets which 
was negative based on the main model remains negative under OLS and 2SLS 
models but became positive under fixed effect model.  The 1% significance level of 
the coefficient of the sign on net loans to asset has changed to 10% under both OLS 
and fixed effect models and became insignificant under 2SLS model.  
The direction of significance level and the direction of the sign of coefficient on cost-
to-income ratio under the main models remains unchanged. Specifically, the 
negative impact of cost-to-income ratio on bank performance under the main model 
has not changed and the 1% level of significance of the coefficient on cost-to-income 
ratio under the main model has also not changed. The positive impact of COR on 
bank performance under the main model remains the same. However, the 5% 
significance level of the coefficient on control of corruption under the main model 
became insignificant based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The negative 
impact of GDP on bank performance under the main model, GMM, has not changed 
under fixed effect and 2SLS but changed to positive under OLS model. Moreover, 
the level of significance of the coefficient on GDP which was 1% under the main 
model remains the same under fixed effect model and changed to insignificant under 
OLS and 2SLS models. Finally, the sign of direction of coefficient on 2007/2008 
financial crisis which was positive based on GMM remains the same. The direction 
of significance of coefficient on 2007/2008 financial crises which shows 1% 
significant level based on the main model remains the same under fixed effect and 
2SLS but became insignificant under OLS model.  
NB: The reason for the inconsistence of some of the results of the main statistical 
model, GMM, with some of the results of OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS, may be partly 
due to the fact that GMM possesses a number of advantages including, resolving 
the problems of endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation and profit 
persistence, which the other techniques may not have.   
8.4 Chapter summary  
This chapter has focused on presenting and discussing the empirical results of the 
relationship between internal corporate governance structures and bank 
performance of African banks. Specifically, this chapter attempted to find out how 
different corporate governance structures help reduce or increase bank 
performance in Africa. This chapter addresses hypothesis 7 to 11. Two bank 
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performance measures were used namely, Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on 
Equity (ROE). Our independent corporate governance variables used are board 
size, board meetings, role or CEO duality, female directors and independent 
directors. Using GMM estimation, we recorded the following findings: First, board 
size has significant negative impact on both ROA and ROE. Second, board 
meetings has significant negative relationship with both ROA and ROE. Third, the 
relationship between CEO or role duality and bank performance, based on ROA, is 
found to be insignificant and positive but significant and negative based on ROE. 
Four, independent directors has insignificant negative impact on ROA and 
significant negative impact on ROE. Finally, the results revealed that female 
directors has significant positive association with bank performance, based on both 
ROA and ROE. Our empirical results suggest that board structures are important 
factors which determine African banks performance. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
MODERATION EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANK RISK AND BANK PERFORMANCE 
9 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical findings of the moderating effect of corporate 
governance on the relationship between bank risk and performance in Africa. In 
other words, the section presents the joint effect of board characteristics and bank 
risk on bank performance in Africa. The board characteristics under consideration 
are board size, role duality, board meetings, presence of female directors and 
presence of independent directors. We use GMM as our main statistical model and 
OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS for robustness tests. Tables 17, 18, 19 and 20 present 
these results. We use GMM as our main model due to a number of advantages that 
go with GMM. They include resolving the problems of endogeneity, unobserved 
heterogeneity, autocorrelation and profit persistence, which other techniques may 
not be able to resolve. 
9.1 Results based on LLPNR as bank risk, interacting variables and bank 
performance 
Below is the econometric models used and the results are presented in tables 17 
and 18.  
ROAit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit 
+ β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALEit + β11INDEPit + 
β12LPNRit + β13(LPNR*SIZE)it + β14(LPNR*MEETINGS)it + β15(LPNR*DUAL)it 
+ β16 (LPNR*FEMALE)it + β17(LPNR*INDEP)it +δ0 + εit                                                                         
(9) 
ROEit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit 
+ β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALEit + β11INDEPit + 
β12LPNRit + β13(LPNR*SIZE)it + β14(LPNR*MEETINGS)it + β15(LPNR*DUAL)it 
+ β16 (LPNR*FEMALE)it + β17 (LPNR*INDEP)it +δ0 + εit                                                                     
(10) 
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Table 17: Results of moderating effect using LLPNR as bank risk measure 
and ROA as bank performance measure 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 2SLS GMM 
     
LLPNR -0.0155 -0.00808 -0.00960 -0.0395*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0103) (0.00959) (0.000632) 
 
BSIZE -0.0207 0.00413 0.00705 -0.0646*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0306) (0.0254) (0.00206) 
 
DUAL 0.215 -0.351 -0.140 -0.0416 
 (0.395) (0.716) (0.429) (0.0458) 
 
MEETINGS -0.0404* 0.00322 -0.00422 -0.0892*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0309) (0.0259) (0.00144) 
 
FEMALE 0.00539 -0.0109 -0.00312 0.00415*** 
 (0.00762) (0.00727) (0.00620) (0.000363) 
 
INDEP 0.00244 0.00696* 0.00767** -0.00408*** 
 (0.00430) (0.00387) (0.00338) (0.000282) 
 
LLPNR*BSIZE -0.000523 -0.000278 -0.000373 0.000306*** 
 (0.00107) (0.000751) (0.000699) (3.32e-05) 
 
LLPNR*DUAL -0.0181* -0.00398 -0.00720 0.0137*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0131) (0.0109) (0.00472) 
 
LLPNR*MEETINGS -0.000144 0.000395 0.000467 0.00209*** 
 (0.00137) (0.000956) (0.000883) (2.03e-05) 
 
LLPNR*INDEP -0.000172 -0.000286*** -0.000276*** 4.08e-06 
 (0.000197) (0.000101) (9.55e-05) (5.73e-06) 
 
LLPNR*FEMALE 0.000236 3.27e-05 8.41e-05 -3.21e-05*** 
 (0.000364) (0.000195) (0.000186) (8.66e-06) 
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LNTA -0.0436 -0.0580 -0.0689* 0.0664*** 
 (0.0525) (0.0433) (0.0361) (0.00245) 
 
EQTA 0.0467*** 0.0412*** 0.0448*** 0.0229*** 
 (0.00800) (0.00889) (0.00660) (0.000305) 
 
NLTA -0.00522 -0.00320 -0.00589 -0.00675*** 
 (0.00419) (0.00583) (0.00445) (0.000292) 
 
COST -0.0469*** -0.0544*** -0.0522*** -0.0327*** 
 (0.00502) (0.00399) (0.00318) (0.000261) 
 
COR -0.00508 -0.00698 -0.00525 -0.00347*** 
 (0.00335) (0.0118) (0.00495) (0.000352) 
 
LNGDP -0.00864 -0.0380 -0.0121 0.0338*** 
 (0.0284) (0.496) (0.0471) (0.00297) 
 
CRISIS7_8 0.581 0.482** 0.502*** 0.200*** 
 (0.377) (0.194) (0.180) (0.00514) 
 
L.ROA    0.393*** 
    (0.00264) 
 
Constant 5.536*** 5.759* 5.362*** 4.682*** 
 (0.598) (3.351) (0.602) (0.0377) 
     
Observations 631 631 631 594 
 
R-squared 0.493 0.438 
 
  
Notes: LLPNR denotes loan loss provision/net interest revenue, BSIZE represents board size of the 
bank, INDEP denotes percentage of independent directors, DUAL represents role duality, FEMALE 
denotes the percentage of female directors on bank board, MEETINGS represents the number of 
board meetings per year, LLPNR*MEETINGS represents interaction between loan loss provision to 
net interest revenue and board meetings, LLPNR*DUAL represents interaction between loan loss 
provision to net interest revenue and role duality, LLPNR*FEMALE represents interaction between 
loan loss provision to net interest revenue and female directors, LLPNR*BSIZE represents interaction 
between loan loss provision to net interest revenue and board size, LLPNR*INDEP represents 
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interaction between loan loss provision to net interest revenue and independent directors, 
LLRGL*MEETINGS represents interaction between loan loss reserve to gross loan and board 
meetings, LLRGL*DUAL, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes cost to income ratio, 
EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, LNGDP represents Gross 
Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 represents 2007/2008 financial crisis, ***, 
**, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, Robust standard errors in parenthesis   
Table 18: Results of moderating effect using LLPNR as bank risk measure 
and ROE as bank performance measure 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROE ROE ROE ROE 
     
LLPNR -0.0118 -0.00130 -0.00974 -0.240*** 
 (0.116) (0.0755) (0.0715) (0.00498) 
 
BSIZE 0.0980 0.0200 0.144 -0.144*** 
 (0.183) (0.224) (0.186) (0.0102) 
 
DUAL 3.080 7.548 3.372 1.593*** 
 (2.635) (5.245) (3.035) (0.253) 
 
MEETINGS -0.187 0.0448 0.0660 -0.650*** 
 (0.159) (0.227) (0.190) (0.0122) 
 
FEMALE 0.102* -0.0583 -0.0110 0.0463*** 
 (0.0541) (0.0533) (0.0457) (0.00471) 
INDEP 8.07e-05 0.0265 0.0360 -0.0178*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0284) (0.0249) (0.00121) 
 
LLPNR*BSIZE -0.00983 -0.00868 -0.00706 -0.00457*** 
 (0.00796) (0.00550) (0.00522) (0.000210) 
 
LLPNR*DUAL -0.122* -0.0481 -0.0891 0.179*** 
 (0.0692) (0.0957) (0.0804) (0.0268) 
 
LLPNR*MEETINGS -0.0214** -0.00440 -0.00830 0.0134*** 
 (0.00933) (0.00700) (0.00657) (0.000186) 
 
LLPNR*INDEP -0.000472 -0.00204*** -0.00192*** -0.000243*** 
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 (0.00133) (0.000744) (0.000713) (6.95e-05) 
 
LLPNR*FEMALE 0.00324 0.00152 0.00142 0.00258*** 
 (0.00238) (0.00143) (0.00139) (0.000128) 
 
LNTA 0.0910 -0.0763 -0.276 0.369*** 
 (0.350) (0.318) (0.266) (0.0160) 
 
EQTA -0.185*** 0.137** -0.0145 -0.147*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0652) (0.0474) (0.00285) 
 
NLTA -0.0193 0.112*** 0.0173 -0.0252*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0427) (0.0323) (0.00184) 
 
COST -0.295*** -0.354*** -0.326*** -0.201*** 
 (0.0339) (0.0292) (0.0230) (0.00197) 
 
COR -0.00299 0.0196 -0.0144 0.0359*** 
 (0.0238) (0.0867) (0.0342) (0.00237) 
 
LNGDP -0.229 -8.728** -0.247 0.0505** 
 (0.201) (3.638) (0.320) (0.0236) 
 
CRISIS7_8 7.985*** 4.972*** 5.875*** 2.641*** 
 (2.932) (1.421) (1.351) (0.0439) 
 
L.ROE    0.402*** 
    (0.00189) 
 
Constant 38.35*** 87.52*** 36.65*** 30.07*** 
 (3.819) (24.56) (4.250) (0.407) 
     
Observations 631 631 
 
631 594 
R-squared 0.439 
 
0.455 
 
  
Notes: LLPNR denotes loan loss provision/net interest revenue, BSIZE represents board size of the 
bank, INDEP denotes percentage of independent directors, DUAL represents role duality, FEMALE 
denotes the percentage of female directors on bank board, MEETINGS represents the number of 
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board meetings per year, LLPNR*MEETINGS represents interaction between loan loss provision to 
net interest revenue and board meetings, LLPNR*DUAL represents interaction between loan loss 
provision to net interest revenue and role duality, LLPNR*FEMALE represents interaction between 
loan loss provision to net interest revenue and female directors, LLPNR*BSIZE represents interaction 
between loan loss provision to net interest revenue and board size, LLPNR*INDEP represents 
interaction between loan loss provision to net interest revenue and independent directors, 
LLRGL*MEETINGS represents interaction between loan loss reserve to gross loan and board 
meetings, LLRGL*DUAL, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes cost to income ratio, 
EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, LNGDP represents Gross 
Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 represents 2007/2008 financial crisis, ***, 
**, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, Robust standard errors in parenthesis   
 9.1.1 Results of independent variables 
From tables 17 and 18, bank risk, measured by LPNR, has significant and negative 
impact on both ROA and ROE at 1% significant level. However, when board size 
was interacted with bank risk, LLPNR*BSIZE, the coefficient became positive and 
significant, based on ROA. This implies that, board size moderate the relationship 
between bank risk and performance, supporting hypothesis twelve. The result can 
be explained by the fact that, under a good corporate governance system such as 
for example using smaller board size, can reduce bank risk and increase bank 
performance in Africa. African banks are able to benefit from strong board which is 
able to work effectively and board members bring ideas together to identify risk and 
able to minimise it to increase bank performance. The result could also mean that, 
the composition of the board which include the right number of people such as more 
female directors and more independent directors who contribute well during board 
meetings reduce risk and improve bank performance.  In addition, the number of 
board members may not be more than what is required by the banks, therefore, they 
do not incur unnecessary agency cost, which could reduce bank performance. 
Moreover, the result can mean that, the banks in Africa are benefiting from the right 
size of board members and board members are able to have constructive 
discussions during meetings, which enable them to reduce risk and improve bank 
performance.  
From tables 17 and 18 LPNR has significant negative impact on bank performance, 
measured by ROE, at 1% level of significance. LLPNR*BSIZE also has negative 
impact on bank performance, measured by ROE, at 1% level of significance. The 
coefficient of LLPNR on performance is -0.240 and the coefficient of LLPNR*BSIZE 
on performance is -0.005. This means that when board size interacted with bank 
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risk, there is a reduction of the negative impact on performance (from -0.240 to -
0.005). This also implies that board size moderate the relationship between bank 
risk and performance, supporting hypothesis twelve. The result also suggests that 
African banks benefit from the size of their board to reduce bank risk to improve 
performance.   
The inconsistence of our results of the positive impact of LLPNR*BSIZE on ROA 
and negative impact of LLPNR*BSIZE on ROE can be explained by the fact, that 
debt holders (ROA) are less likely to accept poor governance practices that may 
result to poor performance. On the other hand, equity holders (ROE) may seem to 
entertain or more tolerant to poor governance practices leading to poor 
performance. Since the behaviour of debt holders and equity holders are not the 
same, the results of ROA and ROE are expected to be different sometimes.  
From table 17 and 18, LLPNR*DUAL has significant and positive impact on both 
ROA and ROE at 1% significance levels. This results mean that duality moderate 
the relationship between bank risk and performance, which supports hypothesis 12. 
The results suggest that a single person holding the positions of CEO and chairman 
is a good governance practice to reduce bank risk and improve bank performance 
in Africa. This could mean that, when a single person holds the two positions in 
Africa, he gains more experience due to the in-depth knowledge already gained in 
the banking business, works harder to protect his reputation, identifies risks and 
deal with them on time (quick decision making), which could minimise risk and 
improve performance. Therefore, duality is seen as blessings to African banks and 
not a curse, as portray by many critics such as proponents of agency theory. The 
findings support stewardship theory which argues, that the same person occupying 
the seats of chairman and CEO minimises conflicts during decision making 
(Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012), strong and unified leadership with a good 
strategic direction is achieved, and timely and best decisions within a firm is made 
(Brickley et al. 1997), which could reduce bank risk and improve performance. 
LLPNR*MEETINGS has significant and positive impact on ROA and ROE at 1% 
significant levels. The results support hypothesis twelve, which predicted a 
moderation effect of corporate governance on the relationship between bank risk 
and performance in Africa. This results suggest that, the bank boards in Africa meet 
regularly to resolve important issues such as risk in a timely manner and take 
appropriate action. In effect, bank risks could be reduced whiles performance is 
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improved. This findings can also mean that, board members of banks in Africa are 
able to focus and have constructive discussion at their meetings. This help them to 
make better decision without disagreement, which could reduce bank risk and 
improve performance. This lend some theoretical backing to agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), which suggests that, important of frequent board meetings is 
the increased capacity to advise effectively, discipline management and monitor 
them, which could reduce bank risk and improve performance. 
The impact of LLPNR*INDEP on bank performance based on ROA is positive but 
not significant. This result implies that independent directors on the bank board 
influence the board decision to reduce risk and improve performance but this is not 
significant in the case of Africa, based on our result. The insignificant of our result 
may be due to measurement error, autocorrelation and multicollinearity.  However, 
the impact based on LLPNR*INDEP on bank performance, measured by ROE is 
highly significant and negative at 1% significant level, supporting hypothesis twelve. 
The coefficients of LLPNR and LLPNR*INDEP are -0.240 and -0.0002 respectively. 
Although the sign on both coefficients are negative, the negative effect on bank 
performance has decreased from -.240 to -0.0002. This implies that when 
independent directors in Africa interact with bank risk, they are able to achieve risk 
reduction to improve bank performance. The result means that independent 
directors in Africa use their skills and experience to contribute during board sittings 
to scrutinise management decisions, which safeguard the banks against 
unnecessary risk taking and ultimately improve banks performance. It is good to 
note in addition that, the monitoring role and resources provided by independent 
directors on African bank board bring risk down and improve performance. The 
result support theoretical view which emphasises that independent directors reduce 
agency problems, gives unbiased decisions (Fuzi et al., 2016),  and will provide 
proper monitoring to see to risk reduction of management inflicting danger on firms 
(Pathan, 2009; Chang et al, 2016),  which could reduce bank risk levels and improve 
performance.  
Finally, LLPNR*FEMALE has significant negative impact on bank performance, 
measured by ROA at 1% significant level. The sign of coefficients on both LLPNR 
and LLPNR*FEMALE are negative. The coefficient of LPNR on ROA is -0.040 and 
that of LLPNR*FEMALE on performance is -3.210. The result shows an increase in 
the negative effect from -0.040 to -3.210. This means, female directors interacting 
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with bank risk in Africa has not improve performance. The result could mean that 
since the number of female directors on African bank board is very small, based on 
our descriptive statistics in Chapter four, they are just a token on the board. As a 
result, they may not be able to challenge the male counterpart on decisions as 
expected. In addition, the female directors may not have enough qualification, skills 
and experience required to be on bank board. They may be friends and family of 
management without going through appropriate scrutiny before appointed as board 
members. As a result, their presence on the board will not do anything good to 
reduce bank risk and improve performance.   
Contrary, LPNR has significant negative impact on ROE while LLPNR*FEMALE has 
significant and positive impact on ROE at 1% significant level. The positive impact 
on ROE implies that female directors moderate the relationship between corporate 
governance and bank performance, which supports hypothesis twelve. This above 
result suggests that female directors in Africa bring their knowledge and experience 
to the board to help reduce bank risk and improve performance. The results also 
suggest that female directors in Africa are risk averse, they do not take risk 
unnecessarily, and even if they take risk, they consider the impact carefully to 
minimise the potential adverse effect on performance. Theoretically, these results 
are consistent with the resource dependency theory, which suggests that board 
diversity, which includes the presence of female directors, brings distinct information 
sets which are available to management improved decision making (Carter et al, 
2010), which could reduce risk and improve bank performance. 
The inconsistence of our results of the negative impact of LLPNR*FEMALE on ROA 
and positive impact of LLPNR*FEMALE on ROE may be caused by the differences 
in the behaviour of debt holders (ROA) and equity holders (ROE). As debt holders 
(ROA) are less likely to accept poor governance practices such as the presence of 
less female directors on the bank board, which may result to poor bank 
performance, equity holders (ROE) may seem to entertain or more tolerant to poor 
governance practices leading to poor performance. Since the behaviour of debt 
holders and equity holders are not the same, the results of ROA and ROE are 
expected to be different sometimes.  
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9.1.2 Results of control variables 
9.1.2.1 Results based on individual corporate governance variables 
These results are presented in table 17 and 18.The relationship between board size 
and bank performance is significant and negative based on both ROA and ROE at 
1% significant levels. Our results show that board size which is small and effective 
is good to increase the bank performance in Africa. The results also imply that since 
the number of the board members is small, they can concentrate and focus fully 
during board meetings; and board members are able to debate on issues and able 
to reach consensus on time. Moreover, because expenses on bigger board size is 
high, African banks are able to take advantage of smaller board size to reduce 
expenses and agency cost to improve their bank performance.   
The findings give theoretical support to agency theory which suggests that because 
of director’s free rider problems, communication and coordination problems, and 
internal conflicts among directors, bigger boards are not efficient (Jensen, 1993). In 
addition, during decision making , it is difficult for bigger boards to organise board 
meetings, it is more difficult and requires a lot of effort for bigger boards to reach 
consensus ((Jensen 1993; Hoque et al, (2013), which could have negative impact 
on bank performance. Contrary, the negative impact of board size on bank 
performance does not support resource dependency theory which advocates for a 
bigger board. The negative impact of board size on bank performance is consistent 
with a number of previous empirical studies (e.g. Liang et al., 2013; Mamatzakis & 
Bermpei, 2015; Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Sakawa & Watanabel, 2018).  
Duality is statistically insignificant and negative related to ROA, which may cause 
by measurement error and multicollinearity. Contrary, duality is found to be highly 
significant positive related to bank performance, measured by ROE, at 1% 
significant level. The positive relationship suggests that a single person holding CEO 
and chairman positions is better for improvement of bank performance in Africa. It 
also suggests, that when the same person holds the positions of CEO and Chairman 
in Africa, he acquires more experience because of the in-depth knowledge he has 
already gained in the banking business.  Furthermore, the person holding the two 
important positions in Africa works harder to protect his reputation, he identifies 
issues within the bank and deal with them in a timely manner, which could improve 
performance. The findings support stewardship theory which suggests, that same 
person occupying the seats of chairman and CEO minimises conflicts during 
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decision making (Syriopoulos and Tsatsaronis, 2012), strong and unified leadership 
with a good strategic direction is achieved, and timely and best decisions within a 
firm is made (Brickley et al. 1997), which could increase performance. The 
significant positive impact of duality on bank performance is consistent with Al-Saidi 
and Al-Shammari (2013). However it is not consistent with the previous studies that 
record insignificant impact of duality on bank performance (e.g. Bukair and Rahman, 
2015; Carty and Weiss, 2012; Abdul Gafoor et al., 2018) and significant negative 
impact of duality on bank performance (e.g. Grove et al, 2011; Mollah and Zaman, 
2015; Dong et al., 2017; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2018; AlManaseer et al. (2012). The 
inconsistent of this result with the result of some previous studies may be due to 
differences in sample size and the way in which variables are measured.  
The findings show that the relationship between board meetings and bank 
performance is significant and negative based on both ROA and ROE at 1% 
significant level. These findings suggests that smaller number of board meetings is 
better so far as improvement in African banks performance in concerned. Having 
fewer meetings could also reduce agency cost in the form of travel expenses and 
refreshments, which can increase banks performance in Africa. Again, the results 
suggest that board having fewer meetings but discusses important issues affecting 
the bank and able to reach consensus will help improve the performance of African 
banks. These findings are not consistent with the agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), which suggests that frequent board meetings come with increased 
capacity to advise effectively, discipline management and monitor them, which could 
result to improvement in bank performance. These findings are also not consistent 
with the previous empirical studies (e.g. Liang et al, 2013; Salim Arjomandi and 
Seufert, 2016; Grove et al, 2011; Abdul Gafoor, 2018) that find a positive 
relationship between board meetings and bank performance, probably due to 
differences in sample size and study period. 
Independent directors is statistically significant negative related to bank 
performance, based on both ROA and ROE at 1% significant level. The significant 
negative relationship between independent directors and bank performance 
suggests that the presence of independent directors causes a decrease in banks 
performance in Africa. The results could mean that more independent directors are 
chosen by the bank for regulatory and compliance purposes, and their presence do 
not bring any benefit to the banks. The results can also suggest that independent 
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directors in Africa are friends and family members of the management and do not 
have enough experience and skills to contribute during board meetings. Therefore, 
their presence can bring cost rather than benefit to the banks. Theoretically, the 
expectation that independent board directors scrutinise the management decisions, 
advice and monitor management activities (Knyazeva et al (2013, which could 
improve bank performance is not the case in Africa. This support the argument by 
Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) who state, that adding more independent directors to a 
board might not always be helpful. The significant negative impact of independent 
directors on bank performance lend support to the empirical findings of Pathan and 
Faff (2013) and Sarkar and Sarkar (2018) who report a significant negative 
association between independent directors and bank performance. However the 
finding does not lend support to some prior empirical findings (e.g. Abdul Gafoor et 
al, 2018; Dong, 2016; Liang et al, 2013; Pathan et al, 2007; Lee and Carlson, 2007), 
that report positive impact of board independent on bank performance, which may 
be due to difference in the way the variables are measured. 
Presence of female directors is significant and positive related to both ROA and 
ROE at 1% level of significant. These results suggest that the ideas, experience and 
qualities female directors bring to the board help improve banks performance in 
Africa. Females are careful in their decision making, they advise their male 
colleagues on important issues and work towards the interest of the shareholders, 
and hence their presence improve the performance of African banks. Females are 
also considered as risk averse and for that matter do not take unnecessary risk 
which may jeopardize the performance of banks. These findings lend support to 
resource dependency theory, which suggests that board diversity, which includes 
the presence of female directors on executive board, comes with distinct information 
sets which are available to management enhance decision making (Carter et al, 
2010), which could improve bank performance. Our results also lend some support 
to the theoretical view, which suggests that female directors in the boardroom 
comes with a competitive advantage since females are more likely to possess non-
business background and have advanced degrees (García-Meca, García-Sánchez 
& Martínez-Ferrero, 2015), which could improve bank performance. The positive 
association between female directors and bank performance is in line with a number 
of previous empirical findings (e.g. Gulamhussen & Santa, 2015; Pathan & Faff, 
2013; García-Meca et al, 2015; Dong et al., 2017).  
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9.1.2.2 Results based on bank specific and macroeconomic variables  
Tables 17 and 18 show the results of the moderation effect of corporate governance 
on the relationship between bank risk (LLPNR) and bank performance, measured 
by ROA and ROE. LLPNR is statistically significant negative related to both ROA 
and ROE. The finding suggests that the overall risk incurred by the bank including 
risks from operations of the business and risks associated with bad loans have 
adverse effect on banks performance. This finding is consistent with the findings of 
previous empirical literature (e.g. Tan et al, 2017; Al-Tamimi, et al, 2015; 
I.Maghyereh and Awartani, 2014; Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 2014; Athanasoglou et 
al, 2008; Sufian, 2011; Liu and Wilson, 2010; Sufian and Chong, 2008; Zhang et al, 
2013; Muriithi and Waweru, 2017) and contrary to positive impact of bank risk on 
performance (e.g. Ekinci, 2016; Tan et al, 2017; Sufian, 2009; Sufian and 
Habibullah; 2009a; Sufian and Habibullah, 2009b). 
Bank size has significant and positive association with bank performance, based on 
ROA and ROE at 1% significant levels. The positive association between bank size 
and performance suggests that the economies of scale enjoyed by larger banks in 
Africa assists them to minimise cost and make higher profit. A reduction in cost can 
help the banks to improve their performance. Moreover, the positive coefficient 
could also suggest that the bigger banks in Africa get benefits through the 
diversification of the activities of their loan portfolios which leads to higher bank 
performance. This finding is consistent with the findings of prior literature which 
report a significant positive correlation between bank size and performance (e.g. 
Sakawa & Watanabel, 2018; Rahman et al., 2015; Tan et al., 2017; Shawtari, 2018; 
Hasanov et al., 2018); but inconsistent with the significant negative impact of bank 
size and bank performance (e.g. Tan, 2016; Al-Shammari, 2013; Dietrich & 
Wanzenried, 2011; Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; Doumpos et al, 2015).  
Equity to asset ratio has significant and positive association with ROA at 1% 
significant level. The result indicates that African banks with higher capital perform 
better. The finding also indicates that well capitalised banks in Africa are able to 
change their funds to higher income earnings. The finding supports the theoretical 
argument by Djalilov and Piesse (2016) and Athanasoglou et al., (2008) who 
indicate that, equity to total asset ratio is expected to have positive impact on bank 
performance because it represents the amount of available funds to back operations 
of the bank, and for that matter serves as safety net in case of adverse events, which 
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could increase bank performance. The result is in line with the findings of some 
previous empirical findings (e.g. Liang et al, 2013; Bougatef, 2017; Daly & Frikha, 
2017; Djalilov and Piesse, 2016; Hasanov et al., 2018) and contrary to empirical 
literature that find a significant negative relationship between equity to asset ratio 
and bank performance (e.g. Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 
2011).  
Contrary, equity to assets ratio is found to be significant and negative association 
with ROE at 1% significant level. This results means that banks in Africa with smaller 
capital make more profit. The result suggests that the smaller capitalised banks in 
Africa manage their available resources efficiently and effectively and make more 
profit. The result is consistent with the findings of Mollah and Zaman, (2015) and 
Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) and contrast with the significant positive impact of 
equity to assets ratio on bank performance documented by the prior literature (e.g. 
Liang et al, 2013; Bougatef, 2017; Daly and Frikha, 2017; Djalilov and Piesse, 2016; 
Hasanov et al., 2018). 
The association between net loans to asset ratio and bank performance based on 
both ROA and ROE is negative and significant at 1% level of significance. This 
suggests that the banks in Africa have a small number of bad loans resulting to a 
reduced level of net loans. As a result, the banks spend less on managing default 
loans. This left the banks with enough capital in the form of money for investment to 
make more profit. The findings are not in line with the findings of Daly and Frikha 
(2017), Dong et al., (2017), Mollah and Zaman (2015) who document a positive 
relationship between net loans to assets ratio and bank performance.  
The relationship between cost-to-income ratio (COST) and bank performance 
based on ROA and ROE is significant and negative at 1% significant levels. The 
negative impact on performance suggests that the banks in Africa have efficient and 
prudent way of managing their operations, which help them to increase their 
performance. This gives theoretical support to Rahman et al, 2015) who posit that, 
when the ratio of cost-to-income is low the higher the performance of the bank, and 
a high cost-to-income ratio leads to lower bank performance. This finding is 
consistent with the findings of some previous empirical studies (e.g. Rahman, 2015; 
Syafri, 2012; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011; Similarly, Goddard, 2013). 
Corruption is significantly negative associated with ROA at 1% significant level. This 
means that when CPI reduces (an increase in corruption), bank performance 
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increases. This indicates that banks take advantage of corrupt activities in Africa to 
influence key decision makers, policy makers, and politicians to make more profit. 
Contrary, corruption is significant and positive associated with ROE at 1% significant 
level. This means that as CPI increases (a reduction in corruption), banks 
performance increases. This suggests that African banks can take advantage to 
improve the performance of their banks when the corrupt activities in the continent 
are reduced. The result is consistent with Bougatef (2017) and contrary to Aburime 
(2009) and Arshad and Rizvi (2013) who find a significant negative relationship 
between corruption and bank.   
GDP has significant and positive impact on performance, measured by both ROA 
and ROE. The findings indicate that higher growth causes a higher demand for 
lending which ultimately leads to higher bank profitability. The result also suggests 
that during a period of cyclical upswing, the probability of demand for lending is high, 
which may lead to higher bank performance. The positive impact of GDP on bank 
performance support the theoretical argument by Boateng et al., (2015) who posit 
that GDP growth leads to a higher demand. This encourages banks to borrow more 
to produce goods and services to meet the higher demand for goods, which 
subsequently increases banks performance. This result lend empirical support to 
the previous empirical findings of Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), Shawtari 
(2018). Contrary, this findings do not lend empirical support to Boateng et al., 
(2015), Safrali and Gumus (2010), Rashid and Jabeen (2016) who find significant 
negative impact of GDP on bank performance.  
The financial crisis of 2007/2008 have significant and positive association with both 
ROA and ROE at 1% significant level. The result can be explained by the fact that 
the banks in Africa were able to manage their businesses and risks efficiently during 
the crises period, hence they were able to increase their performance. The result 
also suggests that the negative impact of the crisis hit more on the developed 
countries than African countries, therefore the African banks were able to improve 
their performance during the crisis period. 
NB: The inconsistent of some of our results with some previous empirical results 
may be caused by differences in sample size, sample period and the way in which 
variables are measured. In addition, the inconsistent of the impact of equity to assets 
ratio and corruption on ROA and ROE may cause by the differences in the behaviour 
of debt (ROA) and equity (ROE) holders. Debt holders may not accept any level of 
  
197 
  
losses or risk while equity holders may accept some level of losses or risk. Debt 
holders may demand their returns when the bank makes profit or not while equity 
holders may demand their returns only when the bank makes profit, since the equity 
holders are the real owners of the bank. The difference in the behaviour of equity 
and debt holders can cause the results of ROA and ROE to be different.  
 
9.2 Results based on LLRGL as bank risk measure, interacting variables and 
bank performance 
Two econometric models were used to achieve this as mentioned in chapter four. 
The results are presented in Tables 19 and 20. Below are the econometric models 
ROAit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit 
+ β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALEit + β11INDEPit + 
β12LLRGLit + β13 (LLRGL*SIZE)it + β14(LLRGL*MEETINGS)it + 
β15(LLRGL*DUAL)it + β16 (LLRGL*FEMALE)it + β17 (LLRGL*INDEP)it +δ0 + εit                                                                
(11) 
ROEit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2EQTAit + β3NLTAit + β4COSTit + β5CORit + β6GDPit 
+ β7BSIZEit + β8MEETINGSit + β9DUALit + β10FEMALE + β11INDEP + 
β12LLRGLit + β13 (LLRGL*SIZE)it + β14 (LLRGL*MEETINGS)it + β15 
(LLRGL*DUAL)it + β16 (LLRGL*FEMALE)it + β17 (LLRGL*INDEP)it +δ0 + εit                                                                 
(12)  
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Table 19: Results of moderating effect using LLRGL as bank risk measure 
and ROA as bank performance measure 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 2SLS GMM 
     
LLRGL -0.0689 0.112 0.0582 0.107*** 
 (0.105) (0.0770) (0.0682) (0.00935) 
 
BSIZE -0.0420* 0.0586 0.0443 -0.0739*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0370) (0.0298) (0.00331) 
 
DUAL 0.451 -0.895 -0.690 0.200*** 
 (0.536) (0.868) (0.508) (0.0424) 
 
MEETINGS -0.0679 0.0611 0.0227 0.0744*** 
 (0.0422) (0.0473) (0.0397) (0.00318) 
 
FEMALE 0.00746 -0.0122 -0.00677 -0.00461*** 
 (0.00887) (0.00843) (0.00733) (0.000669) 
 
INDEP 0.00336 0.00270 0.00528 0.00317*** 
 (0.00503) (0.00472) (0.00403) (0.000524) 
 
LLRGL*BSIZE -0.00547 -0.0169*** -0.0143*** 0.00247*** 
 (0.00661) (0.00593) (0.00488) (0.000414) 
 
LLRGL*INDEP -0.000636 -0.000241 -0.000460 -0.00191*** 
 (0.000801) (0.000644) (0.000561) (7.99e-05) 
 
 
LLRGL*DUAL 0.00416 0.0578 0.0658 0.0319*** 
 (0.0849) (0.0543) (0.0468) (0.00599) 
 
LLRGL*FEMALE 0.000474 0.00184 0.00178* 0.000294*** 
 (0.00171) (0.00116) (0.00103) (6.32e-05) 
 
LLRGL*MEETINGS 0.00775 -0.00511 -0.000906 -0.0101*** 
 (0.00593) (0.00604) (0.00533) (0.000328) 
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LNTA -0.136** -0.0652 -0.0851** -0.00244 
 (0.0558) (0.0466) (0.0384) (0.00302) 
 
EQTA 0.0467*** 0.0378*** 0.0394*** 0.0233*** 
 (0.00997) (0.0109) (0.00802) (0.000325) 
 
NLTA -0.00920** -0.0186*** -0.0182*** -0.0100*** 
 (0.00454) (0.00703) (0.00516) (0.000444) 
 
COST -0.0485*** -0.0525*** -0.0522*** -0.0208*** 
 (0.00551) (0.00416) (0.00333) (0.000192) 
 
COR -0.00399 0.00551 -0.00125 0.00557*** 
 (0.00368) (0.0141) (0.00530) (0.000266) 
 
LNGDP 0.0206 -0.276 -0.00231 -0.0249*** 
 (0.0300) (0.546) (0.0498) (0.00429) 
 
CRISIS7_8 -0.119 0.456** 0.457** 0.314*** 
 (0.379) (0.224) (0.206) (0.00568) 
 
L.ROA    0.525*** 
    (0.00376) 
 
Constant 6.478*** 6.887* 5.561*** 2.669*** 
 (0.688) (3.707) (0.692) (0.0613) 
     
Observations 614 614 
 
614 576 
R-squared 0.452 
 
0.350 
 
  
Notes: LLRGL represents loan loss reserve/gross loan, BSIZE represents board size of the bank, 
INDEP denotes percentage of independent directors, DUAL represents role duality, FEMALE 
denotes the percentage of female directors on bank board, MEETINGS represents the number of 
board meetings per year, LLRGL*FEMALE represents interaction between loan loss reserve to gross 
loan and female directors, LLRGL*BSIZE represents interaction between loan loss reserve to gross 
loan and board size, LLRGL*INDEP represents interaction between loan loss reserve to gross loan 
and independent directors, LLRGL*MEETINGS represents interaction between loan loss reserve to 
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gross loan and board meetings, LLRGL*DUAL, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes 
cost to income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, 
LNGDP represents Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 represents 
2007/2008 financial crisis, ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis    
Table 20: Results of moderating effect using LLRGL as bank risk measure 
and ROE as bank performance measure 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 2SLS GMM 
     
LLRGL -1.053 0.476 -0.0208 -0.473*** 
 (0.745) (0.579) (0.510) (0.0517) 
 
BSIZE -0.291 0.271 0.232 -0.482*** 
 (0.203) (0.278) (0.220) (0.0198) 
 
DUAL 2.638 3.157 -1.041 -0.711*** 
 (3.643) (6.522) (3.664) (0.218) 
 
MEETINGS -0.516* 0.215 0.0484 -0.576*** 
 (0.296) (0.355) (0.295) (0.0219) 
 
FEMALE 0.104 -0.0445 -0.0149 0.00943 
 (0.0658) (0.0633) (0.0548) (0.00578) 
 
INDEP 0.0154 0.00880 0.0338 0.00752** 
 (0.0337) (0.0355) (0.0300) (0.00315) 
 
LLRGL*BSIZE -0.00289 -0.0971** -0.0656* 0.0603*** 
 (0.0463) (0.0446) (0.0362) (0.00265) 
 
LLRGL*INDEP -0.00552 -0.00745 -0.00825** -0.0124*** 
 (0.00600) (0.00484) (0.00420) (0.000587) 
 
LLRGL*DUAL 0.246 0.181 0.305 0.706*** 
 (0.603) (0.408) (0.350) (0.0328) 
 
LLRGL*FEMALE 0.00972 0.00891 0.00834 -0.000252 
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 (0.0115) (0.00868) (0.00771) (0.000698) 
 
LLRGL*METINGS 0.0408 -0.0178 0.00381 0.0234*** 
 (0.0465) (0.0454) (0.0399) (0.00248) 
 
LNTA -0.471 -0.0296 -0.401 0.140*** 
 (0.372) (0.350) (0.287) (0.0357) 
 
EQTA -0.164*** 0.176** 0.00994 -0.0448*** 
 (0.0506) (0.0816) (0.0583) (0.00297) 
 
NLTA -0.0786** -0.0112 -0.107*** -0.0439*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0528) (0.0378) (0.00252) 
 
COST -0.299*** -0.349*** -0.333*** -0.130*** 
 (0.0382) (0.0313) (0.0245) (0.00279) 
 
COR 0.00348 0.0533 0.0135 0.0630*** 
 (0.0256) (0.106) (0.0371) (0.00223) 
 
LNGDP -0.0750 -11.03*** -0.180 -0.165*** 
 (0.212) (4.103) (0.345) (0.0210) 
 
CRISIS7_8 3.051 5.466*** 6.150*** 3.816*** 
 (3.089) (1.680) (1.563) (0.0532) 
 
L.ROE    0.452*** 
    (0.00364) 
 
Constant 49.22*** 103.3*** 42.53*** 26.05*** 
 (4.733) (27.86) (4.980) (0.565) 
     
Observations 614 614 
 
614 576 
R-squared 0.378 0.342 
 
  
Notes: LLRGL represents loan loss reserve/gross loan, BSIZE represents board size of the bank, 
INDEP denotes percentage of independent directors, DUAL represents role duality, FEMALE 
denotes the percentage of female directors on bank board, MEETINGS represents the number of 
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board meetings per year, LLRGL*FEMALE represents interaction between loan loss reserve to gross 
loan and female directors, LLRGL*BSIZE represents interaction between loan loss reserve to gross 
loan and board size, LLRGL*INDEP represents interaction between loan loss reserve to gross loan 
and independent directors, LLRGL*MEETINGS represents interaction between loan loss reserve to 
gross loan and board meetings, LLRGL*DUAL, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes 
cost to income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, 
LNGDP represents Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 represents 
2007/2008 financial crisis, ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis    
9.2.1 Results of independent variables 
These results are presented in Tables 19 and 20. LLR/GL has significant positive 
impact on bank performance, measured by ROA, at 1% significant level. 
LLRGL*BSIZE also has significant and positive impact on ROA at 1% significant 
level. The coefficient of LLRGL on ROA is 0.107 and that of LLR/GL*size on ROA 
is 0.002. It is clear from the above that the positive impact on performance has now 
been reduced from 0.107 to 0.002. This indicates that, even though the coefficient 
on LLRGL*BSIZE is positive, bank performance (ROA) has reduced compared to 
the direct impact of risk on ROA. The result suggests that board size interacting with 
bank risk has not cause anything good to influence bank risk to improve bank 
performance in Africa. The size of the board may be too big which is causing 
problems in effective interaction, communication and coordination among board 
members. Board members may not be able to organise meetings when it is needed. 
Inability of board members to come to consensus during board meetings probable 
due to the nature of the size of the board can also cause problems for African bank 
boards, which can lead to increase in bank risk and a reduction in bank performance. 
The composition of the board may also not help the board of African banks to reduce 
risk and improve performance, if there are fewer female and independent directors 
on the board.  
Contrary, our result shows that the impact of LLRGL on bank performance, 
measured by ROE is negative and significant at 1% significant level, whiles the 
impact of the interacting variable, LLRGL*BSIZE, on ROE is positive and significant 
at 1% significant level. This result implies that, board size moderate the relationship 
between bank risk and performance, which supports hypothesis twelve. The result 
suggests that different ideas, opinions, experience and suggestions brought 
together by board members help reduce bank risk and improve performance in 
Africa. The banks in Africa may also be benefiting from strong board with the right 
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composition of members including more independent directors and probably chief 
risk officer and people with higher qualification such as PhDs, who are able to help 
bring risk down to increase bank performance.  
LLRGL*INDEP has significant and negative relationship with ROA at 1% significant 
level whiles the direct relationship between LLRGL and ROA is positive and 
significant at 1% significant level. This result means that independent directors 
moderate the relationship between bank risk and performance, which supports 
hypothesis twelve. The result suggests that the presence of independent directors 
in Africa do not contribute efficiently to reduce bank risk and improve performance. 
The result could mean that, the independent directors do not have enough 
monitoring experience and skills necessary to contribute at board meetings to 
reduce bank risk and improve performance. In addition, the independent directors 
may be recommended and appointed by friends and family members of the 
management and members who are already on the board. As a result, they will find 
it difficult to scrutinise the management decisions to reduce risk in order to improve 
bank performance. This result is inconsistent with the theoretical argument which 
suggest that, a large number of independent directors can decrease the behavior of 
bank’s risk-taking (Wang et al, 2014; Chang et al, 2016), which could increase 
performance. In addition, the theoretical argument which suggests that, 
independent directors provide extra monitoring in order to reduce the risk of 
management inflicting danger on the firm (Pathan, 2009; Chang et al, 2016), which 
could increase bank performance, is not supported, based on our result.  
On the other hand, both LLR/GL and LLRGL*INDEP have negative impact on ROE 
at 1% significant levels. However, the impact of LLR/GL on bank performance has 
coefficient of -0.473 and LLRGL*INDEP has coefficient of -0.0124. The result 
suggests an improvement in bank performance from -0.473 to -0.0124. These 
findings indicate that, independent directors moderate the relationship between 
LLRGL and ROE, supporting hypothesis twelve. The results suggest that 
independent directors in Africa play effective role on the board, they bring their 
experience and skills to contribute efficiently to reduce risk and improve bank 
performance in Africa. The effective monitoring by independent board members in 
Africa, and their effective scrutiny of management decisions to make sure they take 
the right decisions about the banks, actually improve the performance of the banks 
in Africa. The findings provide theoretical support that, independent directors 
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provide resources and extra monitoring in order to reduce the risk of management 
inflicting danger on the firm (Pathan, 2009; Chang et al, 2016), which could increase 
bank performance. Another theoretical support is that, independent directors are 
entrusted by the shareholders to represent them at the board meetings to provide 
an unbiased business decisions (Fuzi, et al, 2016) and to help reduce agency 
problems (Wang et al, 2014; Chang et al, 2016; Fuzi et al, 2016), which could reduce 
bank risk and increase performance. 
The impact of both LLRGL and LLRGL*DUAL on ROA is positive and significant at 
1% significant levels. However, the coefficient of LLRGL is 0.107 and that of 
LLRGL*duality is 0.0319, showing a reduction in performance from 0.107 to 0.0319. 
The results suggests that duality is not a good governance system which can 
decrease bank risk to improve bank performance in Africa. The results also suggest 
that, the same person may not have enough knowledge, experience and skills to 
hold CEO and chairman positions to minimise risk and improve bank performance 
in Africa. As a result, there is a high possibility that bank performance would be 
affected negatively, when using duality in African banks. In Africa, duality may be 
causing conflict of interest since the same person is reporting to himself. In addition, 
since the market perceives duality as a bad corporate governance practice, 
shareholders and investors may be discouraged to invest in banks that practice 
duality. Therefore, the performance of those banks will be affected negatively. The 
result is consistent with the agency theory, which argues that separating the CEO 
and chairman role is a good corporate governance practice when considering the 
interest of the shareholders and this aids effective control and monitoring of 
management (Jensen, 1993; Syriopoulos and Tsatsaronis, 2012), which could 
reduce bank risk and improve performance. Also, the performance of the chairman 
should not be assessed by the same person, otherwise it will be self-evaluated 
(Jensen, 1993; Syriopoulos and Tsatsaronis, 2012), which could increase risk and 
reduce performance. 
Contrary, the relationship between LLRGL*DUAL and bank performance based on 
ROE is positive and significant at 1% significant level and that of LLRGL on ROE is 
negative and significant at 1% significant level. This result shows that duality 
moderate the relationship between bank risk and performance, supporting 
hypothesis twelve. The result suggests that the same person occupying CEO and 
chairman positions is a good corporate governance practice when it comes to bank 
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risk reduction and performance improvement in Africa. The finding could also 
suggest that, when the same person holds CEO and chairman positions, he 
acquires more experience because of in-depth knowledge already gained in the 
business of banking, he works harder to protect his reputation, and identifies risks 
and deal with them on time, which could minimise risk and improve performance. 
The finding is consistent with stewardship theory which argues, that a single person 
occupying chairman and CEO positions minimises conflicts during decision making 
(Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012), strong and unified leadership with a good 
strategic direction is achieved, and timely and best decisions within a firm is made 
(Brickley et al. 1997), which could reduce bank risk and improve performance.  
LLRGL*FEMALE is significant and positive related with ROA at 1% significant level. 
The coefficient of LLRGL*female on ROA is 0.0003 and the coefficient of LLRGL on 
ROA is 0.107. This means the positive impact on performance has reduced from 
0.107 based on LLRGL to 0.0003, based on the interaction variable, LLRGL*female. 
In other words, the result implies that when female directors interact with bank risk, 
the performance of the banks goes down. On the other hand LLRGL*FEMALE has 
negative impact on performance, measured by ROE, even though, this is not 
significant. The results could mean that, female present on the board do not have 
enough experience, skills and risk management techniques which can help reduce 
the risk which is facing the banks to improve performance. The female directors may 
be friends and family or concubines of the management, who may not qualify to be 
bank board members. When this happens, their presence will rather reduce 
performance instead of increasing it. It may also mean that, because the number of 
female directors on African banks board is too small, it makes it quiet impossible for 
them to challenge their male counterparts on issues which the females consider it  
to be causing or will cause adverse effect on the bank. Therefore, the presence of 
female directors is just a token and will mean almost nothing. Theoretically, this 
result does not support the resource dependency theory, which posit that, the 
inclusion of female directors on board provides many different resources and 
benefits (Carter, 2010), which could reduce risk and improve bank performance.  
The inconsistent of the impact of LLRGL*FEMALE on ROA and ROE may be the 
result of the differences in the behaviour of debt (ROA) and equity (ROE) holders. 
Whiles debt holders (ROA) may not accept any form of poor governance practices, 
which may lead to poor performance, such as for example fewer number of female 
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directors, equity holders (ROE) may appear to entertain poor governance practices 
to some extent. Due to the differences in the behaviour of equity and debt holders, 
ROA and ROE results can be expected to be different sometimes. 
LLRGL*MEETINGS has significant and negative relationship with ROA at 1% 
significant level. Looking at the direct relationship between LLRGL and bank 
performance which is significant and positive, we conclude that hypothesis twelve 
is well supported. The result implies that the number of board meetings cannot 
influence bank risk to increase performance in Africa. On the other hand, meetings 
held by board of directors in Africa do not bring any positive outcome which can 
reduce their bank risk to improve performance. The reason may be that either the 
board members are not able to reach consensus at their meetings or the expenses 
incurred to organise such meetings outweigh the benefit that such meetings can 
bring to the bank, hence such meetings cause negative impact on performance. In 
addition, board members may spend long time to discuss about their personal life 
with little time to discuss issues affecting the banks. Also, the boards of African 
banks may lack frequent meetings, therefore, there may be some delays in 
organising meetings to discuss critical issues affecting the banks. As a result, the 
risk of the banks can increase and subsequently reduce performance.  Theoretically, 
this result supports Vefeas (2008) argument that, firm performance can be affected 
by frequent board meetings through agency cost (refreshment, managerial time, 
travel expenses meeting fees, etc.). 
Contrary, LLRGL has significant negative impact on ROE at 1% significant level 
while LLRGL*MEETINGS has significant positive relationship with ROE at 1% 
significant level. This finding indicates that board meetings moderate the 
relationship between bank risk and performance, supporting hypothesis twelve. The 
result shows that when board meeting interacts with bank risk, the performance 
improves. The result suggests that board members are able to discuss important 
issues affecting the banks, they are able to reach consensus, and able to reduce 
risk and improve performance. Overall, the benefits that African board meetings 
bring are more that the cost involve in organising such meetings, which helps to 
improve performance.  
The inconsistent of the impact of LLRGL*MEETINGS on ROA and ROE may be the 
result of the differences in the behaviour of debt (ROA) and equity (ROE) holders. 
Whiles debt holders (ROA) may not accept any form of poor governance practices, 
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which may lead to poor performance, such as for example fewer board meetings by 
board of directors, equity holders (ROE) may appear to tolerate poor governance 
practices to some extent. As a result of differences in the behaviour of equity and 
debt holders, the results of ROA and ROE can be expected to be different 
sometimes. 
9.2.2 Results of control variables 
9.2.2.1 Results based on individual corporate governance variables 
These results are presented in table 19 and 20. Board size has significant and 
negative correlation with both ROA and ROE at 1% level of significance. The results 
suggest that smaller board size is better and effective to increase banks 
performance in Africa. The results also suggest that the board which has got smaller 
number of members concentrate more and focus fully during board meetings; and 
board members are able to debate on issues and can easily reach consensus. 
Moreover, since the expenses on smaller board is low, African banks are able to 
take advantage of smaller board size to reduce expenses and agency cost 
associated with bigger board size and improve their bank performance.  
The findings are consistent with agency theory which suggests that due to director’s 
free rider problems, communication and coordination problems, and internal 
conflicts among directors, bigger boards are not efficient (Jensen, 1993). Also during 
decision making, it is harder for boards which are bigger to organise board meetings, 
it is also more difficult and demands a lot of effort for bigger boards to reach 
consensus ((Jensen 1993; Hoque et al, (2013), which could have negative impact 
on bank performance. Contrary, the negative impact of board size on bank 
performance is not consistent with resource dependency theory, which advocates 
for a bigger board. The negative impact of board size on bank performance is 
consistent with a number of past studies (e.g. Liang et al., 2013; Mamatzakis and 
Bermpei, 2015; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Sakawa and Watanabel, 2018). However, 
it is inconsistent with the findings of some past studies (e.g. Chahine and Safieddine, 
2011; Salim et al, 2016; O’Sullivan et al, 2016; Adams and Mehran, 2012). 
Duality has significant and positive correlation with ROA at 1% significant level. This 
result implies that the same person holding Chairman and CEO positions is better 
for improvement of bank performance in Africa. The results suggests that, the same 
person holding the two positions may have a very good experience in the job, very 
confident, works well to protect his reputation and take decision and act on it on 
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time, which could improve performance. The finding is consistent with stewardship 
and resource dependency theories which advocates for duality and argue that CEO 
duality promotes leadership unity and organisational effectiveness (Gulick & Urwick, 
1937; Krause et al, 2014), which could increase bank performance. The result is 
consistent with the significant positive impact of duality on bank performance (e.g. 
Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2013). However it is not consistent with the negative impact 
of duality on bank performance reported by prior literature (e.g. Grove et al, 2011; 
Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Dong et al., 2017; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2018; AlManaseer et al. 
(2012). It is also not consistent with insignificant relationship between duality and 
bank performance reported by previous empirical studies (e.g. Bukair & Rahman, 
2015; Carty & Weiss, 2012; Abdul Gafoor et al., 2018). 
Contrary, duality has significant and negative impact on bank performance, 
measured by ROE, at 1% significant level. This result suggests that the situation 
whereby one person holding CEO and Chairman positions at the same time is not 
a good governance practice to improve bank performance in Africa. This result also 
suggests that duality brings about conflict of interest, self-evaluation, and 
inexperienced person holding the positions of Chairman and CEO can cause 
managerial problems within the bank. Therefore, it is beneficial for African banks to 
have a separate CEO from the chairman in order to increase their bank 
performance. The result is in line with agency theory, which posits that CEO duality 
has adverse impact on firm performance, and that to prevent managerial 
entrenchment, management and boards should be independent from each other 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983a). It also lends some support to Rechner and Dalton (1991) 
who argue that assigning one person as CEO and chairman at the same time brings 
about a clear conflict of interest, which could adversely affect bank performance. 
The result is consistent with some previous empirical findings (e.g. Grove et al, 
2011; Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Dong et al., 2017; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2018; AlManaseer 
et al. (2012) and contrast with the positive impact of duality on bank performance 
that prior empirical literature find (e.g. Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2013).  
The inconsistent of the impact of duality on ROA and ROE may be caused by 
differences in the behaviour of debt (ROA) and equity (ROE) holders. Debt holders 
(ROA) may not accept any form of poor governance practices which can cause poor 
performance. On the other hand, equity holders (ROE) may appear to accept poor 
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governance practices to some extent. As a result of differences in the behaviour of 
equity and debt holders, the results of ROA and ROE can differ sometimes. 
Board meetings has significant and positive relationship with ROA at 1% level of 
significance. The result suggests that having more meetings is a good governance 
practice to improve banks performance in Africa. The result also suggests that 
frequent meetings assist the board members to identify problems within the banks 
and resolve them on time. This can help minimise critical issues that could affect 
bank performance. As a result, the performance of the banks will not be negatively 
affected but rather will be improved. The result gives theoretical support to agency 
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which suggests that frequent board meetings 
come with increased capacity to advise effectively, discipline management and 
monitor them, which could result to improvement in bank performance. The result is 
consistent with the past empirical studies (e.g. Liang et al, 2013; Salim Arjomandi 
and Seufert, 2016; Grove et al, 2011; Abdul Gafoor, 2018) which find a positive 
relationship between board meetings and bank performance.  
Contrary, the findings show that the relationship between board meetings and bank 
performance, measured by ROE is significant and negative at 1% level of 
significance. This finding implies that having smaller number of meetings is better 
for improvement in bank performance in Africa. The result also suggests that, 
because more meetings bring some expenses, the agency cost in the form of travel 
expenses, refreshments, directors’ meetings and time which go into having more 
meetings is far more than advantages that more meetings bring to the banks. These 
findings do not lend any support to agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which 
suggests that frequent board meetings come with increased capacity to advise 
effectively, discipline management and monitor them, which could result to 
improvement in bank performance. The finding is inconsistent with the past 
empirical studies which find a positive impact of board meetings on bank 
performance (e.g. Liang et al, 2013; Salim Arjomandi and Seufert, 2016; Grove et 
al, 2011; Abdul Gafoor, 2018). 
FEMALE has significant and negative relationship with bank performance at 1% 
significant level. The result suggests that the presence of female directors do not 
bring any good to improve bank performance in Africa. This result could mean that 
the female directors on the board do not have the necessary qualifications, skills 
and experience needed to contribute during meetings to improve performance of 
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the banks. Due to corruption, some members of the management can recommend 
and appoint their fiancées who do not qualify to be board of directors, hence their 
contribution to the board will be meaningless. Therefore, the presence of female 
directors will bring cost rather than benefit to the bank. The result do not support the 
theoretical view, that female brings different views to the boardroom and have 
advanced degrees which aid firms to gain competitive advantage, which could 
improve performance. The result is not consistent with a number of previous 
empirical findings (e.g. Gulamhussen & Santa, 2015; Pathan & Faff, 2013; García-
Meca et al, 2015; Dong et al., 2017) that document a positive impact of female 
directors on bank performance. Contrary, our results show that female directors has 
insignificant positive relationship with bank performance, measured by ROE.   
Independent directors has significant and positive impact on ROA and ROE at 1% 
and 5% significant levels respectively. These results suggest that independent 
directors use their skills and experience and contribute during board meetings, 
which assist improve the bank performance in Africa. The results also suggest that, 
independent directors in Africa are able to use their experience to scrutinise the 
decisions of management and provide a good monitoring role to make sure that the 
right thing is done by the management, to ensure the success and improvement of 
financial performances of the banks. The results are in line with the theoretical 
prediction, that independent directors have technical experts in management and 
decision making that enables them to be effective monitors (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Nguyen & Nielson, 2010). Also CEOs are more likely to be removed by outside-
dominated boards as a result of poor performance (Weisbach, 1988) and serves as 
a valuable monitoring role and positively affects ﬁrm proﬁtability and operating 
performance. The findings are consistent with the findings of some prior empirical 
literature  (e.g. Abdul Gafoor et al, 2018; Dong, 2016; Liang et al, 2013; Pathan et 
al, 2007; Lee & Carlson, 2007), and contrast with the significant negative impact of 
independent directors on bank performance reported by some prior studies (e.g. 
Pathan & Faff, 2013; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2018).  
NB: The inconsistence of the results of MEETINGS, FEMALE and DUAL on ROA 
and ROE may cause by the differences in the behaviour of debt (ROA) and equity 
(ROE) holders. Debt holders may not accept any level of losses or risk while equity 
holders may accept some level of losses or risk. Debt holders may demand their 
returns when the bank makes profit or not while equity holders may demand their 
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returns only when the bank makes profit, since the equity holders are the real 
owners of the bank. The difference in the behaviour of equity and debt holders can 
cause the results of ROA and ROE to be different. Also, the inconsistent of some of 
our results with some previous empirical results may be caused by differences in 
sample size, sample period and the way in which variables are measured.  
9.2.2.2 Results based on bank specific and macroeconomic variables   
The results of bank specific and macroeconomic variables are presented in Tables 
19 and 20. Using LLRGL as risk measure, the following results are obtained. LLRGL 
is significant and positively correlated with ROA and significant and negatively 
correlated with ROE. 
With regards to the control variables the following findings were found: Bank size 
has insignificant and negative association with ROA. The insignificant nature of the 
result may be due to measurement error and autocorrelation. The negative 
association on performance suggests that smaller banks are more easily managed 
by managers to make profit in Africa than larger banks. It also suggests that banks 
in Africa are more efficient when they concentrate on smaller number of businesses, 
and make more profit to increase their performance. However this is not significant 
in the case of Africa. This finding is consistent with the finding of Bougatef (2017) 
who documents insignificant relationship between bank size and bank performance 
in Tunisia. However, the finding is not consistent with the findings of significant 
positive relationship between bank size and performance (e.g. Sakawa & 
Watanabel, 2018; Rahman et al., 2015; Tan et al., 2017; Shawtari, 2018; Hasanov 
et al., 2018) and significant negative relationship between bank size and 
performance reported by Tan (2016), Al-Shammari (2013), Dietrich and Wanzenried 
(2011), Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) and Doumpos et al (2015).  
However, the results find that bank size has significant and positive relationship with 
ROE at 1% significant level. The positive relationship between bank size and 
performance indicates that the economies of scale enjoyed by larger banks in Africa 
help them to decrease their cost and make more profit. Moreover, the positive 
impact could also suggests that the bigger banks in Africa get benefits through 
diversification of the activities of their loan portfolios which leads to higher bank 
performance. This finding is consistent with the findings of previous literature (e.g. 
Sakawa & Watanabel, 2018; Rahman et al., 2015; Tan et al., 2017; Shawtari, 2018; 
Hasanov et al., 2018); and contrast with the findings of significant negative impact 
  
212 
  
of risk on bank performance (e.g. Tan, 2016; Al-Shammari, 2013; Dietrich & 
Wanzenried, 2011; Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; Doumpos et al, 2015).  
The inconsistent of the impact of bank size on ROA and ROE may be caused by the 
behaviour of debt (ROA) and equity (ROE) holders. Debt holders (ROA) may not 
accept any form of losses or risk but equity holders (ROE) may accept some level 
of risk and losses. As a result of differences in the behaviour of equity and debt 
holders, the results of the impact of bank size on ROA and ROE can differ 
sometimes. 
 Equity to asset ratio is significant and positive associated with ROA at 1% level of 
significance. The finding suggests that well capitalised banks in Africa are able to 
change their funds to higher income earnings to make more profit. The finding 
supports the theoretical argument by Djalilov and Piesse (2016) and Athanasoglou 
et al., (2008) who posit that, the ratio of equity to total asset is expected to have 
positive impact on bank performance because it represents the amount of available 
funds to back operations of the bank, and for that matter serve as safety net in case 
of adverse events, which could increase bank performance. The result supports the 
findings of some previous empirical literature (e.g. Liang et al, 2013; Bougatef, 2017; 
Daly & Frikha, 2017; Djalilov & Piesse, 2016; Hasanov et al., 2018). However, the 
finding does not support the findings of some past empirical literature that find a 
significant negative relationship between equity to asset ratio and bank performance 
(e.g. Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011).  
Contrary, the result finds equity to assets ratio to have significant and negative 
impact on bank performance, measured by ROE at 1% level of significance. This 
finding suggests that banks with small capital in Africa earn higher profit. The result 
can be explained by the fact that the smaller capitalised banks manage their 
available resources efficiently and make more profit. The result is consistent with 
the findings of Mollah and Zaman, (2015) and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) and 
contrast with the significant positive impact of equity to assets ratio on bank 
performance recorded by prior literature (e.g. Liang et al, 2013; Bougatef, 2017; 
Daly & Frikha, 2017; Djalilov & Piesse, 2016; Hasanov et al., 2018).  
The inconsistence of the impact of equity to assets ratio on ROA and ROE may be 
caused by the behaviour of debt (ROA) and equity (ROE) holders. Debt holders 
(ROA) may not accept any form of losses or risk but equity holders (ROE) may 
accept some level of risk and losses. As a result of differences in the behaviour of 
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equity and debt holders, the results of the impact of equity to assets ratio on ROA 
and ROE can differ sometimes.  
Net loans to assets is significant and negative related to both ROA and ROE at 1% 
significant levels. This result means that when the ratio of loans to assets decreases, 
it left the banks with enough liquidity to invest and cater for any unforeseen fund 
requirement. This gives confidence to depositors to deposit more funds. When more 
funds are deposited, the banks get opportunity to invest some of the deposits to 
make more profit. The result also suggests that African banks have the ability to 
manage, control and monitor their loans very efficiently, and subsequently reduce 
cost leading to higher bank performance. The findings are not in line with the findings 
of Daly and Frikha (2017), Dong et al., (2017), Mollah and Zaman (2015) who 
document a positive relationship between net loans to assets ratio and bank 
performance 
Cost-to-income ratio have significant and negative association with bank 
performance, based on both ROA and ROE at 1% level of significance. These 
results mean that when ratio of cost to income ratio decreases the performance of 
the banks increases. The result suggests that banks in Africa manage their 
operations efficiently, reduce risk and for that matter make more profit. This findings 
lend some support to the theoretical argument by Rahman et al, (2015) who state 
that, when the cost to income ratio is higher, the less efficiency of the management 
become, which could reduce bank performance, and when it is low the more efficient 
the management  become, which could increase bank performance. The significant 
negative relationship between cost to income ratio and bank performance is in line 
with the findings of previous empirical studies (e.g. Rahman, 2015; Syafri, 2012; 
Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011; Goddard, 2013). 
Corruption is significantly positive associated with ROA and ROE at 1% significant 
levels. The significant impact of corruption on performance means that as CPI 
increases (a reduction in corruption), bank performance significantly increases. The 
result shows that the impact of corruption within the institutions in Africa is harmful 
to the banks performance. On the other hand, a reduction in corrupt activities will 
help improve the performance of African banks. The result is consistent with 
Bougatef (2017) and contrary with Aburime (2009) and Arshad and Rizvi (2013) who 
find a significant negative relationship between corruption and bank performance.   
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The association between GDP and bank performance based on both ROA and ROE 
is statistically significant and negative at 1% level of significance. The findings show 
that, in a bad economic situation in Africa when GDP is low, the demand for loans 
and other bank services in Africa can increases, because individuals and companies 
will need support from banks to survive. The interest of the high demand from loans 
increases the performance of the banks, hence the negative relationship between 
GDP and performance. The result is consistent with the results of previous empirical 
findings (e.g. Boateng et al., 2015; Safrali & Gumus, 2010; Rashid & Jabeen, 2016) 
and contrary to Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), Mollah and Zaman (2015) and 
Shawtari (2018) who find a positive impact of GDP on bank performance.  
Financial crisis of 2007/2008 is statistically significantly positive associated with 
ROA and ROE at 1% significant levels. The result indicates that banks in Africa were 
able to manage their businesses and risks efficiently and able to make more profit 
during the crisis. The result also suggests that there was little or no impact of the 
crisis on African banks and for that matter they were able to make more profit at the 
time of the crisis.      
NB: Our empirical findings are not consistent with some previous empirical findings. 
The reason (s) may be that the way we measured our variables may be different 
from how the previous studies measured their variables. Our sample size and 
sample period are also different from the previous studies.     
9.3 Robustness analysis 
9.3.1 Results based on LLPNR as bank risk measure and ROA as bank 
performance measure 
9.3.1.1 Results of independent variables  
These results are presented in table 17. With regards to the interacting variables 
the following findings are reported: The impact of LLPNR*BSIZE on bank 
performance which was positive under the main model is now negative under OLS, 
fixed effect and 2SLS models. Moreover, LLPNR*BSIZE which was 1% significant 
under the main model is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS 
models. The impact of LLPNR*DUAL on bank performance which was positive 
under the main model, GMM, is now negative under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS 
models. The significance level of LLPNR*DUAL which was statistically significant 
at 1% level under the main model is now statistically significant at 10% based on 
OLS model and statistically insignificant based on fixed effect and 2SLS models. 
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The sign on coefficient of LLPNR*MEETINGS which was positive under GMM 
model has not changed under fixed effect and 2SLS models but changed to 
negative under OLS model. In addition, the significance level of 
LLPNR*MEETINGS which was 1% under GMM model is now insignificant under 
OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The sign on coefficient of LLPNR*INDEP 
which was positive based on the main model is now negative based on OLS, fixed 
effect and S2LS models. Moreover, the statistically insignificant on coefficient of 
LLPNR based on the main model has not changed under OLS model but changed 
to 1% significant based on fixed effect and 2SLS models. Finally, the sign on 
coefficient of LLPNR*FEMALE which was negative under the main model is now 
positive under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The 1% significance level of 
LLPNR*FEMALE under the main model has become insignificant under OLS, fixed 
effect and 2SLS models.  
9.3.1.2 Results of control variables 
9.3.1.2.1 Results based on individual corporate governance variables 
These results are presented in table 17. The sign on coefficient of board size which 
was negative under the main model remains the same under OLS model but 
changed to positive under fixed effect and 2SLS models. In addition, the level of 
significance of board size which was 1% based on the main model is now 
insignificant based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The significant level of 
duality has not changed. However, the sign on coefficient of duality which was 
negative under GMM model remains the same under fixed effect and 2SLS models 
but changed to positive under OLS models. With regard to board meetings, the 
sign on coefficient which was negative based on the main model has not changed 
under OLS and 2SLS models, but changed to positive under fixed effect model. 
Also, there are changes in the significant levels. Specifically, the impact of board 
meetings, which was significant at 1% level under GMM model is now significant 
at 10% level under OLS model and insignificant under fixed effect and 2SLS 
models. The positive impact of female directors on bank performance based on 
the main model has not changed under the OLS model but changed to negative 
under the fixed effect and 2SLS models. In addition, the 1% level of significance 
of female directors under the main model became insignificant under OLS, fixed 
effect and 2SLS models. The presence of independent directors which was 
negatively related to bank performance based on the main model in now positively 
related to bank performance based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. 
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Moreover, the presence of independent directors which was 1% significant level 
under GMM is now significant at 5%, 10% and insignificant based on 2SLS, fixed 
effect and OLS models respectively.   
9.3.1.2.2 Results based on bank specific and macroeconomic variables   
The results of the bank specific and macroeconomic variables are presented in 
Table 17. The sign on coefficient of LLPNR which was negative under the main 
model has not changed. However, the level of significance has changed. 
Specifically, LLPNR which was statistically significant at 1% under the main model, 
GMM, is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. 
The sign on coefficient of bank size (LNTA) and the level of significance has 
changed. Specifically, the sign on coefficient of bank size which was positive under 
the main model, GMM, is now negative under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. 
Bank size which was significant at 1% level under GMM model is now significant 
at 10% level under 2SLS model and insignificant under OLS and fixed effect 
models. The positive impact of equity to assets ratio on bank performance and 1% 
level of significance of equity to assets ratio under the main model remain 
unchanged. The negative impact of net loans to assets ratio on bank performance 
under the main model has not changed. However, the significance level of net 
loans to assets ratio which was 1% under the main model is now insignificant under 
OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The direction of sign on coefficient and the 
level of significance of cost-to-income ratio remains the same. The sign on 
coefficient of control of corruption which was negative under the main model has 
not changed. However, the significant level of control of corruption which was 1% 
under GMM is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The 
positive impact of GDP on bank performance based on the main model has 
changed to negative impact based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The 1% 
significant level of GDP under GMM model has changed to insignificant under 
OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. Finally, the sign on coefficient of 2007/2008 
financial crisis which was positive remains the same. However, The level of 
significance of 2007/2008 financial crisis has changed. Specifically, the 1% level 
of significance of 2007/2008 financial crisis under the main model remains 
unchanged under 2SLS model but changed to 5% and insignificant under fixed 
effect and OLS models respectively.    
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9.3.2 Results based on LLPNR as bank risk measure and ROE as bank 
performance measure 
9.3.2.1 Results of independent variables 
These results are presented in table 18. The sign on coefficient of LLPNR*BSIZE 
which is negative has not changed. The significance level of LLPNR*BSIZE which 
was 1% under the main model, GMM, became insignificant under OLS, fixed effect 
and 2SLS models. The sign on coefficient of LLPNR*DUAL which was positive 
under the main model is now negative under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. 
The 1% significance level of LLPNR*DUAL under the main model is now 10% under 
OLS and insignificant under fixed effect and 2SLS models. The direction on the sign 
of coefficient of LLPNR*MEETINGS has changed. Specifically, the positive impact 
of LLPNR*MEETINGS on bank performance under the main model is now negative 
under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. Moreover, the level of significance of 
LLPNR*MEETINGS which was 1% based on GMM is now 5% under OLS and 
insignificant based on fixed effect and 2SLS models. The sign on coefficient of 
LLPNR*INDEP remains unchanged. However, the 1% significance level of 
LLPNR*INDEP remains the same under fixed effect and 2SLS models and became 
insignificant under OLS models. Finally, the positive impact of LLPNR*FEMALE on 
bank performance remains the same. However, the LLPNR*FEMALE was 
significant at 1% level of significance under GMM but became insignificant under 
OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models.  
9.3.2.2 Results of control variables 
9.3.2.2.1 Results based on individual corporate governance variables   
 These results are presented in Table 18. The results of the corporate governance 
variables are as follows: First, the sign on coefficient of board size and independent 
directors under the main model, GMM, have changed from negative to positive 
under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The statistical level of significance of 
board size and independent directors have also changed. In particular, the 
coefficients of board size and independent directors, which was statistically 
significant at 1% under the main model, is now statistically insignificant under OLS, 
fixed effect and 2SLS models. Second, the sign on coefficient of duality remains the 
same. However, the coefficient of duality, which was statistically significant at 1% 
under the main model, is now statistically insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 
2SLS models. Third, the negative impact of board meetings on bank performance 
under the main model remains the same under OLS model but became positive 
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under fixed effect and 2SLS models. The coefficient of board meetings, which was 
statistically significant at 1% under the main model, is now insignificant under OLS, 
fixed effect and 2SLS models. Fourth, consistent with the main model, the sign on 
coefficient of female directors, which was positive, remains the same under OLS 
models, but became negative under fixed effect and 2SLS models. Moreover, the 
level of significance of female directors, which was 1% under the main model is now 
10% under OLS and insignificant under fixed effect and 2SLS models.  
9.3.2.2.2 Results based on bank specific and macroeconomic variables  
The results of bank specific and macroeconomic variables are presented in table 
18. Consistent with the main model, GMM, the sign on coefficient of LLPNR has not 
changed. However, there is a change is the significance level on coefficient of 
LLPNR. Specifically, the coefficient on LLPNR, which was 1% significant under the 
main model, is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models.  
Consistent with the main model, the sign on coefficient of bank size, which was 
positive, remains the same under OLS models, but became negative under fixed 
effect and 2SLS models. In addition, the level of significance of bank size, which 
was 1% under the main model is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS 
models. Consistent with the main model, the sign on coefficient of equity to assets 
ratio, which was negative based on the main model, has not changed based on OLS 
and 2SLS models but changed to positive based on fixed effect model. The direction 
of coefficient on equity to assets ratio has changed. In particular, the coefficient of 
equity to assets ratio which was statistically significant at 1% is now the same under 
OLS model and became 5% and insignificant under fixed effect and 2SLS models 
respectively. The negative impact of net loans to assets ratio under GMM, remains 
unchanged under OLS model but became positive under fixed effect and 2SLS 
models. In addition, the 1% significant level on coefficient of net loans to assets ratio 
based on the main model remains the same based on fixed effect model and 
changed to insignificant based on OLS and 2SLS models. Consistent with the main 
model, the sign on coefficient and the level of significance of cost-to-income ratio 
and 2007/2008 financial crisis have not changed. The positive impact of control of 
corruption on bank performance based on the main model, remains the same based 
on fixed effect model and became negative based on OLS and 2SLS models. The 
coefficient on control of corruption, which was 1% significant under the main model, 
is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The sign on 
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coefficient of GDP, which was positive based on GMM, is now negative based under 
OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. Also, the coefficient on GDP, which was 5% 
significant, remains unchanged under fixed effect model, but changed to 
insignificant under OLS and 2SLS models.  
9.3.3 Results based on LLRGL as risk measure and ROA as performance 
measure  
9.3.3.1 Results of independent variables    
These results are presented in table 19. The sign on coefficient of LLRGL*BSIZE 
which was positive based the main model, is now negative based on OLS, fixed 
effect and 2SLS. The coefficient on LLRGL*BSIZE, which was statistically significant 
at 1% based on the main model, remains the same under fixed effect and 2SLS and 
became insignificant under OLS model. The sign on coefficient of LLRGL*INDEP 
and LLRGL*DUAL has not changed. However, the coefficient on LLRGL*INDEP and 
LLRGL*DUAL, which was statistically significant at 1% based on the main model, is 
now insignificant based OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The sign on coefficient 
of LLRGL*FEMALE remains positive. However, the coefficient on LLRGL*FEMALE, 
which was significant at 1% based on the main model, is now 10% based on 2SLS 
and insignificant based on OLS and fixed effect models. LLRGL*MEETINGS, which 
was negatively related to bank performance under GMM model remains the same 
under fixed effect and 2SLS models but changed to positive under OLS. In addition, 
the significance level on the coefficient of LLRGL*MEETING, which was 1% under 
GMM, is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models.   
9.3.3.2 Results of control variables 
8.3.3.2.1 Results based on individual corporate governance variables  
These results are presented in table 19. The coefficient on board size, which was 
negative based on the main model remains negative under OLS model and became 
positive based on fixed effect and 2SLS models. The coefficient on board size, 
which was statistically significant at 1% based on the main model, is now significant 
at 10% based on OLS and insignificant based on fixed effect and 2SLS models. The 
coefficient on duality, which was positive based on the main model, remains 
unchanged under OLS and became negative under fixed effect and 2SLS models. 
The coefficient on duality, which was 1% significant, is now insignificant under OLS, 
fixed effect and 2SLS models. The positive impact of board meetings on bank 
performance based on the main model remains unchanged based on fixed effect 
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and 2SLS models and became negative based on OLS. Moreover, the coefficient 
on board meetings, which was 1% significant under the main model, is now 
insignificant based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The negative impact of 
female directors on bank performance, based on GMM, remains unchanged under 
fixed effect and 2SLS models and became positive under OLS model. The 
coefficient on female directors, which was 1% significant based on the main model, 
is now insignificant based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The positive 
coefficient on independent directors remains unchanged. However, the coefficient 
on independent directors, which was 1% significant under the main model, is now 
insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models.  
9.3.3.2.1 Results based on bank specific and macroeconomic variables 
These results are presented in table 19. The sign of coefficient on LLRGL, which 
was positive based on the main model, GMM, remains the same based on fixed 
effect and 2SLS models and changed to negative based on OLS model. The 
coefficient on LLRGL, which was 1% significant under the main model, GMM, is now 
insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models.  
The sign of coefficient on bank size (LNTA), which was negative, based on the main 
model, GMM, has not changed. The coefficient on bank size, which was statistically 
insignificant based on the main model, is now 5% significant based on OLS and 
2SLS models and insignificant based on fixed effect model. The signs of coefficients 
and statistical significance on equity to assets ratio and cost-to-income ratio have 
not changed. The sign of coefficient on net loans to assets ratio, which was negative 
based on the main model, remains the same. The coefficient on net loans to assets 
ratio, which was 1% significant under the main model, remains the same under fixed 
effect and 2SLS models and changed to 5% significant under OLS. The impact of 
control of corruption, which was positive under the main model, remains the same 
under fixed effect and became negative under OLS and 2SLS models. Moreover, 
the coefficient on control of corruption, which was 1% significant under the main 
model, is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The impact of 
GDP on bank performance, which was negative under the main model, remains the 
same under fixed effect and 2SLS models but changed to positive under OLS 
model. In addition, the coefficient on GDP which was 1% significant, is now 
insignificant based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. Finally, the sign of 
coefficient on 2007/2008 financial crisis, which was positive, based on the main 
  
221 
  
model, remains the same under fixed effect and 2SLS models and became negative 
under OLS. The coefficient on 2007/2008 financial crisis, which was 1% significant, 
under the main model, is now 5% significant under fixed effect and 2SLS models 
and insignificant under OLS model.   
9.3.4 Results based on LLRGL as bank risk measure and ROE as bank 
performance measure  
9.3.4.1 Results based on independent variables.   
These results are presented in table 20. The sign on coefficient of LLRGL*BSIZE of 
the main model, GMM, which was positive, is now negative under OLS, fixed effect 
and 2SLS models. The coefficient on LLRGL*BSIZE, which was statistically 
significant at 1% based on the main model, is now statistically significant at 10%, 
5% and insignificant based on 2SLS, fixed effect and OLS models respectively. The 
sign on coefficient of LLRGL*INDEP, which was negative, remains the same. The 
coefficient on LLRGL*INDEP, which was 1% significant based on the main model, 
is now significant at 5% under 2SLS and insignificant under OLS and fixed effect 
models. The sign on coefficient of LLRGL*DUAL, which was positive under the main 
model, has not changed. However, there is a change in the level of significance of 
LLRGL*DUAL. Specifically, the coefficient on LLRGL*duality, which was significant 
at 1% under the main model, is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS 
models. The impact of LLRGL*female on bank performance, which was negative 
under the main model, is now positive under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. 
However, the significance level of LLRGL*female, which was insignificant based on 
the main model, has not changed.  The impact of LLRGL*meeting on bank 
performance which was positive under the main model, remains the same under 
OLS and 2SLS models and changed to negative under fixed effect model. The 
coefficient on LLRGL*MEETINGS, which was 1% significant under GMM, changed 
to insignificant based on OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models.  
9.3.4.2 Results of control variables  
9.3.4.2.1 Results based on individual corporate governance variables 
These results are presented in table 20. The sign on coefficient of board size, which 
was negative under the main model, GMM, remains the same under OLS and 
became positive under fixed effect and 2SLS models. The coefficient on board size, 
which was significant at 1% based on the main model, is now insignificant based on 
OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The sign of coefficient on duality, which was 
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negative under the main model remains the same under 2SLS and became positive 
under OLS and fixed effect models. The coefficient on duality, which was 1% 
significant level under the main model, is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect 
and 2SLS models. The impact of board meetings on bank performance, which was 
negative under GMM, remains the same under OLS, and changed to positive under 
fixed effect and 2SLS models. The sign on coefficient on board meetings, which was 
significant at 1% under the main model, is now significant at 10% under OLS and 
insignificant under both fixed effect and 2SLS models. The impact of female 
directors on bank performance, which was positive remains the same under OLS 
model and became negative under fixed effect and 2SLS models. However, the 
significance level of female directors, which was insignificant remains the same.  
Finally, the sign on coefficient of independent directors which was positive based on 
the main model has not changed. However, there is a change in the significance 
level of independent directors. Specifically, the coefficient on independent directors, 
which was 5% significant under the main model, is now insignificant under OLS, 
fixed effect and 2SLS models. 
9.3.4.2.2 Results based on bank specific and macroeconomic variables  
The results of bank specific and macroeconomic variables are presented in table 
20. The sign on coefficient of LLRGL, which was negative under the main model, 
GMM, remains the same under OLS and 2SLS and became positive based on fixed 
effect model. The sign on coefficient of LLRGL, which was 1% significant under the 
main model, is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models.   
The sign on coefficient of bank size (LNTA), which was positive under the main 
model, GMM, is now negative under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The sign 
on coefficient of bank size, which was 1% significant under the main model, is now 
insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The negative impact of 
equity to assets ratio under the main model remains the same under OLS and 
became positive under fixed effect and 2SLS models. The coefficient on equity to 
assets ratio, which was significant at 1% based on the main model remains the 
same under OLS model and changed to 5% and insignificant based on fixed effect 
and 2SLS models respectively. The negative sign on the coefficient of net loans to 
assets ratio has not changed. However, there is a change in the significance level 
on the coefficient of net loans to assets ratio. Specifically, the coefficient on net loans 
to assets ratio, which was 1% significant under the main model remains the same 
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under 2SLS and became 5% and insignificant under OLS and fixed effect models 
respectively. The sign on coefficient and significance level of cost-to-income ratio 
has not changed. The sign on coefficient of control of corruption remains the same. 
However, the coefficient on control of corruption, which was significant at 1% under 
the main model, is now insignificant under OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS models. The 
sign on coefficient of GDP which was negative has not changed. However, the 
coefficient on GDP, which was significant at 1% under the main model, remains 
unchanged under fixed effect and changed to insignificant under OLS and 2SLS 
models. Finally, the sign on coefficient of 2007/2008 financial crisis has not 
changed. The coefficient on 2007/2008 financial crisis, which was significant at 1% 
under the main model remains the same under fixed effect and 2SLS models and 
changed to insignificant under OLS model.  
NB: The reason for the inconsisten of some of the results of the main statistical 
model, GMM, with some of the results of OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS, may be partly 
due to the fact that GMM possesses a number of advantages including, resolving 
the problems of endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation and profit 
persistence, which the other techniques may not have. 
9.4 Chapter summary 
The chapter has focused on presentation of results and discussion of examination 
of the moderation effect of corporate governance on the relationship between bank 
risk and bank performance in Africa. The main objective is to find out the joint effect 
of bank risk and corporate governance on bank performance in Africa. Two 
dependents bank performance proxies used are return on assets (ROA) and return 
on equity (ROE). Our two bank risk proxies are loan loss provision to net interest 
revenue (LLPNR) and loan loss reserve to gross loan (LLRGL). The corporate 
governance variables used are board size (BSIZE), board meetings (MEETINGS), 
role or CEO duality (DUAL), female directors (FEMALE) and independent directors 
(INDEP). The empirical results reported based on LLPNR and corporate 
governance variables are as follows: LLPNR*BSIZE has significant positive impact 
on ROA and significant negative impact on ROE. LLPNR*DUAL has significant 
positive impact on both ROA and ROE. Similarly, LLPNR*MEETINGS has 
significant positive impact on ROA and ROE. The impact of LLPNR*INDEP on bank 
performance is insignificantly positive based on ROA and significantly negative 
based on ROE. Finally, our results show that LLPNR*FEMALE has significant 
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negative impact on bank performance, based on ROA and significant positive 
impact on bank performance, based on ROE.  
When bank risk, measured by LLRGL interacted with the corporate governance 
variables, we reported the following results: LLRGL*BSIZE has significant positive 
relationship with both ROA and ROE. Similarly, LLRGL*DUAL has significant 
positive relationship with both ROA and ROE. The relationship between 
LLRGL*MEETINGS and bank performance is significant and negative based on 
both ROE and ROE. LLR/GL*INDEP has significant and negative relationship with 
both ROA and ROE. LLR/GL*FEMALE has significant positive impact on ROA and 
insignificantly negative pact on ROE. Our results suggest that corporate governance 
moderate the relationship between bank risk and bank performance in Africa.   
Table 21: A summary of hypothesis and findings of the impact of bank risk, 
corporate governance and interacting variables on bank performance 
Dependent 
variables 
  ROA ROE 
Risk 
variables 
Hyp 
No. 
Expec
ted 
sign 
Findi
ng 
sign 
 
Findings 
significa
nce 
Hypoth
esis 
status 
Findi
ng 
sign 
Finding 
significa
nce 
Hypoth
esis 
status 
LLPNR 1 - - Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
- Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
LLRGL 1 - - Insignifi
cant 
 
Rejecte
d 
- Insignific
ant 
Rejecte
d 
MEETINGS 7 + - Significa
ntat 
(1%) 
Rejecte
d 
- Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Rejecte
d 
DUAL 8 - + Insignifi
cant 
Rejecte
d 
- Significa
ntat 
(10%) 
Accepte
d 
FEMALE 9 + + Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
+ Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
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BSIZE 10 - - Significa
ntat 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
- Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
INDEP 11 + - Insignifi
cant 
Rejecte
d 
- Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Rejecte
d 
LLPNR*MEE
TINGS 
12 +/- + Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
+ Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
LLPNR*DUA
L 
12 +/- + Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
+ Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
LLPNR*FEM
ALE 
12 +/- - Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
+ Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
LLPNR*BSIZ
E 
12 +/- + Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
- Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
LLPNR*INDE
P 
12 +/- + Insignifi
cant 
Rejecte
d 
- Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
LLRGL*MEE
TINGS 
12 +/- - Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
+ Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
LLRGL*DUA
L 
12 +/- + Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
+ Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
LLRGL*FEM
ALE 
12 +/- + Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
- Insignific
ant 
Rejecte
d 
LLRGL*BSIZ
E 
12 +/- + Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
+ Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Rejecte
d 
LLRGL*INDE
P 
12 +/- - Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
- Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
Notes: ROA represents return on asset, ROE represents return on equity, LLPNR denotes loan loss 
provision/net interest revenue, LLRGL represents loan loss reserve/gross loan, BSIZE represents 
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board size of the bank, INDEP denotes percentage of independent directors, DUAL represents role 
duality, FEMALE denotes the percentage of female directors on bank board, MEETINGS represents 
the number of board meetings per year, LLPNR*MEETINGS represents interaction between loan 
loss provision to net interest revenue and board meetings, LLPNR*DUAL represents interaction 
between loan loss provision to net interest revenue and role duality, LLPNR*FEMALE represents 
interaction between loan loss provision to net interest revenue and female directors, LLPNR*BSIZE 
represents interaction between loan loss provision to net interest revenue and board size, 
LLPNR*INDEP represents interaction between loan loss provision to net interest revenue and 
independent directors, LLRGL*MEETINGS represents interaction between loan loss reserve to gross 
loan and board meetings, LLRGL*DUAL represents interaction between loan loss reserve to gross 
loan and role duality, LLRGL*FEMALE represents interaction between loan loss reserve to gross 
loan and female directors, LLRGL*BSIZE represents interaction between loan loss reserve to gross 
loan and board size, LLRGL*INDEP represents interaction between loan loss reserve to gross loan 
and independent directors 
Table 22: A summary of hypothesis and findings of the impact of corporate 
governance on bank risk 
Depende
nt 
variable
s 
  LLPNR LLRGL 
Corporat
e 
governan
ce 
variables 
Hy
p 
No
. 
Expect
ed 
sign 
Findi
ng 
sign  
 
Findings 
significan
ce 
Hypothe
sis 
status 
Findi
ng 
sign 
Finding 
significan
t 
Hypothe
sis 
status 
BSIZE 2 + - Insignific
ant 
Rejected - Significa
nt at (1%) 
Accepte
d 
FEMALE 3 - - Significa
nt at (1%) 
Accepte
d 
+ Significa
nt at (1%) 
Rejected 
INDEP 4 - + Insignific
ant 
rejected - Significa
nt at (1%) 
Accepte
d 
DUAL 5 - - Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
- Insignific
ant 
Rejected 
MEETIN
GS 
6 - - Significa
nt at 
(1%) 
Accepte
d 
+ Significa
nt at (1%) 
Rejected 
Notes: LLPNR denotes loan loss provision/net interest revenue, LLRGL represents loan loss 
reserve/gross loan, BSIZE represents board size of the bank, INDEP denotes percentage of 
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independent directors, DUAL represents role duality, FEMALE denotes the percentage of female 
directors on bank board, and MEETINGS represents the number of board meetings per year 
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CHAPTER TEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
10 Introduction  
As indicated in chapter one, Africa financial institutions is quiet diversified and the 
banking sector is more developed at some part than the other. However, the banking 
services are not accessible to many households.  One of the major problems facing 
the continent of Africa is corruption and the enforcement to tackle this problem is 
also weak. The banking sector in Africa like every part of the globe faces the problem 
of risk especially credit risk through non-performing loans which has adverse effect 
on the performance of the banks. However, the separation of ownership and control 
in modern corporations such as banks has called for attention to be given to 
corporate governance not within the developed countries but developing African 
countries as well. Over the past and due to weak governance systems, many 
institutions including banks in Africa have suffered tremendously which needs 
proper attention.  As a result, many African countries have come out with different 
corporate governance codes which companies are expected to comply. These 
codes contain a number of recommendations which organisations need to follow in 
order to make sure that organisations are managed properly and also to mitigate 
issues related to agency problems.  
Many studies have been conducted in the developed countries to look at the 
relationship between bank risk and performance; relationship between bank risk and 
corporate governance; and the relationship between corporate governance and 
bank performance. It has become important also to apply this to see the results of 
these relationships in developing Africa, where the empirical evidence is lacking. In 
the first place, this study looked at how the risks facing the banks in Africa impact 
on bank performance. The study uses panel data analysis to investigate the impact 
of bank risk on bank performance in Africa. Unlike many studies that conduct a 
single country, for example Tan (2016), this study uses cross country study involving 
635 banks from 48 countries between 2000 to 2016, giving a total of 10795 firm year 
observations. Secondly, the study investigated how corporate governance 
characteristics affect bank risk in Africa. Based on data availability, five board 
characteristics namely board size; board meetings, role duality, independent board 
directors and female board directors were chosen to examine such relationship with 
ban risk. Third, this study provided an examination into the relationship that exists 
between corporate governance and bank performance. To be specific, the study 
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attempted to find out the impact of corporate governance structures on bank 
performance in Africa. The same board characteristics mentioned above were used 
to find such relationship. Finally, using the same board characteristics, this study 
attempted to find out the moderation effect of corporate governance on the 
relationship between bank risk and performance in Africa. In order words, the study 
finds out the joint effect of bank risk and corporate governance on bank performance 
in Africa.  
10.1 Summary of main findings 
This section provides a summary of the empirical results of the impact of bank risk 
on bank performance in Africa; the impact of corporate governance on bank risk in 
Africa; the impact of corporate governance on bank performance in Africa; and the 
moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between bank risk 
and bank performance in Africa. The rest of this section provide discussions on 
policy implications, recommendations based on this study, contributions and 
limitations of the study as well as recommendations for further research.  
NOTE: Although all the above findings represent Africa as a monolithic whole, the 
researcher recognises that there are differences in the banking and corporate 
governance systems among individual African countries. Such differences include 
population size, security systems, employment levels, bank regulations, culture and 
the judiciary systems. These differences can affect the governance systems 
differently among individual countries. Such differences can also impact on the bank 
risk and performance of banks in individual countries differently. As recommended 
in avenues for future research in this chapter, future research can look at individual 
countries or different African regions (north, south, east and west) separately to see 
whether any significant differences are observed.  
10.1.1 Findings based on bank risk and performance 
This subsection presents the summary of the empirical results related to bank risk 
and performance which have been discussed earlier in chapter six. This subsection 
in particular seeks to answer the first research question; what is the relationship 
between bank risk and performance in Africa? The answer to this question relates 
to the first hypothesis which states that “there is a significant and negative 
association between bank risk and bank performance in Africa”. Two risk measures, 
LLPNR and LLRGL and two performance measures, ROA and ROE were used.  
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First, the empirical results show that LLPNR is significantly negative associated with 
both ROA and ROE, bank performance measures, at 1% level of significance. This 
result supports hypothesis one. The result indicates that bank risk has significant 
adverse impact on bank performance in Africa, and has implications for 
governments, policy makers and regulatory bodies in Africa. However, the result 
shows that LLRGL is insignificantly negative associated with both ROA and ROE, 
which rejects hypothesis one.  
10.1.2 Findings based on corporate governance and bank risk 
The objective here is to investigate the relationship that exists between corporate 
governance and bank risk. The empirical findings relate to five hypothesis 
(hypothesis 2-6) tested to find the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and bank risk which have been discussed earlier in chapter seven. 
The two bank risk measures used are LLPNR and LLRGL; and corporate 
governance variables used are board size, female directors, independent directors, 
role duality and board meetings. The summary of these findings are as follows:  
The second hypothesis examined whether there is a statistically significant positive 
association between board size and bank risk in Africa. The result shows that the 
relationship between board size (BSIZE) and bank risk, measured by LLPNR, is 
found to be negative and insignificant. However board size is found to be highly 
significant and negative when bank risk is measured by LLRGL at 1% significant 
level. The significant negative relationship between board size and bank risk 
supports hypothesis two. The result means that bigger board is good for risk 
management and reduction in Africa compared to smaller board.  
The third hypothesis tested whether there is statistically significant negative 
association between the presence of female directors and bank risk in Africa. The 
empirical result indicates that female directors (FEMALE) has statistically significant 
negative impact on bank risk, LLPNR, at 1% significant level. This result supports 
hypothesis three, and shows that the presence of more female directors on African 
banks board is good to reduce bank risk. However, the impact of female directors 
(FEMALE) on bank risk became significant and positive at 1% significant level when 
risk was measured by LLRGL, rejecting hypothesis three. This finding means that 
the presence of more female directors in the boardroom increases bank risk in 
Africa. The contradicting results of the impact of female directors on LLPNR and 
LLRGL has been explained in chapter seven. 
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The fourth hypothesis tested whether there is a statistically significant association 
between board independent and bank risk. The result shows that independent 
directors (LLPNR) is insignificant and positive associated with LLPNR but significant 
negatively associated with LLRGL at 1% level of significance. The significant 
negative association between board independent and bank risk (LLRGL) supports 
hypothesis four. This result implies that the presence of more independent directors 
contributes to minimising bank risk in Africa.  
The fifth hypothesis examined whether there is a statistically significant negative 
association between duality and bank risk in Africa. The result indicates that DUAL 
has significant negative impact on bank risk, measured by LLPNR at 1% level of 
significance. This result supports hypothesis five. This result indicates that one 
person holding CEO and chairman role at the same time is a good governance 
practice for bank risk reduction in Africa.  
The sixth hypothesis provided an examination to find out whether there is a 
statistically significant negative association between board meetings and bank risk. 
The finding reveals that board meeting (MEETINGS) has significant negative impact 
on bank risk, measured by LLPNR, at 1% significant level. This finding supports 
hypothesis six. This result shows that more board meetings is better to reduce bank 
risk in Africa than less meetings. However, the result indicates a significant positive 
relationship between board meetings and bank risk, measured by LLRGL at 1% 
significant level. This finding rejects hypothesis six, and show that less board 
meetings is better to reduce bank risk in Africa than more board meetings. The 
reason for these contracting results has been given in chapter seven.   
10.1.3 Findings based on corporate governance and bank performance 
The main objective here is to investigate the correlation between corporate 
governance and bank performance in Africa. The empirical findings relate to five 
hypothesis (hypothesis 7-11) tested to find the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and bank performance, which has been discussed 
earlier in chapter eight. The two performance measures used are ROA and ROE; 
and corporate governance variables used are board size, female directors, 
independent directors, role duality and board meetings. The result of the main 
findings are summarised below:  
 The seventh hypothesis examined whether there is a statistically significant positive 
association between board meetings and bank performance. The finding shows that 
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the association between board meetings and bank performance is significant and 
negative based on both ROA and ROE at 1% level significance level. This result 
rejects hypothesis seven. These findings imply that having less meetings is effective 
to improve bank performance in Africa than having more meetings.  
Hypothesis eight provides examination whether there is a significant and negative 
association between duality and bank performance. The empirical result shows that, 
duality is negatively associated with bank performance, supporting hypothesis eight. 
This result suggests that the situation whereby a single person holds the positions 
of CEO and chairman at the same time is not good corporate governance strategy 
that improves banks performance in Africa. Therefore the two posts should be 
separated. 
Hypothesis nine tested whether there is a significant positive association between 
the presence of female directors and bank performance in Africa. These findings 
indicate that female directors and bank performance, measured by ROA and ROE 
is significant and positively associated at 1% significant level. These findings mean 
that, hypothesis nine is well supported. The findings indicate that more female 
directors in the boardroom improves bank performance in Africa.  
The tenth hypothesis tested whether there is a statistically significant negative 
association between board size and bank performance in Africa. The result shows 
that board size is significantly and negative related to both ROA and ROE at 1% 
significant level. The findings indicate that hypothesis ten is supported. Our results 
show that smaller board works better; it is more effective and efficient to improve 
bank performance in Africa than bigger board.  
Finally, Hypothesis eleven examined whether there is a significant positive 
association between board independent and bank performance in Africa. The 
results show that board independent has insignificant negative impact on bank 
performance, measured by ROA. However, independent directors has significant 
negative impact on bank performance, measured by ROE, at 1% significant level, 
rejecting hypothesis eleven. This suggests that more independent directors in the 
boardroom causes a reduction in bank performance in Africa.  
 
 
  
233 
  
10.1.4 Findings based on moderation effect of corporate governance on the 
relationship between bank risk and bank performance.  
The rationale here is to find the joint effect of corporate governance and bank risk 
on performance of African banks. The empirical results relate to hypothesis twelve, 
which tested the moderation effect of corporate governance on the relationship 
between bank risk and bank performance in Africa, which has been discussed 
earlier in chapter nine. Bank risk measures used are LLPNR and LLRGL; the 
corporate governance variables used are board size, board meetings, role duality, 
female directors and independent directors. ROA and ROE are used as proxies for 
bank performance.   
10.1.4.1 Summary of findings of the effect of corporate governance and bank 
risk (LLPNR) on bank performance, ROA and ROE.  
LLPNR*SIZE has significant and positive impact on bank performance, based on 
ROA. Contrary, LLPNR*BSIZE has significant and negative impact on bank 
performance, measured by ROE, at 1% level of significance. These results suggest 
that board size moderate the relationship between bank risk and bank performance 
in Africa, which supports hypothesis twelve. The reason for the inconsistent results 
based on ROA and ROE is given in chapter nine. LLPNR*DUAL has significant and 
positive impact on both ROA and ROE at 1% significant levels, supporting 
hypothesis twelve. The results suggest that a single person holding the positions of 
CEO and chairman is a good governance practice to reduce bank risk and improve 
performance in Africa.  
LLPNR*MEETINGS has significant and positive impact on ROA and ROE at 1% 
significant levels. The results support hypothesis twelve. These results suggest that, 
board meetings help in reducing bank risk to improve bank performance in Africa. 
This implies that when board meetings in Africa interact with bank risk, it is able to 
reduce bank risk and improve performance. The impact of LLPNR*INDEP on bank 
performance based on ROA is positive but not significant. However, the impact 
based on LLPNR*INDEP on bank performance, measured by ROE is highly 
significant and negative at 1% significant level, supporting hypothesis twelve. The 
significant negative impact on bank performance suggests that independent 
directors can reduce bank risk to increase bank performance in Africa.  
The result shows that Female directors (LLPNR*FEMALE) has significant negative 
impact on bank performance, measured by ROA at 1% significant level. However 
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LLPNR*FEMALE has significant and positive impact on ROE at 1% significant level. 
Both results suggest that female directors moderate the relationship between bank 
risk and bank performance in Africa, which support hypothesis twelve. The reason 
for the inconsistent of the results has been provided in chapter nine.  
10.1.4.2 Summary of findings of the effect of corporate governance and bank 
risk (LLRGL) on bank performance, ROA and ROE.   
The result shows that LLRGL*SIZE has significant and positive impact on both ROA 
and ROE at 1% significant levels. These results mean that board size moderate the 
relationship between bank risk and performance in Africa, which supports 
hypothesis twelve. LLRGL*INDEP has significant and negative relationship with 
both ROA and ROE at 1% significant levels, indicating that independent directors 
moderate the relationship between bank risk and bank performance in Africa. 
LLRGL*FEMALE has positive impact on ROA at 1% significant level, suggesting 
that LLRGL moderate the relationship between bank risk and bank performance in 
Africa. LLRGL*FEMALE has insignificant negative impact on ROE. The impact of 
LLRGL*DUAL on bank performance, measured by both ROA and ROE is positive 
and significant at 1% significant levels. These results show that duality moderate 
the relationship between bank risk and bank performance. Our findings support 
hypothesis twelve, which predicted that corporate governance moderate the 
relationship between bank risk and bank performance. Finally, LLRGL*MEETINGS 
has significant and negative relationship with ROA and positive with ROE at 1% 
significant levels. These findings indicate that board meetings moderate the 
relationship between bank risk and bank performance, supporting hypothesis 
twelve.  
10.1.5 Results based on robustness analysis 
As discussed earlier, a number of robustness analysis have been carried out to find 
out the extent to which the results of the main technique, GMM, are robust or 
sensitive to the results of other techniques. Different techniques used to check the 
robustness of the results of our main technique are OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. In 
all, the results from the analysis of these different techniques suggest that the results 
of this study are robust.  The results are summarised below. 
First, we test for the relationship between bank risk and performance in Africa. 
Firstly, to check whether the results are robust, two alternative risk measures, 
LLRGL and LLPNR and two performance measures, ROA and ROE were used. Our 
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findings show similar results whether ROA or ROE and whether LLPNR or LLRGL 
was used. Secondary, we use GMM as the main technique and re-regressed using 
OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS techniques. The results of the three alternative 
techniques are similar to the results of the main technique.  
Second, we test for the relationship between corporate governance and bank risk in 
Africa. Firstly, two alternative risk measures, LLPNR and LLRGL were used to test 
such relationships. Secondly, we use GMM as the main technique and re-regressed 
using three different alternative techniques, OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. The results 
of our main technique, GMM are similar to the results of the three alternative 
techniques whether LLPNR or LLRGL was used as risk measure, although there 
are some sensitivities in some of the signs and significance levels of coefficient on 
some of the variables.  
Third, we test for the relationship between corporate governance and bank 
performance in Africa. Firstly, two alternative performance measures, ROA and 
ROE were used to test for such relationships. Secondly, we use GMM as the main 
technique and re-regressed using three different alternative techniques, OLS, fixed 
effect and 2SLS. The results of the three alternative techniques, whether ROA or 
ROE was used as performance measure, are similar to the results of the main 
technique, although there are some sensitivities in some of the signs and 
significance levels of coefficient on some of the variables 
Four, we test for the moderation effect of corporate governance on the relationship 
between bank risk and performance in Africa. Firstly, two alternative performance 
measures, ROA and ROE, and two risk measures LLPNR and LLRGL were used to 
test for such relationships. Secondly, we use GMM as the main technique and re-
regressed using three different alternative techniques, OLS, fixed effect and 2SLS. 
The results of the three alternative techniques, whether ROA or ROE as 
performance measure, and whether LLPNR or LLRGL as risk measure , are similar 
to the results of the main technique, although there are some sensitivity in some of 
the signs and significance levels of coefficient on some of the variables.  
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10.2 Policy implications of the research findings and recommendations 
10.2.1 Bank risk and bank performance, Policy Implications and 
Recommendations 
Some form of implications can be drawn from the impact of bank risk on 
performance in Africa. The analysis of the impact of bank risk on bank performance 
indicates that, both risk measures, LLPNR and LLRGL have negative impact on the 
two performance measures, ROA and ROE. The results imply that the risk activities 
taken by the banks in Africa, such as the administration of bad loans have adverse 
impact on performance of African banks. These results are consistent with a number 
of previous studies. The result have many policy implications for African 
governments, bank managers and regulatory authorities to enhance bank 
performance. A high negative impact of bank risk on performance may discourage 
investors, especially foreign investors from investing in the banking industry in 
Africa. It will also have negative impact on the socio-economic development on 
African countries. A number of recommendations have been made. (1)  
Management of African banks should do well to find appropriate bank risk 
management strategies to minimise the impact of risk on performance in order to 
improve bank performance in Africa, to make it attractive business to both local and 
foreign investors. (2) African government should do well to help banks by reducing 
their rate of tax. (3) Proper background check should be done on each loan applicant 
to gather enough information before any loan is granted. This will help to reduce 
default risk to improve bank performance. (4) Companies and individuals who take 
loans from banks should be well informed on the importance of loan insurance to 
cover them, in the event of difficulties in the loan repayment. The purchase of loan 
insurance will minimise the negative impact of default risk on bank performance (5) 
Banks to recruit experienced staff and provide regular training opportunities for 
existing staffs; banks should use well trained and skilled personnel to assess loan 
applications. (6) To achieve efficient risk management in Africa, bank risk 
management teams should be highly educated and be trained to do their job. (7) 
Anti-corruption campaign should be strengthened in Africa to discourage bribery and 
corruption to avoid the negative impact of corruption on banks and financial sector 
as a whole. In addition, loans should not be granted to individuals or companies 
based on to whom you know, but to those who qualify for the loans. (8) Inflation rate 
is a big concern across the length and breadth of Africa, therefore appropriate fiscal 
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and monetary policies must be implemented to control inflation within African 
banking industry.   
10.2.2 Corporate governance and bank risk, Policy Implications and 
Recommendations 
This study attempts to find out the relationship that exists between corporate 
governance and bank risk in Africa. The empirical result shows that corporate 
governance characteristics namely, board size, board meeting, duality, female 
directors and independent directors have significant relationship with bank risk. 
Overall, the results find evidence that corporate governance characteristics play 
important roles in bank risk in Africa. The results have policy implications for bank 
management, government and regulatory bodies in Africa to reduce bank risk.  
In the first place, board size has insignificant negative impact on LLPNR and 
significant and negative relationship with bank risk, based on LLRGL. The significant 
negative result means that bigger board is effective for reducing bank risk in Africa. 
Even though having smaller board size is perceived to be better governance 
practice by the market and it is supported by agency theory, it increases bank risk 
in Africa. It is therefore advisable for African banks to use bigger board size so that 
board members can bring different ideas together to help the banks to reduce risk. 
If the banks in Africa prefer to use smaller board size, then it is highly recommended 
that they use board members who are highly educated and trained with high record 
of experience so that they can work efficiently to reduce the risk being faced by the 
banks.  
Secondly, duality has insignificant negative relationship with bank risk, measured by 
LLRGL and significant negative relationship with LLPNR. The significant negative 
impact of duality on bank risk suggests that the same person holding the positions 
of Chairman and CEO roles is the best way to reduce bank risk in Africa. Even 
though the market perceives the split roles of CEO and Chairman positions to be 
better corporate governance practice, which could help reduce bank risk, this is not 
the case in Africa. The advantages associated with duality, such as quick decision 
making, which could reduce bank risk is manifested in Africa banking system. This 
sends signal to regulatory bodies and policy makers, that policies which allow the 
split roles of chairman and CEO positions is not appropriate in Africa. Thus, within 
African context, CEO duality allows charismatic, experienced and hardworking CEO 
to have a good focus and hardworking attitude to work effectively and bring bank 
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risk to a minimum. Therefore, based on our result, duality must be allowed to 
practice in African banking industry. 
Thirdly, our findings reveal that the presence of independent directors has 
insignificant positive impact on bank risk, measured by LLPNR. Contrary, the result 
shows that the presence of independent directors has significant negative impact 
on bank risk, measured by LLRGL. This result indicates that more independent 
directors on the board is beneficial to reduce bank risk in Africa. More independence 
directors on the board is also perceived by the market to be good corporate 
governance practice which must be encouraged by management and regulatory 
bodies. The monitoring role and resources provided by more independent directors’ 
help in a long way to reduce the risk of banks in Africa. Therefore, management and 
regulatory bodies and policy makers must ensure that more independent directors 
are hired on the board of African banks to scrutinise and monitor the decisions and 
activities of management so that any decision that is taken by the management 
which will increase the risk of the banks are brought to minimum. More independent 
directors on corporate board is supported by agency theory, and it is also perceived 
by the market to be a good corporate governance practice which must be 
encouraged to attract more investors to invest in African banks. More investment 
means more resources to minimise the risk of the banks.  
Fourthly, the presence of female directors is found to be significant and negative 
related to banks risk, measured by LLPNR. This result implies that a higher 
proportion of female directors on the bank board of directors is effective corporate 
governance practice to reduce bank risk. The ideas female directors may have to 
bring to the board to support their male counterparts on the board will be vital during 
decision making, which can help in no small way to reduce bank risk of the banks. 
As females are perceived to be risk averse, they will scrutinise and challenge the 
male directors so that they will not take decisions which will increase the risk of the 
banks. The inclusion of more female board directors on company boards is being 
encouraged in some developed countries such as France and Norway. Therefore, 
government and policy makers should also enforce this and encourage banks to 
hire more female directors to the bank boards in Africa. Since the inclusion of female 
directors on the board is perceived by the market as good corporate governance 
practice, more female directors on the bank board in Africa will not only reduce bank 
risk but will attract more investors 
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However, our results finds that female directors has significant and positive 
relationship with bank risk, measured by LLRGL. This result implies that the 
inclusion of more female directors on the banks board of Africa is not good as it 
increases bank risk. The reason may be that female directors on the board are just 
appointed to come to the board just to fulfil the regulatory requirements, they may 
be friends and family members of the management who do not actually qualify to be 
board members. Another reason may be that, the female directors on the board may 
lack the necessary qualifications, skills and experience needed to be a member on 
the board. Therefore, their presence on the board will increase the risk of the bank 
rather than helping to reduce it. The management and regulatory bodies should 
emphasize that, every female appointed to the board possesses the necessary 
qualification and experience needed to be a member of the board. In addition, 
female directors on the board should be given regular training to enable them work 
effectively on the board. These will give them the qualities needed to work effectively 
on the board to help reduce the risk facing the banks.  
Finally, our findings indicate that board meetings has significant negative impact on 
bank risk measured by LLPNR. This finding indicates that smaller number of board 
meetings is not good for African banks so far as bank risk reduction is concerned, 
because it increases bank risk. The market perceives more board meetings to be a 
good corporate governance practice, which could be used to reduce bank risk. The 
use of more board meetings is supported by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), which states that frequent corporate board meetings is the increased 
capacity to advise effectively, discipline management and monitor them, which could 
reduce bank risk and improve financial performance. Moreover, frequent board 
meetings will help identify problems on their early stages and find appropriate 
solutions to them on time to avoid any catastrophic events to the banks. Therefore, 
the regulatory bodies and management of the banks should organize more board 
meetings every year to ensure that they resolve issues within the banks in order to 
reduce the risks facing the banks. More board meetings will also help to identify any 
misconduct or self-interested activities by management which may cause the risks 
of the banks to increase.  
Contrary, our findings show that board meetings have significant and positive impact 
of bank risk, measured by LLRGL. This finding suggests that more board meetings 
is harmful to African banks because they increase the risk of the banks. This is 
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supported by the fact that the expenses incurred to organise more board meetings 
are more than the benefits that more board meetings bring to the bank and for that 
matter increase the risk of the banks. Moreover, the meetings may not be effective 
enough and members may only be interested in the sitting allowance they get from 
attending meetings, which in effect, will not reduce the risk of the banks in any way. 
In addition, they may organise more board meetings just to satisfy the regulatory 
requirements without discussion any important issues at the meeting. In this regard, 
it is advisable for management to consider small number of board meetings per 
year. Organising smaller and effective meetings which can reduce bank risk and 
improve performance is far better than organising more meetings which will not help 
the banks. Organising smaller number of meetings will also cut the expenses of the 
banks. 
The results of female directors and board meetings on LLPNR and LLRGL are 
contradicting since the impact of more female directors and more board meetings 
or less females or less board meetings increase bank risk. This suggests that female 
directors and board meetings are sensitive to bank risk, and female directors and 
board meetings have different impact on different measures of bank risk.  Therefore, 
banks management and policy makers should consider different measures of bank 
risk when they are assessing the impact of female directors and board meetings on 
bank risk.  Moreover, it is recommended that, if more female directors are appointed 
to the board, and if they are appointed through the right channel and possess good 
qualifications, the necessary skills and experiences, given that female are risk 
averse, they can help to minimise the risk of the bank. More board meetings can 
also assist in resolving important issues affecting the bank in a timely manner to 
minimise adverse effect on the bank 
As mentioned earlier, more female directors and more board meetings are 
perceived by the market as good governance practices, therefore, appointment of 
more female directors and having more board meetings can attract investors which 
can bring more resources to the bank. As a result, bank managers and policy 
makers are encouraged to include more female directors on African bank board, not 
forgetting more board meetings.  
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10.2.3 Corporate governance and bank performance, Policy Implications and 
Recommendations  
The study attempts to find the impact of corporate governance on bank performance 
in Africa. The results indicate that corporate governance characteristics, board size, 
board meetings, role duality, presence of female directors and presence of 
independent directors have impact on bank performance. The result have many 
policy implications for African government, bank managers and regulatory 
authorities to improve bank performance.   
First, board size has significant negative impact on bank performance, based on 
both ROA and ROE. This result suggests that smaller board is effective for 
improving bank performance in Africa. This finding is consistent with agency theory 
which suggests that due to communication problems and internal conflicts among 
directors, bigger boards are inefficient (Jensen, 1993). In this regard, it is advisable 
for management and policy makers’ to recommend smaller board to the banks in 
Africa. Smaller board size which is effective and the board members are 
experienced is better than bigger board with many members who are unable to 
contribute effectively to the bank. Management should refrain from increasing the 
number of members on the board through adding friends and family who are not 
experienced or who do not qualify to be board members. Quality is better than 
quantity, therefore, it is important for management to be selective when it comes to 
who becomes a board member on their bank board. Government and regulatory 
bodies should come out with effective corporate governance codes that advise firms 
including banks on effective selection of board members onto their board. The codes 
can also set out the maximum number of board members that every firm should 
have and strict selection criteria that firms should follow to select their board 
members.  
Second, based on the result, board meetings has significant negative impact on 
bank performance, based on both ROA and ROE. This implies that smaller number 
of board meetings is effective for increasing bank performance in Africa. This finding 
is not in line with the agency theory. It is argued that corporate board gives advice, 
supervision, and seek accountability from management so that the interest of 
shareholders is pursued by managers (Jensen and Meckling (1976). Corporate 
board meetings play important role in which companies are managed and governed, 
and this subsequently help to improve bank performance. As a result, Management 
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should ensure that regular meetings that is suitable to sort issues out within the bank 
must be encouraged. Meetings should be organised immediately to address issues 
that need urgent attention. Therefore, management should not push issues which 
require urgent attention to next meeting, even if this will increase the number of 
meetings arranged for the year. However, based on our result, too many meetings 
is not beneficial to improve the performance of African banks. The cost associated 
with organising many board meetings may outweigh the benefit that more meetings 
will bring to the banks in Africa. Therefore, it is recommended that too many 
meetings should be discouraged or avoided. It is also important for management 
and regulatory bodies to ensure that the banks comply with the advice on board 
meetings stipulated in their corporate governance codes, in order to improve Bank 
performance.   
Third, our result shows that duality is significant and negative related to bank 
performance, measured by ROE. This finding supports agency theory which posits 
that duality has adverse impact on firm performance. The codes of corporate 
governance of African countries advises firms, including banks, to separate the 
positions of Chairman and CEO, it is important for management and regulatory 
bodies to ensure that the banks abide by this regulation. Due to the adverse effect 
that duality can bring to firms such as banks, many corporate governance codes 
around the globe, such as the UK corporate governance code (2012), recommends 
that organisations to separate the role of Chairman and CEO. Duality may constitute 
a clear conflict of interest; it also causes self-evaluation and a reduction of 
monitoring, which may affect performance of banks negatively. Therefore effective 
supervision of banks by regulatory bodies and policy makers to make sure the banks 
in Africa do the right thing and management comply with the rules and regulations 
are important determinants to improve bank performance in Africa. In addition, 
agency cost of banks can be reduced in the situation where decision management 
is separated from decision control, hence the need for management of African banks 
to appoint two separate individuals to hold the positions of CEO and Chairman to 
increase bank performance. 
Fourth, our findings show that female directors has positive impact on bank 
performance, based on both ROA and ROE. This implies that, the experience and 
contributions female directors bring to the board help improve bank performance in 
Africa. To increase women empowerment for them to contribute towards the socio-
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economic development of African countries, it is important for regulatory bodies and 
bank management to add more women to the bank board. Women who have 
banking experience and those who are interested in working in the banking industry 
should be encouraged and supported to acquire higher qualifications, they must be 
given the necessary training and acquire the skills required. Diversity in the 
boardroom, including adding women to the board to improve bank performance is 
supported by resource dependency theory. This is because, due to distinct 
information held by diverse directors, diversity have the opportunity to enhance the 
information delivered by the board to managers to improve performance. In addition, 
with the inclusion of female directors on the board, transparency and better decision 
making is likely to come during board meetings, due to different views female add 
to their male counterparts. Many developed countries including France and Norway 
are promoting, encouraging and increasing the number of female directors in the 
boardrooms, it is important for Africans to emulate such good practice and add more 
female directors to their bank boards to increase performance.  
Fifth, our result indicates that, the presence of independent directors has significant 
negative impact on bank performance, measured by ROE. This finding suggests 
that more independent directors on the bank board in Africa do not contribute to 
improvement of bank performance. The finding is inconsistent with Fuzi et al (2016) 
who posit that board independence reflects the ability of the board to provide 
independent monitoring and oversight role of management actions so as to reduce 
moral hazard. Our findings may mean that, the independent directors on the board 
of African banks, one reason or the other, are not able to monitor the management 
and scrutinise their decisions effectively to improve bank performance. It is therefore 
recommended, that bank management should ensure that they do not appoint their 
friends and families who do not have the necessary skills and experience to the 
board.  Management and regulatory bodies should make sure that all banks follow 
the right procedure to appoint the independent directors who have the necessary 
experience and skills needed on the board. In the interest of shareholders, banks in 
Africa are encouraged to appoint more independent directors who can effectively 
represent the interest of shareholders during board meetings. Also, government and 
regulatory bodies in Africa should make sure that the directions and rules contain in 
the codes of corporate governance which advises and directs banks on their 
business activities are enforced to improve bank performance in Africa.  
  
244 
  
 10.2.4 Moderation effect of corporate governance on the relationship 
between bank risk and performance, Policy Implications and 
Recommendations   
This study attempts to find the moderation effect of corporate governance on the 
relationship between bank risk and performance. Empirical results show that 
corporate governance moderate the relationship between bank risk and 
performance in Africa. The findings have policy implications for government, 
management of the banks, and regulatory bodies in Africa. 
Bank risk, measured by LPNR, has significant negative impact on ROA and ROE 
with coefficients of -0.0395 and -0.2403 respectively. Bank risk, measured by 
LLRGL, has significant positive impact on performance measured by ROA with 
coefficient of 0.1072. However, LLRGL has significant and negative impact on ROE, 
with coefficient of -0.4728. 
The interacting between LPNR and board size (LPNR*BSIZE) has significant and 
positive impact on performance, measured by ROA and significant and negative 
impact on performance, measured by ROE. The interaction between board size and 
risk (LLRGL*BSIZE) has significant and positive impact on performance, measured 
by both ROA and ROE. The results indicate that board size moderate the 
relationship between bank risk and performance. This suggests that board size is 
important and has policy implications for bank management and policy makers of 
African banks. This result indicates that a good board size with a reasonable amount 
of numbers will work well to reduce bank risk and improve performance. The 
management and regulatory bodies should ensure that the banks comply with the 
codes of corporate governance within their countries and use the size of the board 
specified in the codes. They should emphasize on the board size that work for them 
and include the right people who have the qualifications, knowledge and experience 
to be on the board to reduce the risks and improve performance of the banks. The 
composition of the size of the board should also be taken into account when aiming 
at minimising bank risk to increase performance. Bank board which include people 
with good accounting and finance background, female directors , more independent 
directors and people with higher qualifications like PhDs are expected to reduce 
bank risk and improve performance. In addition, the number of people on the board 
should include chief risk officer, who is expected to scrutinise management decision 
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on risk taking activities so that management refrain from any risk taking activities 
that will not benefit the bank.   
LLPNR*MEETINGS has significant positive impact on both ROA and ROE with 
coefficients of 0.0021 and 0.0134 respectively. LLRGL*MEETINGS has significant 
negative impact on ROA and significant positive impact on ROE with coefficients of 
-0.0101 and 0.0234 respectively. The results show that board meetings moderate 
the relationship between bank risk and performance. In other words, board meetings 
can influence bank risk to increase or decrease it, which could affect bank 
performance in Africa. Bank management and policy makers should ensure that 
banks in Africa have the right number of meetings every year to ensure that 
important issues are discussed on time and resolved, in order to reduce the risk of 
the banks to improve performance. The board should meet regularly to discuss 
critical issues that may affect the effective functioning of the bank. If issues are left 
too long before they are discussed, the implication is that, the effective functioning 
of the bank may be endangered, which may increase risk and reduce performance. 
If a particular issue is not resolved at a meeting, another meeting should be 
scheduled as soon as possible to ensure that the issue is resolved completely. 
Meetings should not focus on personal issues of board members but rather critical 
issues relating to the business of the bank. If misunderstanding occurs at a meeting, 
members should not take it personal but can have a vote on it. Constructive 
discussions at board meetings is vital for risk reduction and performance 
improvement in every organisation. Therefore, is it important for board members to 
understand the issues they are discussing at the meeting in order for everyone at 
the meeting to contribute to achieve the goal of the bank.  
LLPNR*DUAL has significant positive relationship with both ROA and ROE. 
LLRGL*DUAL has significant positive relationship with both ROA and ROE. The 
result shows that duality moderate the relationship between bank risk and 
performance in Africa. Our analysis show surprise results since interaction of duality 
and bank risk improves performance. The market perceives duality as bad corporate 
governance practice. As a result, many corporate governance codes around the 
world, including those in Africa encourage the split roles of CEO and chairman. 
However, our result gives a new evident that, duality can interact with bank risk to 
improve bank performance. In African context, the advantages associated with 
duality outweighs the advantages of splitting the roles of CEO and Chairman, based 
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on our result. Therefore, management and policy makers in African banks must 
revise their regulations and corporate governance codes and make it flexible to 
allow banks that wish to practice duality to do so.  
LLPNR*INDEP has insignificant positive impact on ROA and significant and 
negative impact on ROE. LLRGL*INDEP has significant negative relationship with 
both ROA and ROE. Our results shows that independent directors moderate the 
relationship between bank risk and bank performance. The market perceives more 
independent directors on bank board to be good corporate governance practice. 
More independent members on bank board can boast confidence in both investors 
and shareholders. Corporate governance codes recommends the inclusion of more 
independent directors on bank board. Their monitoring role on the board help shape 
the activities and decisions of the management, so management do not deviate from 
doing the right thing which will help reduce bank risk and improve performance. Like 
any other banks in the world, the inclusion of more independent directors will benefit 
African banks to monitor management activities to reduce risk and improve bank 
performance. Therefore regulatory bodies and management of African banks should 
comply with all codes of corporate governance and include more independent 
directors. The right procedure must also be followed to appoint independent 
directors on the board. This ensures that independent directors appointed have got 
the right education, knowledge and experience required, so that they can contribute 
at all board meetings. Management should desist from all corrupt activities and also 
refrain from all unethical activities such as appointment of family and friends who do 
not have qualifications and experience to the board. Once the board is strong, it is 
guaranteed that bank risk will be minimised to increase performance.  
LLPNR*FEMALE has significant negative relationship with bank performance, 
measured by ROA, and significant and positive relationship with bank performance, 
measured by ROE. LLRGL*FEMALE has significant positive relation with ROA and 
insignificant negative relationship with ROE. The results suggest that female 
directors moderate the relationship between bank risk and performance. The market 
perceives the inclusion of female directors on bank board to be good corporate 
governance practice, which is supported by resource dependency theory. The 
ideas, experience and contribution female directors bring to the board can help 
minimise bank risk and increase performance. Therefore, the banks in Africa should 
appoint more female directors on their board. Female directors are perceived to be 
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risk averse and therefore do not take risk unnecessarily. This means, they will serve 
as a guide and challenge their male counterparts on the board when it comes to risk 
taking decisions. This will help minimise the risk of the banks and improve 
performance. Female directors are also perceived to be more responsible of their 
actions and bring distinct information sets which are available to management 
improve decision making, which could help reduce bank risk and improve 
performance. However, like the appointment of independent directors, the right 
procedure should be followed to appoint female directors to the board. Management 
should not appoint female directors who are their family and friends who do not 
qualify to be board of directors. When this happens, their presence will add more 
risk and cost to the bank, which could increase risk and reduce bank performance. 
The inclusion of more female directors on bank board has been seen as blessing to 
banks and also serve as a way of empowering women to contribute to 
socioeconomic development in many developed countries such as France and 
Germany, so African can benefit from this practice as well to reduce their bank risk 
and improve performance.  
10.3 Research contributions 
This study is distinct from previous studies in general and those who examine bank 
risk, corporate governance and bank performance relationship. This study makes a 
number of new contributions to the extant bank risk, corporate governance and bank 
performance literature.  
First, the study uses an unbalanced panel data of 635 banks from 48 countries from 
2000 to 2016 providing a total of 10795 firm year observations over 17 year period. 
This study provides a very detailed empirical evidence on the impact of bank risk on 
bank performance in Africa; the impact of corporate governance on bank risk in 
Africa; the impact of corporate governance on bank performance in Africa; and the 
joint effect of bank risk and corporate governance on bank performance in Africa. In 
addition, unlike many previous studies, the study does not only use large sample or 
listed banks, all banks including small, medium, large, listed and or unlisted with 
sufficient data were selected for this study. Moreover, unlike the majority of the 
previous studies which include only one country or few countries in their sample, 
banks from 48 countries in Africa are included in this study. Due to the above, the 
findings of this study can be used to generalise bank risk, corporate governance 
and bank performance relationships in Africa.  
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Secondly, unlike the previous studies, this study offers the first time evidence of the 
impact of bank risk on performance using a large sample size and cross country 
study consisting of 48 countries. Consistence with the results of some past studies 
(e.g. Tan and Floros, 2012; Arif and Nauman Anees, 2012; I.Maghyereh and 
Awartani, 2014; Al-Tamimi, et al, 2015; Boadi et al, 2016; Tan et al.; 2017)), the 
findings indicate that bank risk is statistically significant negative relation with bank 
performance in Africa.  
Third, this study offers first time cross-country study in Africa with a large sample 
size involving over 40 countries on the relationship between bank risk and corporate 
governance. In addition, using corporate governance data which was tapped directly 
from banks annual report, the study offers the first time evidence on the relationship 
between corporate governance and bank risk. The findings reveal some evidence 
that corporate governance characteristics affect bank risk in Africa.  
Fourth, this study offers first time cross-country study in Africa with a large sample 
size involving over 40 countries on the relationship between corporate governance 
and bank performance in Africa. The findings show that corporate governance 
characteristics significantly affect bank performance in Africa.  
Fifth, using a cross country studies, this study fills the existing gap within the 
literature by offering the first time evidence on the moderating effect of corporate 
governance on the relationship between bank risk and performance in Africa. The 
results show that corporate governance characteristics moderate the relationship 
between bank risk and bank performance in Africa.  
10.4 Research limitations 
Although the results of this study are fairly robust, it suffers from some weaknesses 
which need to be mentioned. The corporate governance data was extracted 
manually from annual reports of individual banks at the banks websites.  
One, as mentioned earlier, the sample excludes banks with less than five years 
information. These banks were considered as not having enough information to be 
included in the final sample. This may be described as sample selection bias. Two, 
this study may also suffer from omitted variable bias. The study relies on the 
available data during data collection. This means, the model may be over specified 
or under specified. Thus, the variable selected for the study may not be enough or 
were too much. In addition, due to data limitations, using alternative measures of 
  
249 
  
many variables was impossible. Three, in a cross country study like this, bank 
performance may be determined by many other factors which are not included in 
this study. The factors may include culture, population, the number of people in 
employment and political stability. Therefore, corporate governance and bank 
specific variables alone may not be the main determinants of bank performance in 
Africa.  
Four, Corporate governance variables were manually collected from the annual 
reports, and all annual reports were manually downloaded one after the other. This 
made it very time consuming and labour-intensive activity. Corporate governance 
information of some of the banks were not available. The reason is that, the annual 
reports of some banks were either not found or not available at all. In addition, some 
banks either did not provide the detailed corporate governance information in their 
annual reports or did not provide the corporate governance information at all in their 
annual report. Therefore, the corporate governance data was quiet limited. As a 
result, the findings based on corporate governance characteristics may not be a true 
reflection of corporate governance within African banks.  
Overall, a large sample size of 635 banks, which generate a total of 10795 firm-year 
observations, is very significant. Banks from 48 countries in Africa means that at 
least a bank was selected from almost every country in Africa for the study. In 
addition, using data from 2000 to 2016 (17 year span) is also considered as very 
good enough. These make this study a unique cross-country study and therefore 
the results can be trusted. 
10.5 Avenues for future research and improvement 
There are many important avenues for future research and improvement. First, as 
mentioned earlier, due to limited data availability at the time of data collection, this 
study may be subject to omitted variables. Future studies in this area may include 
other determinants of bank risk and bank performance in addition to those examined 
in this research. Specifically, more bank specific, corporate governance 
characteristics and macro-economic factors may be considered in addition to the 
ones examined in this research in order to resolve the issue of omitted variables. 
Second, this study employs only quantitative methodology to do the analysis and 
this can limit how to interpret the results. If possible, future research can add other 
methodologies such as qualitative (for example survey and or interview) to help 
overcome this problem.  
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Third, this study provides the examination of how only internal corporate governance 
characteristics impact on bank performance in Africa. Future studies can examine 
how external corporate governance characteristics such as managerial labour 
market and law impact on bank performance. Four, it will be interesting for future 
research to focus on how risk governance characteristics such as the presence of 
risk committee, risk committee size and the number of risk committee meetings 
affect bank risk and performance in Africa.  
Fifth, as voluntary corporate disclosure can affect bank performance, future studies 
can focus on the examination of the association between corporate disclosure and 
bank performance in Africa. Sixth, this study concentrates only on the examination 
of the impact of risk on bank performance in Africa. Future research can improve 
this study by adding the main factors that cause the major risk to banks in Africa. In 
addition, Future research can examine the main bank risk management strategies 
that can help mitigate the banking risks which will lead to better bank performance 
in Africa.  
Seventh, it is evident that corruption is prevalent in almost every country in Africa in 
addition to political instability in some African countries. As a result, future 
researchers can look at these two major issues (corruption and political instability) 
and examine their impact on the performance of banks in Africa. Finally, this study 
removes many African banks from the final sample because of data unavailability. 
In addition, many banks also either did not provide their corporate governance 
information at all or did not provide enough of their corporate governance 
information in their annual reports. Moreover, some annual reports of many of the 
banks were not found at all. This, in fact, can affect the generalisability of the results 
of this study. Therefore, future studies can combine other methods such as 
questionnaire to tap the information direct from the affected banks to improve the 
generalisability of the findings.  
Eighth, instead of treating African as a monolithic whole, it would be interesting if 
future research considers different African regions (north, south, east and west) 
separately to see whether any significant differences are observed.  
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Appendix 1 
Table 23: Bank Risk and Performance using Zscore As Risk and ROA As 
Performance Measure 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 2SLS GMM 
     
ZSCORE 0.457*** 1.054*** 0.826*** 0.443*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0200) (0.0177) (0.0902) 
 
LNTA -0.0137 -0.0340* -0.0183 -0.00149 
 (0.0175) (0.0183) (0.0160) (0.0379) 
 
EQTA 0.0476*** 0.0648*** 0.0578*** 0.0320** 
 (0.00313) (0.00271) (0.00239) (0.0155) 
 
NLTA -0.0128*** 0.00414** -0.00264* 0.0177 
 (0.00134) (0.00164) (0.00148) (0.0108) 
 
COST -0.0400*** -0.0342*** -0.0379*** -0.0332*** 
 (0.00154) (0.00106) (0.00102) (0.00767) 
 
LNGDP 0.0319*** 0.208** 0.0348 0.430*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0888) (0.0226) (0.101) 
 
COR -0.00465*** -0.00311 -0.00805*** -0.0129* 
 (0.00129) (0.00272) (0.00199) (0.00739) 
 
CRISIS7_8 0.0909 -0.109** -0.0342 -0.0421 
 (0.143) (0.0492) (0.0512) (0.0866) 
 
L.ROA    0.239*** 
    (0.0242) 
Constant 3.209*** -0.527 1.905*** -1.262 
 (0.209) (0.616) (0.225) (1.218) 
     
Observations 6,230 6,230 6,230 5,543 
 
R-squared 0.504 0.589   
Notes: ZSCORE denotes Z-score, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes cost to income 
ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, LNGDP represents 
Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 represents 2007/2008 financial crisis, 
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L.ROA represents lagged of return on assets, ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% 
respectively, Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
 
APENDIX 2 
Table 24: Bank Risk and Performance Using Zscore As Risk And ROE As 
Performance 
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS Fixed effect 2SLS GMM 
     
ZSCORE 4.315*** 11.24*** 8.945*** 3.342*** 
 (0.174) (0.124) (0.121) (0.608) 
 
LNTA 0.599*** -0.00808 -0.0170 0.0385 
 (0.131) (0.115) (0.108) (0.285) 
 
EQTA -0.135*** 0.135*** 0.0515*** 0.0274 
 (0.0139) (0.0169) (0.0163) (0.132) 
 
NLTA -0.129*** 0.0122 -0.0435*** -0.195*** 
 (0.00906) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0712) 
 
COST -0.240*** -0.159*** -0.192*** -0.152** 
 (0.0107) (0.00659) (0.00687) (0.0608) 
 
LNGDP 0.0140 -0.811 0.0955 0.109 
 (0.0806) (0.553) (0.163) (0.685) 
 
COR -0.0333*** -0.00395 -0.0630*** -0.132** 
 (0.00876) (0.0170) (0.0138) (0.0539) 
 
CRISIS7_8 4.584*** -1.126*** -0.205 1.229** 
 (1.007) (0.308) (0.342) (0.611) 
 
L.ROE    0.188*** 
    (0.0206) 
 
Constant 24.95*** 5.467 11.62*** 27.18*** 
 (1.445) (3.836) (1.587) (8.304) 
     
Observations 6,246 6,246 6,246 5,556 
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R-squared 0.515 0.722   
Notes: ZSCORE denotes Z-score, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes cost to income 
ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, LNGDP represents 
Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 represents 2007/2008 financial crisis, 
L.ROE represents lagged on return on equity, ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% 
respectively, Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Appendix 3 
Table 25: Bank Risk and Performance Using Tier 1 As Risk And ROA As 
Performance Measures 
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS  Fixed effect 2SLS GMM 
     
TIER1 0.00855 0.0286*** 0.0244*** 0.0135 
 (0.00682) (0.00603) (0.00509) (0.0158) 
 
LNTA -0.0566* -0.0312 -0.0657** -0.0419 
 (0.0321) (0.0345) (0.0278) (0.0569) 
 
EQTA 0.0293*** 0.0368*** 0.0259*** 0.0297 
 (0.0100) (0.00790) (0.00624) (0.0252) 
 
NLTA -0.00774*** 0.0158*** 0.00621** -0.0423*** 
 (0.00278) (0.00354) (0.00290) (0.00968) 
 
COST -0.0647*** -0.0712*** -0.0681*** -0.0691*** 
 (0.00233) (0.00199) (0.00174) (0.00544) 
 
LNGDP 0.110*** -0.331 0.0940*** 0.315*** 
 (0.0220) (0.216) (0.0331) (0.0869) 
 
COR 0.000964 -0.000765 -0.00101 0.0342*** 
 (0.00246) (0.00630) (0.00343) (0.00747) 
 
CRISIS7_8 0.398* 0.303*** 0.358*** 0.265** 
 (0.233) (0.0849) (0.0838) (0.115) 
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L.ROA    0.176*** 
    (0.0333) 
 
Constant 5.014*** 6.822*** 4.424*** 3.924*** 
 (0.358) (1.618) (0.380) (0.998) 
     
Observations 2,095 2,095 2,095 1,964 
R-squared 0.482 0.453   
Notes: TIER 1 denotes Tier 1 denotes Z-score, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes 
cost to income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, 
LNGDP represents Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 represents 
2007/2008 financial crisis, L.ROA represents lagged of return on assets, ***, **, * indicate significance 
at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
 
Appendix 4 
Table 26: Bank Risk and Performance Using Tier 1 As Risk And ROE As 
Performance Measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 2SLS GMM 
     
TIER1 -0.00994 0.174*** 0.112*** 0.459*** 
 (0.0351) (0.0475) (0.0388) (0.137) 
 
LNTA 0.252 -0.193 -0.479** -0.264 
 (0.251) (0.272) (0.212) (0.414) 
 
EQTA -0.189*** -0.0631 -0.155*** -0.641** 
 (0.0460) (0.0623) (0.0471) (0.256) 
 
NLTA -0.0998*** 0.105*** -0.00201 -0.0532 
 (0.0215) (0.0279) (0.0219) (0.0702) 
 
COST -0.419*** -0.479*** -0.445*** -0.424*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0157) (0.0132) (0.0411) 
 
LNGDP 0.359** -7.109*** 0.349 0.373 
 (0.161) (1.704) (0.232) (0.624) 
  
283 
  
 
COR 0.0423** 0.0716 0.0540** 0.237*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0497) (0.0248) (0.0504) 
 
CRISIS7_8 7.811*** 3.588*** 4.529*** 2.924*** 
 (1.620) (0.669) (0.659) (0.814) 
 
L.ROE    0.0924*** 
    (0.0329) 
 
Constant 40.07*** 84.58*** 38.42*** 31.59*** 
 (2.571) (12.76) (2.759) (7.621) 
     
Observations 2,095 2,095 2,095 1,964 
R-squared 0.437 0.373   
Notes: TIER 1 denotes Tier 1 denotes Z-score, LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes 
cost to income ratio, EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, 
LNGDP represents Gross Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 represents 
2007/2008 financial crisis, L.ROE represents lagged of return on equity, ***, **, * indicate significance 
at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
Appendix 5 
Table 27: Bank Risk and Corporate Governance Using Zscore As Bank Risk 
Measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 2SLS GMM 
     
BSIZE 0.0625*** -0.00101 0.00809 0.0542*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0196) (0.0180) (0.00467) 
 
FEMALE 0.0188*** 0.00241 0.00193 -0.00144 
 (0.00624) (0.00461) (0.00423) (0.00102) 
 
INDEP -0.00402 -0.00212 -0.00230 0.00352*** 
 (0.00363) (0.00242) (0.00227) (0.000652) 
 
DUAL -0.675*** 0.261 0.0541 0.110 
 (0.241) (0.429) (0.341) (0.103) 
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MEETINGS -0.0454* 0.00812 -0.000744 -0.0339*** 
 (0.0253) (0.0181) (0.0170) (0.00447) 
 
LNTA -0.246*** -0.0281 -0.0672** -0.0732*** 
 (0.0569) (0.0300) (0.0265) (0.0122) 
 
EQTA -0.0248*** 0.00227 -0.000324 0.00290** 
 (0.00412) (0.00573) (0.00510) (0.00136) 
 
NLTA 0.0149*** -0.000547 3.57e-05 0.000238 
 (0.00383) (0.00394) (0.00343) (0.000782) 
 
COST -0.0314*** -0.0240*** -0.0252*** -0.00565*** 
 (0.00330) (0.00253) (0.00233) (0.000930) 
 
COR 0.0215*** -0.000424 0.0126** -0.00200*** 
 (0.00379) (0.00825) (0.00521) (0.000733) 
 
LNGDP 0.0179 -0.964*** -0.0144 -0.0312*** 
 (0.0299) (0.336) (0.0589) (0.0100) 
 
CRISIS7_8 0.226 0.626*** 0.716*** 0.410*** 
 (0.482) (0.131) (0.123) (0.0129) 
L.ZSCORE    0.732*** 
    (0.0103) 
Constant 3.736*** 10.35*** 3.539*** 0.872*** 
 (0.610) (2.255) (0.601) (0.133) 
     
Observations 682 682 682 640 
R-squared 0.275 0.247   
Notes: LLPNR denotes loan loss provision/net interest revenue, BSIZE represents board size of the 
bank, INDEP denotes percentage of independent directors, DUAL represents role duality, FEMALE 
denotes the percentage of female directors on bank board, MEETINGS represents the number of 
board meetings per year LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes cost to income ratio, 
EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, LNGDP represents Gross 
Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 represents 2007/2008 financial crisis, 
L.ZSCORE represents lagged of Z-score ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis     
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Appendix 6 
Table 28: Bank Risk and Corporate Governance Using Tier 1 as Risk 
Measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TIER1 TIER1 TIER1 TIER1 
     
BSIZE 0.0421 0.353** 0.129 -0.0320 
 (0.0987) (0.150) (0.121) (0.0195) 
 
FEMALE -0.102** -0.0485 -0.0639** 0.0268*** 
 (0.0517) (0.0382) (0.0325) (0.00570) 
 
INDEP -0.0362** -0.0368* -0.0262 -0.0355*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0211) (0.0178) (0.00246) 
 
DUAL -5.025*** -5.918* -5.679*** 0.734*** 
 (1.351) (3.330) (2.004) (0.262) 
 
MEETINGS 0.347*** 0.128 0.117 0.102*** 
 (0.0983) (0.124) (0.110) (0.0104) 
 
NLTA -0.285 -0.0307 -0.0931 0.781*** 
 (0.384) (0.267) (0.218) (0.0425) 
 
EQTA 0.425*** 0.371*** 0.363*** 0.270*** 
 (0.160) (0.0632) (0.0481) (0.0253) 
 
NLTA -0.222*** -0.269*** -0.226*** -0.136*** 
 (0.0478) (0.0410) (0.0292) (0.00398) 
 
COST -0.0156 -0.0200 0.00261 -0.0649*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0244) (0.0177) (0.00265) 
 
COR 0.0435** 0.0567 0.0297 0.0216*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0726) (0.0268) (0.00281) 
 
LNGDP 0.123 4.177 -0.00853 -0.00887 
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 (0.162) (2.998) (0.254) (0.0540) 
 
CRISIS7_8 -3.429* 0.364 -0.0769 -0.839*** 
 (1.826) (1.178) (1.089) (0.0759) 
 
L.TIER1    0.577*** 
    (0.00557) 
 
Constant 24.64*** -4.509 24.41*** 12.16*** 
 (4.717) (20.78) (3.351) (0.894) 
     
Observations 379 379 379 331 
R-squared 0.409 0.289   
Notes: LLPNR denotes loan loss provision/net interest revenue, BSIZE represents board size of the 
bank, INDEP denotes percentage of independent directors, DUAL represents role duality, FEMALE 
denotes the percentage of female directors on bank board, MEETINGS represents the number of 
board meetings per year LNTA denotes the size of the bank, COST denotes cost to income ratio, 
EQTA denotes equity/total asset, NLTA represents net loans/total assets, LNGDP represents Gross 
Domestic product, COR denotes corruption, CRISIS7_8 represents 2007/2008 financial crisis, 
L.TIER1 represents lagged of Tier1 ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis     
 
